Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs

Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self‐dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex ante RPTs, transactions that predate a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin's Q whereas ex post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.     

On the DuPont analysis in the health care industry

Prior research documents that the DuPont components of return on net operating assets (profit margin and asset turnover) represent an incremental source of information about the operating characteristics of a firm and are useful tools for market participants (Soliman, 2008). We find that the informativeness of DuPont components about future profitability is reduced in the healthcare setting, relative to an all-industry sample. Moreover, to the extent that DuPont components are useful for market participants, we show that profit margin is more persistent than asset turnover for US for-profit health care providers, which contradicts the results documented in prior literature that considered all industries. We argue that the special features of the health care industry (i.e. heavy regulation, unique operational characteristics) affect the information content of accounting signals obtained based on financial statements.     

Ex‐Dividend Profitability and Institutional Trading Skill

We use institutional trading data to examine whether skilled institutions exploit positive abnormal ex‐dividend returns. Results show that institutions concentrate trading around certain ex‐dates, and earn higher profits around these events. Dividend capture trades represent 6% of all institutional buy trades but contribute 15% of overall abnormal returns. Institutional dividend capture trading is persistent. Institutional ex‐day profitability is also strongly cross‐sectionally related to trade execution skill. The relation between execution skill and profits disappears around placebo non‐ex‐days. Results suggest that skilled institutions target certain opportunities rather than benefiting uniformly over time. Furthermore, only skilled institutions can profit from dividend capture.     

我国投资银行业市场结构、规模与绩效实证研究

本文的实证研究表明,市场结构、行业规模以及市场整体收益率对我国投资银行业的利润率有着很强的解释能力,三个因素对于净资产收益率的解释能力超过98%。从影响的相对水平来看,集中度的影响要大于市场收益的影响,规模的影响与集中度、市场收益的影响相反。进一步研究还表明,尽管行业资产规模与净资产收益率的时间序列显示随着行业资产规模的增加,我国证券公司的净资产收益率呈现出不断下降的特征,但这并不意味着我国投资银行业是规模不经济的。有关规模经济的横截面分析数据表明,现阶段我国证券公司的规模与其绩效之间并不存在着明显的关系,既没有显示出规模不经济,也没有显示出规模经济。     

The Empirical Average Cost of Capital: A New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Corporate Funds

The authors develop a new way to measure the cost of capital, called the empirical average cost of capital (or “EACC”), which is consistent with existing methods of calculating the weighted average cost of capital, but uses information from the firm's financial statements and requires fewer and less subjective inputs. The authors’ model relies on the concept of economic profit while using data from the period 1990‐2012 on net operating profits and total capital to estimate the EACC at both the individual company and industry‐wide levels. Estimates of the EACC and rolling quarterly forecasts of future net operating profits for a single company, McDonald's, for its related industry, and for 57 other U.S. industries are compared to five conventional “textbook” estimates of the weighted average cost of capital published by Ibbotson Associates. The authors find that the EACC yields forecasts of future net operating profit after taxes that compare favorably to those of the five published measures of the weighted average cost of capital, as well as the average and median of these measures.     

Testing the growth option theory: the profitability of enhanced momentum strategies in Australia

Recent literature relates growth option theory to various return regularities. Sagi and Seasholes (2007) (S&S) develop a model that explains momentum profitability using growth option theory. We test the model’s predictions in the Australian market by examining three momentum strategies. Two of these strategies examine the profitability of momentum strategies conditioned on stocks characteristics, whereas the third conditions on previous market returns. Our results are largely supportive of the S&S model. As predicted by S&S, the two strategies that use firm‐specific characteristics yield a higher profit than a simple momentum strategy. The third strategy that conditions on the previous market return also leads to differences in momentum profitability between bull and bear markets, but these differences are small and largely insignificant.     

Profit pools: a fresh look at strategy

In charting strategy, many managers focus on revenue growth, assuming that profits will follow. But that approach is dangerous: today's deep revenue pool may become tomorrow's dry hole. To create strategies that result in profitable growth, managers need to look beyond revenues to see the shape of their industry's profit pool. The authors define an industry's profit pool as the total profits earned at all points along the industry's value chain. Although the concept is simple, the structure of a profit pool is usually quite complex. The pool will be deeper in some segments of the value chain than in others, and depths will vary within an individual segment as well. Segment profitability may, for example, vary widely by customer group, product category, geographic market, and distribution channel. Moreover, the pattern of profit concentration in an industry will often be very different from the pattern of revenue concentration. The authors describe how successful companies have gained competitive advantage by developing sophisticated profit-pool strategies. They explain how U-Haul identified new sources of profit in the consumer-truck-rental industry; how Merck reached beyond its traditional value-chain role to protect its profits in the pharmaceuticals industry; how Dell rebounded from a misguided channel decision by refocusing on its traditional source of profit; and how Anheuser-Busch made a series of astute product, pricing, and operating decisions to dominate the beer industry's profit pool. The companies with the best understanding of their industry's profit pool, the authors argue, will be in the best position to thrive over the long term.     

