浅谈政府控制、市场环境与会计稳健性

政府控制和市场环境对会计稳健性有着深远的影响,笔者在实证分析我国2007-2009年沪深股市上市公司的会计信息的基础上来探讨三者之间的关系,并得出以下结论:中央政府控制的上市公司的会计稳健性高于地方政府控制的公司;市场环境越好,政府所控制的上市公司的会计稳健性越高;减少政府控制,改善市场环境有利于提高政府控制公司的会计信息质量。     

浅谈政府控制、市场环境与会计稳健性

政府控制和市场环境对会计稳健性有着深远的影响,笔者在实证分析我国2007-2009年沪深股市上市公司的会计信息的基础上来探讨三者之间的关系,并得出以下结论:中央政府控制的上市公司的会计稳健性高于地方政府控制的公司;市场环境越好,政府所控制的上市公司的会计稳健性越高;减少政府控制,改善市场环境有利于提高政府控制公司的会计信息质量。     

环境不确定性、多元化经营与权益资本成本

以2009~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为研究样本,检验环境不确定性及多元化经营对公司权益资本成本的影响。研究发现,环境不确定性越高则公司的权益资本成本也越高,同时在高环境不确定性背景下,多元化经营将有助于缓解环境不确定性与权益资本成本之间的正相关关系;进一步,对于政府控制公司,多元化经营能够更显著地降低环境不确定性所导致的代理问题,并且若其所处地区政府干预程度较低,则多元化经营缓解环境不确定性与权益资本成本之间正相关关系的作用越大。     

制度环境对债务期限结构的影响研究

本文将制度环境与产权性质纳入到对公司债务期限结构研究的统一分析框架,深入研究了我国各地区制度环境的差异对债务期限结构的影响以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间存在的差异。研究发现:市场化程度高的地区具有相对短的债务期限结构;而政府干预能够帮助公司获取较长期限的贷款,政府干预程度与公司债务期限结构显著正相关;在金融发展水平较高的地区,银行更倾向于发放较多的短期贷款来约束上市公司;法律环境的改善会降低公司债务期限结构;与非国有控制公司相比,制度环境的改善对国有控制公司债务期限结构的负向影响相对更大。     

制度环境、产权性质与资本结构

以沪、深两市2004-2009年上市公司为研究对象,将制度环境与产权性质纳入统一分析框架,深入研究了我国各地区制度环境差异对公司资本结构的影响以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间的差异。研究表明:市场化程度高的地区具有相对较低的负债水平,而政府部门能够通过行政干预帮助公司获取银行贷款,政府干预程度与资产负债率显著正相关;随着法律环境的改善,公司倾向于降低资产负债率水平;相对于非国有控制公司,在国有控制公司,市场化程度、法律环境对资产负债率的负向影响更大,而政府干预程度对资产负债率的正向影响也更大。这一研究结果不仅丰富了国内外学者关于资本结构影响因素的经验研究,而且有助于深入理解我国公司资本结构不合理的制度根源。     

政府控制、治理环境与上市公司过度投资

本文基于中国上市公司的经验数据,对政府控制、治理环境与企业过度投资之间的关系进行了探索,研究结果表明:与非政府控制的上市公司相比,政府控制的上市公司过度投资现象较为严重,且地方政府控制的上市公司更易发生过度投资行为;但公司所处治理环境的改善使过度投资行为得到有效抑制。     

内部控制、应计质量与盈余反应——基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2009年中国A股上市公司为样本,从财务信息内部生产和投资者反应两个视角研究内部控制质量与会计信息质量之间的关系。研究表明:在信息生产方面,高质量的内部控制提高了应计质量;在投资者反应方面,内部控制质量越高,盈余反应系数越大。这证实了内部控制的财务报告目标,也证实了内部控制制度在我国的适用性。我国政府监管部门目前正在积极建立和实施内部控制体系,本文的研究结论为其提供了经验数据支持。     

政府控制层级对公司价值的影响研究——基于A股上市公司的实证研究

中国特有的经济＂双轨制＂决定着上市公司受不同最终控制人的影响,由此造成不同控制性质的公司价值存在差异性。以2007-2011年中国所有A股上市公司作为研究样本,根据实际控制人性质将上市公司细分为非政府控制、县级政府控制、市级政府控制、省级政府控制以及中央政府控制这五种类型,实证分析了不同层级政府控制和非政府控制人对公司价值的影响。实证结果表明,相对于非政府控制上市公司,政府控制的上市公司价值更低,其中市级县级等低层级政府控制的上市公司价值更低。同时也发现政府控制的上市公司比例有显著性下降,说明中国经济主体转向非政府控制经济已初见成效。     

