浅析工程项目责任成本的二次分解

目前在施工企业实施的项目责任成本管理是有效控制成本、提高经济效益的有效途径。但在实际工作中,责任预算指标下达后,将责任成本指标在项目作业层面进行二次分解成为责任成本管理推进的关键。本文主要从业务层面对责任成本的二次分解的意义、原则及业务流程等方面进行了粗浅的探讨,希望在施工企业项目责任成本管理的推进、最终提高项目管理效益等方面有所帮助。     

浅谈工程项目的责任成本控制与合同管理

作为施工企业,在激烈的市场竞争中获取工程任务并依托项目取得最大效益是其作为独立法人的本质表现,建立以责任承包合同为纽带,以施工项目部、作业层、项目部内各职能部门及分包商等各级单位和个人为责任中心,明确各自的“责、权、利”关系的成本管理,推行项目成本管理责任制和项目成本核算制为主要内容的项目管理,是增强企业实力、拓展经营领域、提高经济利益的有效手段。     

实现目标成本 强化过程控制是关键

面对激烈的市场竞争,施工企业如何在低价中标的压力下实现经济效益是企业健康发展的关键,而项目成本中人财物等生产要素贯穿在施工生产过程的始终,如何控制项目的目标成本是实现经济效益,保证企业健康持续发展的根本所在。本文就工程项目的目标成本过程控制问题谈几点粗浅认识。一、切实可行的责任成本指标、科学合理的控制措施,是做好目标成本管理的基础当工程中标后,企业应及时组织有关人员对项目进行总体评估,测算并确定项目的责任成本、上交的各项税费和目标利润指标。工作内容主要包括以下几个方面:1.确定责任成本编制依据。责任成本编…     

建筑工程项目成本管理的几点做法

项目成本管理水平不仅直接决定着项目的经济效益,而且最终影响到企业经济效益最大化目标的实现。因而加强项目成本控制是实现项目效益最大化的基本保障,是施工企业财务管理的重要组成部分。我们针对前几年存在的组织层次多,管理粗放,成本观念淡薄,费用开支无约束等问题,将项目部作为成本控制中心,以贯彻落实责任成本管理为切入点,狠抓成本费用组成的四项重点(劳、材、机、费),建立了四项制度,坚持了四项原则。几年来的实践表明,这些制度和措施对提高施工企业经济效益发挥了积极作用。 一、四项制度 1.管理目标责任合同制。为满足业主对企业的合同要求,兑现投标承诺,公司在每项工程中标上场前,都要签订《项目管理目标责任书》,把项目工期、质量、安全、上交款、经费开支等指标以合同的形式写进责任书内,并将     

项目成本管理的几点做法

项目成本控制是施工企业财务管理的重要组成部分.公司针对前几年存在的组织层次多,管理粗放,成本观念淡薄,费用开支无约束等问题,将项目部作为成本控制中心,以贯彻落实责任成本管理为切入点,狠抓成本费用组成的四项重点(劳、材、机、费),建立了四项制度,坚持四项原则.实践表明,这些制度和措施对提高企业经济效益发挥了积极作用.     

项目成本管理的几点做法

项目成本控制是施工企业财务管理的重要组成部分.公司针对前几年存在的组织层次多,管理粗放,成本观念淡薄,费用开支无约束等问题,将项目部作为成本控制中心,以贯彻落实责任成本管理为切入点,狠抓成本费用组成的四项重点(劳、材、机、费),建立了四项制度,坚持四项原则.实践表明,这些制度和措施对提高企业经济效益发挥了积极作用.……     

浅谈工程建设项目成本控制

影响工程建设项目成本控制的因素众多,但其中项目决策、设计、施工和采购阶段的影响重大。本文通过对上述关键因素的分析,结合实际案例,论述如何有效开展工程建设项目的成本控制。     

