When fund management skill is more valuable?

Does fund management skill allow managers to identify mispriced securities more accurately and thereby make better portfolio choices resulting in superior fund performance when noise trading – a natural setting to detect skill – is more prevalent? We find skilled fund managers with superior past performance to generate persistent excess risk‐adjusted returns and experience significant capital inflows, especially in high sentiment times, high stock dispersion, and economic expansion states when price signals are noisier. This pattern persists after we control for lucky bias, using the ‘false discovery rate’ approach, which permits disentangling manager ‘skill’ from ‘luck.’     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

Benchmarking benchmarks: measuring characteristic selectivity using portfolio holdings data

This study proposes methodological adjustments to the widely adopted performance benchmarking methodology of Daniel et al. (1997 ) as a means of improving the precision of alpha measurement for active equity fund managers. We achieve this by considering the monthly updating of characteristic benchmarks and to ensure neutrality to the Standard & Poor's/Australian Stock Exchange 300 index. Applying this benchmark to a representative sample of active Australian equity funds and simulated passive portfolios that mimic fund manager‐style characteristics, we find statistically different and lower tracking error compared with using the standard characteristic benchmark methodology. We also find evidence that the modified benchmark statistically infers an alpha closer to zero compared with the standard benchmark methodology. Our findings suggest that improved specifications of characteristic benchmarks represent better methods in quantifying fund manager skill.     

Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill

We propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market. We find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. Moreover, the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions. These fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund's market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms. The measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance.     

Fund Manager Allocation

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Do funds selected by managers’ skills perform better?

We construct a simple intuitive rating mechanism to evaluate stock picking and market timing skills of equity and hybrid equity fund managers in China. We find that both our skill-rated 5-star (SR-5S) fund and the Morningstar 5-star (MS-5S) fund portfolios outperform the market. The SR-5S fund portfolio outperforms its counterpart MS-5S portfolio in most situations, depending on whether portfolio performance is measured by the abnormal returns of the CAPM model, the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) model, the Carhart four-factor (CH4) model and the Fama-French five-factor (FF5) model. Both market timing skill and stock picking skill affect the performance difference between the SR-5S fund and MS-5S fund portfolios. Additionally, the departure of a SR-5S or MS-5S fund manager is associated with fund performance declines, and the declines in performance for SR-5S funds are generally larger than the declines for the MS-5S funds.     

Risk-taking and performance of government bond mutual funds

This paper investigates the risk exposures of government bond mutual funds and how risk-taking behavior affects fund performance. Government bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark bond indexes before but not after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that the risk-taking behavior of fund managers helps to explain the different performances of government bond funds with and without controlling for the risk factors. Our results suggest that risk-taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal risk periods but lower returns in high risk periods, suggesting that fund managers consistently take risky bets in fund management. We further show that the risk-taking of government bond funds is persistent and that investors typically have no ability to differentiate between the skill and risk components of fund performance. These findings suggest why fund managers have incentives to take consistently risky positions.     

Manager characteristics: Predicting fund performance

A great deal of research effort has sought to understand whether fund managers have skill. However, most of this research draws inferences from fund returns attributable to funds that may have been managed by many different managers over the years. In this paper we focus on the fund manager. We put together a comprehensive data base of manager returns, including a time series of managers' career returns, concatenating performance from the different funds that a manager may have managed over time. We relate these returns to the characteristics of the managers as we seek to understand whether these characteristics have an impact on: manager skill; manager style; and on performance persistence.     

The timing ability and global performance of Tunisian mutual fund managers: A multivariate GARCH approach

It is well-established in the financial literature that the global performance of mutual fund managers is the result of two skills: selectivity and market timing. This paper examines whether the multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) approach improves our perception of the global performance of fund managers compared with the unconditional approach and the conditional approach based on instruments. We find strong evidence that the multivariate GARCH method makes mutual fund performance looks better relative to the existent approaches, but this improvement in the global performance does not mean necessarily that mutual funds outperform traditional benchmarks. Indeed, mixed mutual funds yield neutral performance relative to benchmarks, whereas bond mutual funds generate significant positive global coefficients. The strong performance of bond fund managers comes from their ability to pick profitable bonds, not from their ability to time the market. Also, the empirical tests highlight that the best (worst) bond funds in the past remain at the top (bottom) of the ranking in the following years. These findings suggest that the Tunisian bond market presents strong opportunities for sophisticated investors.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Pension fund manager skills over the economic cycle: the (non-)specialization cost

We study whether pension fund managers, as professionals of important social and financial products, are able to add value for their clients and adapt to economic changes. To this end, we analyze the performance and skills (market timing and stock picking) over the economic cycle from both pension fund and manager perspectives. This double analysis allows examining whether skills reside in managers and/or funds and control for manager substitutions. Despite the long-term nature of pension funds, we find that both fund and manager skills vary with market conditions, showing better evidence of stock-picking in booms, and of market timing in recessions. Nonetheless, top (bottom) funds and managers exhibit both (incorrect) skills in booms and in recessions. Some of the top (bottom) funds and managers are the best (worst) in both abilities in the same periods, but not in different periods, showing that not all managers have the ability to adapt to market conditions. Additionally, managers with limited skills tend to specialize because diversification requires multi-task skills and the non-specialization of these managers usually results in incorrect skills.     