Gains from Disaggregation and the Definition of a Segment: A Note on SSAP 25

The role of line of business segment disclosure is examined in a setting in which disaggregated data is a means of mapping analysts' specialist expertise concerning the future profitability of the industry, to the consolidated profit forecast of the individual firm. Using this analysis, we show formally that relevant segmental disclosure requires that the management of a company define segments in such a way that users (and, in particular, analysts) can use their specialist forecasting expertise. We show that, unless segments are so defined, consolidated profit alone is a sufficient disclosure. This means that appropriate reportable segments may not necessarily coincide with the company's organisational structure, which is unlikely to be determined solely by factors relating to forecasting efficiency. We also provide a rationale for different types of segmental information. Measures of segmental activity enable the expected performance of the industry to be mapped to the individual firm; but using these measures alone assumes that the segment profitability mirrors its industry. The additional disclosure of segmental profit allows this mapping to be varied according to the segment's position in relation to its industry norm.     

WHAT'S IN A NAME? A CAUTIONARY TALE OF PROFITABILITY ANOMALIES AND LIMITS TO ARBITRAGE

The recent literature investigating profitability anomalies defines profitability in various ways (i.e., gross, operating, and cash based). We show that limits to arbitrage are associated with returns of gross and cash-based operating profitability anomalies, suggesting mispricing. In contrast, returns from the operating profitability strategy have no relation with barriers to arbitrage and exhibit no evidence of mispricing. Additionally, we show that the differential effects of limited arbitrage-related mispricing of gross and cash-based operating profitability anomalies are attributable to their respective correlations with selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expense and accruals anomalies. We find that SG&A return predictability, like that of accruals, is related to limits to arbitrage. These findings suggest that investors and researchers should proceed with caution when searching for return predictability by redefining profitability measures.     

The Cost of Debt

We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.     

基于DFA方法的中国财险业盈利能力分析

我国财险业在过去十年问发展迅速,但保费收入的增加并没有显著提高财险公司的盈利能力。如何提高企业盈利能力,优化经营效率的提高是财险业持续健康发展的根本。本文尝试建立我国财险行业经营活动的动态财务分析模型,运用Crystal ball软件模拟了未来五年财险行业净利润相关财务指标的变化趋势。本文的实证研究表明股权投资、基金投...     

The other side of value: The gross profitability premium

Profitability, measured by gross profits-to-assets, has roughly the same power as book-to-market predicting the cross section of average returns. Profitable firms generate significantly higher returns than unprofitable firms, despite having significantly higher valuation ratios. Controlling for profitability also dramatically increases the performance of value strategies, especially among the largest, most liquid stocks. These results are difficult to reconcile with popular explanations of the value premium, as profitable firms are less prone to distress, have longer cash flow durations, and have lower levels of operating leverage. Controlling for gross profitability explains most earnings related anomalies and a wide range of seemingly unrelated profitable trading strategies.     

Bank profitability and the business cycle

An important element of the macro-prudential analysis is the study of the link between business cycle fluctuations and banking sector profitability and how this link is affected by institutional and structural characteristics. This work estimates a set of equations for net interest income, non-interest income, operating costs, provisions, and profit before taxes, for banks in the main industrialized countries and evaluates the effects on banking profitability of shocks to both macroeconomic and financial factors. Distinguishing mainly the euro area from Anglo-Saxon countries, the analysis also identifies differences in the resilience of the respective banking systems and relates them to the characteristics of their financial structure.     

Trend‐Following Trading Strategies in U.S. Stocks: A Revisit

We show that previous findings regarding the profitability of trend‐following trading rules over intermediate horizons in futures markets also extend to individual U.S. stocks. Portfolios formed using technical indicators such as moving average or channel ratios, without employing cross‐sectional rankings of any kind, tend to perform about as well as the more commonly examined momentum strategies. The profitability of these strategies appears significant, both statistically and economically, through 2007, but evidence of profitability vanishes after 2007. Market‐state dependence, while clearly present, does not explain the post‐2007 reduction in returns to these strategies.     

The Post‐Cost Profitability of Momentum Trading Strategies: Further Evidence from the UK

This paper examines the post‐cost profitability of momentum trading strategies in the UK over the period 1988–2003 and provides direct evidence on stock concentration, turnover and trading cost associated with the strategy. We find that after factoring out transaction costs the profitability of the momentum strategy disappears for shorter horizons but remains for longer horizons. Indeed, for ranking and holding periods up to 6‐months, profitable momentum returns would not be available to most average investors as the cost of implementation outweighs the possible returns. However, we find post‐cost profitability for ranking and/or holding periods beyond 6 months as portfolio turnover and its associated cost reduces. We find similar results for a sub‐sample of relatively large and liquid stocks.     