企业社会责任与财务绩效之间交互跨期影响实证研究

本文以我国2007-2011年沪市A股上市公司为研究样本,通过尝试建立企业社会责任综合评价指数和剔除盈余管理之后的财务绩效指标,运用系统GMM方法,实证分析了企业社会责任与财务绩效之间的交互跨期影响。研究结果表明,滞后一期的社会责任对当期财务绩效有显著正向影响,当期财务绩效对当期社会责任有显著正向影响。这些研究结论对我们深入理解企业社会责任与财务绩效的关系,对企业提高社会责任意识,自觉履行社会责任具有一定的启示意义。     

施工企业施工项目成本控制现状及改进策略研究

随着社会经济的发展,城市化进程越来越快,工程项目越来越多,施工企业得到了蓬勃发展。在施工企业的管理过程中项目成本控制具有重要的地位,就目前来看,施工企业在进行施工项目成本控制过程当中存在着一些问题,影响了成本控制工作成效的发挥,使得施工成本偏高。在当前形势之下,施工企业要想实现长远发展,就必须要加强对项目成本的控制。本文从施工项目成本控制着手,分析施工企业施工项目成本控制的现状,探究有效的改进策略。     

关于电力施工企业成本控制的探索

电力施工企业成本控制,是电力施工企业根据一定时期预先建立的成本管理目标,由成本控制责任主体在其职权范围内,在生产耗费发生以前和成本控制过程中,对各种影响成本的因素和条件采取的一系列预防和调节措施,以保证成本管理目标实现的管理行为.本文对电力施工企业的成本控制进行了探索.     

Assessing the interaction effect of cost control systems and information technology integration on manufacturing plant financial performance

The interface between management control and information technology is an under-developed research area with a knowledge gap concerning its implications for financial performance. This study contributes to bridging this gap by investigating the interaction effect of cost control systems and information technology integration on manufacturing plant financial performance. We surveyed a sample of 518 managers of U.S. manufacturing plants, approximately evenly distributed between those using activity-based costing and volume-based costing. Using hierarchical regression analyses, results indicate that while information technology integration and cost control systems do not provide significant independent effects on plant financial performance, they do interact to positively impact manufacturing plant financial performance. Thus, our findings suggest that manufacturing plants will reap the greatest financial performance benefits from investments in activity-based cost control systems when combined with information technology integration.     

MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP,TAKEOVER DEFENSES,AND DEBT FINANCING

We examine the effect of agency conflicts on debt financing and show that managerial ownership and its interaction with takeover defenses affect these decisions. We find that (1) the relation between leverage and takeover defenses becomes insignificant when we control for the interaction of these defenses with managerial ownership, and (2) firms with large managerial ownership operate at high debt levels unless they have a large number of takeover defenses. Therefore, a two‐dimensional aspect of governance that includes the interaction between managerial ownership and takeover defenses is useful in understanding the effect of agency conflicts on firms' debt financing decisions.     

供应链成本控制:价值引擎与方法集成

本文以伙伴关系与信息共享为基础,分析了供应链成本控制中关系性租金和跨组织学习两种价值引擎。从时间序列、空间范围、流程深化三个角度,论证了全生命周期成本控制、跨组织成本控制、协同价值链分析三个供应链成本控制概念对各种成本控制方法的拓展与集成。在当前条件下,以伙伴关系为基础,加强成员间的信息共享与跨组织学习,开展供应链集成成本控制,有利于提升供应链竞争力。     

Activity-Based Pricing in a Monopoly

In this article, I study the interaction between cost accounting systems and pricing decisions in a setting where a monopolist sells a base product and related support services to customers whose preference for support services is known only to them. I consider two pricing mechanisms—activity‐based pricing (ABP) and traditional pricing—and two cost‐accounting systems—activity‐based costing (ABC) and traditional costing, for support services. Under traditional pricing, only the base product is priced, whereas support services are provided free because detailed cost‐driver volume information on the consumption of support services by each customer is unavailable. Under ABP, customers pay based on the quantities consumed of both the base product and the support services because detailed cost‐driver volume information is available for each customer. Likewise, under traditional costing for support services the firm makes pricing decisions on cost signals that are noisier than they are under ABC. I compare the equilibrium quantities of the base product and support services sold, the information rent paid to the customers, and the expected profits of the monopolist under all four combinations of cost‐driver volume and cost‐driver rate information. I show that ABP helps reduce control problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems, for the supplier and increases the supplier's ability to engage in price discrimination. I show that firms are more likely to adopt ABP when their customer base is more diverse, their customer support costs are more uncertain, their costing system has lower measurement error, and the variable costs of providing customer support are higher. Firms adopt ABC when their cost‐driver rates for support services under traditional costing are noisier measures of actual costs relative to their cost‐driver rates under ABC and when the actual costs of support services are inherently uncertain. I also show that cost‐driver rate information and cost‐driver volume information for support services are complements. Although the prior literature views ABC and activity‐based management (ABM) as facilitating better decision making, I show that ABC and ABP (a form of ABM) are useful tools for addressing control problems in supply chains.     