监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量

中国上市公司大股东持股比例相对较高,大股东之间可能存在合谋掏空或监督制衡的关系,为此,以2008~2016年A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东的股权结构对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：相对于只有单一大股东的公司而言,具有多个大股东的公司内部控制质量更高;大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股比例越高、大股东之间股权偏离度越低,公司内部控制质量越高;外国投资者和国有法人大股东能够显著提升公司内部控制质量;多个大股东的治理效应主要体现在非国有企业中,公司所处地区的法律及市场环境越好,多个大股东监督效应对公司内部控制质量的提升作用越明显。     

大股东控制、政府控制层级与公司价值创造

本文着眼于公司价值的边际增量——投资绩效,从相对更短的价值链,研究了大股东控制、政府控制层级在我国上市公司价值创造过程中的作用与效率,以深入探究所有权结构与公司价值关系的迷雾。基于我国上市公司的经验证据发现:不同的所有权结构在公司价值创造中的作用与效率和终极所有权性质密不可分,大股东追求控制权私有收益对市县级政府和非政府所属上市公司的投资收益产生了消极影响。具体而言:市县级政府控制和非政府控制上市公司的投资绩效受到堑壕效应的消极影响,但利益趋同效应仅在非政府控制上市公司中有所显现;股权制衡对市县级政府和非政府控制的上市公司投资绩效有一定的积极作用。     

State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with non-state-owned firms, Chinese state-owned enterprises controlled by province, city, and county governments (local SOEs) are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region (small local auditors). In regions with less developed institutions, SOEs controlled by central government (central SOEs) also have such a tendency. However, the tendency of local and central SOEs to hire small local auditors is attenuated as the institutions develop. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by SOEs’ lack of demand for large or non-local auditors, small local auditors’ superior local knowledge, and SOEs’ collusion incentives.     

终极股东特征、公司多元化与融资约束

理论研究表明公司多元化经营形成的内部资本市场有助于缓解公司所面临的融资约束,不同的终极股东特征可能由于代理问题或由于加强内部资本市场功能而减弱或增强缓解公司融资约束的作用。本文以2004～2009年中国上市公司作为样本,实证考察不同终极股东特征下,非国有控制公司与国有控制公司多元化经营战略缓解公司融资约束的作用是否存在显著差异。实证结果表明当终极股东现金流权与控制权不偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较多时,非国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用显著强于国有控制公司。然而,当终极股东现金流权与控制权偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较少时,国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用并没有显著强于非国有控制公司。     

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.     

Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed companies

By tracing the identity of large shareholders, we group China’s listed companies into those controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), and Private investors. We argue that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, we contend that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test our arguments we investigate the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and Private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG controlled firms are in the middle. The results are consistent with our predictions.     

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value: (1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies; (2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and (3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises (SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.     

产权性质、CFO背景特征与内部控制质量

基于高层梯队理论和社会网络理论,以2008-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证考察CFO背景特征对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：CFO的年龄越大、任期越长,内部控制质量越低;CFO的学历越高,内部控制质量越高;女性CFO较男性CFO在内部控制建设方面存在相对劣势;CFO外部兼职有助于提升内部控制质量。进一步研究发现：在国有企业和非国有企业中,CFO背景特征对内部控制质量的影响存在显著的差异。     

Government assisted earnings management in China

As the socialist system in China embraces the market economy, it has created many conflicts of interests and collusion between firms and different layers of governments. The central government in China sets regulations to ensure the quality of firms listed in the capital market, while local governments engage in inter-jurisdictional competition for more capital, and their interests are aligned with listed firms through the stringent IPO quota system. This paper examines how local governments in China help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. We find that local governments provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings above the regulatory threshold of rights offering and delisting. Moreover, this collusion between government and listed firms in earnings management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments.     

Crossing the River by Touching Stones?: The Reform of Corporate Ownership in China

The privatization of Chinese enterprises in a low-legal-protection environment raises the question as to how minority shareholders are assured that their capital will not be expropriated. This paper sheds some light on this issue by examining the influence of controlling shareholders on the corporate performance of listed firms from 1997 to 2006. The first main finding is that firms controlled by local governments are more valuable to minority shareholders, whereas firms controlled by individuals are less valuable. The second main finding is that the post-WTO-accession relinquishment of control from local governments to private shareholders appears to have reduced corporate performance.     

政府控制对审计质量的双重影响

本文从上市公司和会计事务所的产权性质与区域属性的角度,研究了政府控制对审计质量的影响。研究发现,国有企业和本地会计事务所审计的公司的盈余管理水平较低;而较低的盈余管理水平能够降低审计师出具非标意见的概率;同时,国有企业在控制了盈余管理水平的情况下,其得到非标意见的概率相对要低。研究结果表明,政府控制对审计质量的影响具有双重性:一方面,政府控制增强了会计事务所的"本土知识"优势和抵御公司压力的能力,进而提高了公司报表质量;另一方面,政府控制依据它对审计市场的控制降低了出具非标意见的概率,损害了审计质量。     

Political connections,tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2007, we find that private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without such managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers underperform those without such managers. Moreover, we find that private firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers are prone to more severe over-investment problems. Our study reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies on the effect of political connections on firm performance.