Preserving Value through Adaptation to Climate Change

Corporate “mitigation” efforts to limit greenhouse gases alone will not be sufficient to protect companies against future environmental impacts. For most companies intent on preserving their operating efficiency and value, “adaptation”—the process of changing behavior in response to actual or expected climate change impacts—is emerging as a critical partner to mitigation efforts aimed at reducing the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The recent growth in the expected costs associated with the risk of climate change emphasizes the importance of developing new technology and redesigning infrastructure and other assets that will enable companies to respond to such change without excessive reductions in profitability. The nature and extent of adaptation in each situation will depend on the costs involved relative to the benefits of adopting different adaptation strategies to achieve a target level of resilience. Companies that choose to adapt and do so effectively are expected to benefit from an improvement in their net risk‐return profile. Consistent with this expectation, the authors found that a sample of companies from the European energy sector that adapted to the 2005 EU climate change mandate by diversifying their fuel sources (mainly away from coal) experienced reductions in both risk and return while non‐adapting firms experienced roughly the same returns, but at the cost of higher risk. The benefit of adapting is thus seen as showing up not in higher returns per se, but in higher risk‐adjusted returns.     

Can representativeness heuristic traders survive in a competitive securities market?

The literature views aggressive trading behavior as the key for representativeness heuristic traders to survive in competition with rational traders. This paper provides another reason. That is, in this dynamic model of a competitive securities market, representativeness heuristic traders can derive more expected profit from the misvaluations (created by noise traders) than can rational traders. Consequently, the expected profit for heuristic traders can be bigger than that for rational traders. If traders' types replicate according to the profitability of the strategies, heuristic traders can survive or even drive out rational traders.     

Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in monitoring managers’ investment decisions

Watts (2003), among others, argues that conservatism helps in corporate governance by mitigating agency problems associated with managers’ investment decisions. We hypothesize that if conservatism reduces managers’ex ante incentives to take on negative net present value projects and improves the ex post monitoring of investments, firms with more conservative accounting ought to have higher future profitability and lower likelihood (and magnitude) of future special items charges. Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms with more conservative accounting have (i) higher future cash flows and gross margins and (ii) lower likelihood and magnitude of special items charges than firms with less conservative accounting.     

Exits,Performance, and Late Stage Private Equity: the Case of UK Management Buy‐outs

Using a hand‐collected dataset of 1,225 buy‐outs, we examine post buy‐out and post exit long term abnormal operating performance of UK management buy‐outs, during the period 1980–2009. Our univariate and panel data analysis of post buy‐out performance conclusively show positive changes in output. We also find strong evidence for improvements in employment and output and a lack of significant changes in efficiency and profitability following initial public offerings (IPO) exits. IPOs from the main London Stock Exchange (LSE) market outperform their counterparts from the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) only in terms of changes in output. For secondary management buy outs (SMBOs), performance declines during the first buy‐out but in the second buy‐out performance stabilises until year three, after which profitability and efficiency fall while employment increases. Although private equity (PE) backed buy‐outs do not exhibit either post buy‐out or post exit underperformance, they fail to over‐perform their non‐PE backed counterparts. In the subsample of buy‐outs exiting via IPOs on the AIM, PE firms do not outperform non‐PE buy‐outs. Our findings highlight the importance of tracing the overall performance of buy‐outs over a longer period and controlling for sample selection bias related to the provision of PE backing.     

Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden

The traditional U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy process in which financial claims are renegotiated under court protection and the firm continues to operate under existing management has long been criticized by economists as an inefficient way of dealing with financially distressed companies. In this paper, the authors make the case for a mandatory auction bankruptcy system of the kind now used in Sweden—one that requires all companies filing for Chapter 11 to be sold in open auctions soon after the filing. After discussing the notable features of and differences between the U.S. and Swedish bankruptcy systems, the authors summarize recent research (much of it their own) on the benefits and possible drawbacks of the Swedish system. Among the most notable findings of this research, there is no evidence that mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden lead to “fire‐sale” discounts in auction premiums. Moreover, the fact that three‐quarters of the Swedish companies that filed for bankruptcy survived as going concerns should allay concerns that an auction system will produce excessive liquidations. At the same time, the post‐bankruptcy operating profitability of the companies that emerge from Swedish auctions as going concerns tends to be on a par with that of their (non‐bankrupt) industry peers. Such post‐operating performance, when combined with a 75% rate of reorganization (versus liquidation), suggests that allowing auction investors—instead of the bankruptcy court—decide which companies survive and how they get capitalized and restructured has been quite effective in accomplishing the two aims of a bankruptcy system: (1) preserving intact all economically viable enterprises while (2) eliminating the excess capacity that results from prolonging the existence of companies that are never expected to earn high enough returns on capital to attract private investment. Consistent with these findings, the U.S. in recent years has seen a sharp increase in the use of auctions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, though on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. Such a change reflects the growing recognition of the role of auction processes in reducing bankruptcy costs and preserving going‐concern values as U.S. capital market participants push harder for private workouts, “prepackaged” Chapter 11 filings, and auction sales in Chapter 11.