When are outside directors effective?

This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases when outsiders are added to the board, and when the cost of information is high, performance worsens when outsiders are added to the board. The estimates provide some of the cleanest estimates to date that board independence matters, and the finding that board effectiveness depends on information cost supports a nascent theoretical literature emphasizing information asymmetry. We also find that firms compose their boards as if they understand that outsider effectiveness varies with information costs.     

The effects of organic and mechanistic control in exploratory and exploitative innovations

This study investigates the indirect effects of mechanistic and organic types of control on project performance acting through innovativeness in exploratory and exploitative innovation projects. It also examines the interaction effect of these controls on performance. The research model is empirically tested with survey data from 119 projects in various project organizations, using Partial Least Squares (PLS) with controls for the size of the project and task uncertainty. The results illustrate that organic control, acting through innovativeness on project performance is an important form of control in exploratory innovations, and also enhances performance in exploitative innovations. In addition, the results indicate that the interaction effect of organic and mechanistic control types enhances performance in both exploratory and exploitative innovation projects, suggesting a complementary effect. The findings are discussed in relation to theory and their managerial implications.     

Firm R&D and financial analysis: How do they interact?

This paper demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that firms’ research and development (R&D) efforts and investors’ analyses of their prospects are mutually reinforcing. Entrepreneurs attempt more research when financiers are better informed about projects’ profitability because they expect financiers to provide more funding to successful projects. Conversely, financiers collect more information about projects when entrepreneurs undertake more R&D because the opportunity cost of missing out on successful projects is then higher. Two natural experiments confirm that this interaction occurs and suggest that it contributes to about one third of the total effect of a policy designed to stimulate R&D. Overall, the analysis suggests that policies aimed at promoting R&D – such as research subsidies or tax breaks – have a multiplier effect owing to the induced improvement in capital efficiency. As a result, those policies can be rendered more effective by coupling them with other policies designed to increase capital efficiency. The feedback effect that we document also helps explaining why innovative ecosystems such as that in the Silicon Valley are challenging to set up.     

高铁时空压缩效应与公司权益资本成本——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

以往文献大多集中于交通基础设施对一国或地区宏观经济的影响,而较少关注其对资本市场的作用。本文基于信息不对称视角,考察了高铁开通改变地理距离的时空约束后如何影响公司权益资本成本。以2007—2018年A股上市公司为样本,本文研究发现,上市公司所在地开通高铁后,由于内外信息不对称程度的降低,公司权益资本成本显著下降。该现象受到一系列公司特征的影响,与多数投资者聚集地距离越远、业务复杂度越高的公司,权益资本成本受高铁开通影响而下降得更明显。进一步的研究表明,高铁开通后公司股票流动性的提升及信息披露质量的提高是影响权益资本成本的重要路径。     

The effect of cost information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings

We investigate the influence of total cost of ownership (TCO) information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on social exchange theory and recent literature on information processing, we expect that buyers with detailed TCO information and less power than their negotiation partners may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information, whereas more powerful buyers do not seem to be able to profit from TCO information. These somewhat counterintuitive findings are explained through detailed analysis of the buyer’s negotiation behavior, which shows that less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data use problem solving techniques more frequently than powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive bargaining techniques instead. We conclude that power can motivate a failure to share TCO information, resulting in less effective interfirm negotiation outcomes.     

Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.