Do Hot Hands Exist among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

In measuring performance persistence, we use hedge fund style benchmarks. This allows us to identify managers with valuable skills, and also to control for option-like features inherent in returns from hedge fund strategies. We take into account the possibility that reported asset values may be based on stale prices. We develop a statistical model that relates a hedge fund's performance to its decision to liquidate or close in order to infer the performance of a hedge fund that left the database. Although we find significant performance persistence among superior funds, we find little evidence of persistence among inferior funds.     

The Predictability of Managerial Heterogeneities in Mutual Funds

Using a sample of Chinese mutual funds, we empirically assess how managerial heterogeneity affects mutual fund performance. We find that funds with higher manager fixed effects outperform those with lower manager fixed effects by 2% per year. We also note that fund performance improves after managers with higher fixed effects are hired. The results are consistent with the notion that manager fixed effects are associated with managerial innate ability. Finally, we find that investors pay attention to managerial attributes beyond the traditional performance measures, providing supporting evidence for the rational explanation of convex flow‐performance sensitivity in the literature.     

The investment performance,attributes, and investment behavior of ethical equity mutual funds in the US: an empirical investigation

This paper examines the investment performance of US ethical equity mutual funds relative to the market and their traditional counterparts using a survivorship-bias-free database. We detect selectivity and market timing performance of fund managers using two models. First, we use Treynor and Mazuy’s (Harv Bus Rev 44:131–136, 1966) model to determine these performances from a quadratic regression of fund returns on market returns. Second, we use a comprehensive and integrated model derived by Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (A note on performance evaluation. Technical Report 714, Stanford, California, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 1983) and Lee and Rahman (J Bus 63:261–278, 1990) to simultaneously capture stock selection and market timing skill of fund managers. This model extracts timing skill from the relationship between managers’ forecast and realized market return. In addition, the R² approach developed by Amihud and Goyenko (Rev Financ Stud 26:667–694, 2013) for evaluating selectivity is also used in this paper. Our empirical results indicate that ethical funds perform no worse than their traditional counterparts, although ethical and traditional funds do not outperform the market. We find some evidence of superior security selection and/or market timing skill among a very small number of ethical and traditional funds. It appears that matching traditional funds have slightly more abnormal (superior as well as inferior) performance than ethical funds in our sample.     

Long-term negative fund alpha: Is it caused by bad skill or bad luck?

This paper examines the sources of long-term negative fund alpha. We compare the actual loser funds with a control group of bootstrapped loser funds. We find that the returns of the two fund groups are co-integrated, and that they are similar in market risk exposure, alpha consistency, portfolio holdings, and GARCH volatility. The test results show that long-term negative fund alpha occurs due to bad luck rather than to bad skill.     

Mutual Fund Managers’ Prior Work Experience and Their Investment Skill

This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund managers’ past professional backgrounds and their portfolio performance using Chinese mutual fund data from 2003 to 2016. We focus on managers with prior work experience either as industry analysts or as macroanalysts. We hypothesize that managers who worked as industry analysts exhibit superior stock picking skills, while managers with a background as macroanalysts time the market better. These hypotheses are supported by the data after controlling for observable fund and manager characteristics. Bootstrap analyses suggest that a significant difference in performance between these two types of managers cannot be attributed purely to luck.     

Time-varying fund manager skills of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds in developed and emerging markets

We examine stock selectivity and timing abilities in the market-wide return, volatility and liquidity of SRI fund managers. We find that multi-dimensional fund manager skills are time-varying and persistent in the short run, with developed market funds exhibiting longer persistence in all dimensions. Fund manager skills tend to be affected by fund characteristics (i.e., expense ratio, fund size, turnover and management tenure) and market characteristics (i.e., ESG market capitalization, mandatory ESG regulation and 10–2 yield spread). Fund managers of developed (emerging) market funds outperform (underperform) the market indices. For both fund types, fund managers possess exceptional volatility and liquidity timing despite poor return timing. Moreover, fund managers focus more (less) on timing the market’s return and less (more) on picking stocks when the prospect of recession keeps increasing (decreasing). Interestingly, if fund managers attempt to time the market-wide return or liquidity, stock selectivity will be worsened by their timing behavior.     

Pitfalls and perils of financial innovation: The use of CDS by corporate bond funds

We use the financial crisis of 2007–2009 as a laboratory to examine the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers in asset management. We find that when a fund uses complex trading strategies involving the use of CDS team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds. This may be due to the greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to single managers. During the financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams becomes negative, which may be because of the slower decision times of teams, which are especially costly during times of rapidly changing market conditions.