When fund management skill is more valuable?

Does fund management skill allow managers to identify mispriced securities more accurately and thereby make better portfolio choices resulting in superior fund performance when noise trading – a natural setting to detect skill – is more prevalent? We find skilled fund managers with superior past performance to generate persistent excess risk‐adjusted returns and experience significant capital inflows, especially in high sentiment times, high stock dispersion, and economic expansion states when price signals are noisier. This pattern persists after we control for lucky bias, using the ‘false discovery rate’ approach, which permits disentangling manager ‘skill’ from ‘luck.’     

Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

Rewarding risk-taking or skill? The case of private equity fund managers

We examine whether typical private equity fund compensation contracts reward excessive risk-taking rather than managerial skill. Our analysis is based on a novel model of investment value, cash flows, and fee dynamics of private equity funds. Given the embedded option-like fee components, our results demonstrate that fund managers indeed have an incentive for excessive risk-taking when only fee income from the current fund is considered. However, when managers also consider potential compensation from follow-on funds, their risk-taking incentives depend on their individual skill levels, and skilled managers will have an incentive to reduce fund risk. We also show that managers must generate substantial abnormal returns in order to compensate investors for the given fee components.     

Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.     

Global equity fund performance, portfolio concentration, and the fundamental law of active management

This paper investigates the relation between portfolio concentration and the performance of global equity funds. Concentrated funds with higher levels of tracking error display better performance than their more broadly diversified counterparts. We show that the observed relation between portfolio concentration and performance is mostly driven by the breadth of the underlying fund strategies; not just by fund managers’ willingness to take big bets. Our results indicate that when investors strive to select the best-performing funds, they should not only consider fund managers’ tracking-error levels. More important is that they take into account the extent to which fund managers carefully allocate their risk budget across multiple investment strategies and have concentrated holdings in multiple market segments simultaneously.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Strategic behavior within families of hedge funds

The paper investigates the strategic behavior of hedge fund families. It focuses on decisions to start and liquidate family-member funds. Hedge fund families tend to liquidate funds that underperform compared to other member funds, and to replace them by new ones. By choosing a launch time after a short period of superior performance by their member funds, families extend the spillover to new funds. Hedge fund families seem to be more experienced in promoting their funds and attracting fund inflow than in generating superior performance. This results in higher dollar compensation earned by managers within multi-fund families than in stand-alone funds.     

On luck versus skill when performance benchmarks are style-consistent

We firmly believe that style-appropriate, investible benchmarks not only provide a more parsimonious way of describing manager performance, but also better aligns performance evaluation with the real world performance targets of fund managers’. It is against such benchmarks that managers should be judged. With this principle foremost in our approach, we use style-consistent benchmarks to determine whether any observed alpha produced by a sample of U.S. equity funds is due to skill or to luck. We find that different segments of the market, ranging from large-cap growth to small-cap value, exhibit different levels of skill and luck. Our results also show that the use of standard multi-factor models underestimates managerial ability and overstates the proportion of funds whose abnormal performance can be attributed to chance rather than to skill, when compared against the use of style-consistent practitioner benchmarks. We also find that a single factor performance evaluation model that uses Russell Style indices consistent with the style orientation of a fund and market practice provides a parsimonious way of accounting for fund performance. Finally, our findings should be of particular relevance in mutual fund markets where the risk factors commonly used in the academic literature to evaluate manager performance – SMB, B/M, MOM and others – are not readily available.     

Derivative use,fund flows and investment manager performance

Prior literature which examines the use of derivatives by investment managers does not discern between different types of derivative trading strategies. This study is the first to examine and gather data on a particular type of derivative trading strategy undertaken by investment managers. We examine the extent to which equity fund managers use index futures to manage fund flows and the effect this has on their alpha and market timing measures of performance. Our results show that funds that do not use derivatives exhibit lower returns and negative market timing skills when they experience fund flow. The performance of funds that use derivatives, however, is independent of investor’s liquidity demands. In fact, the unconditional performance of the average user fund is statistically equivalent to the performance of the average non-user fund conditional on zero fund flow. Our results provide evidence that derivatives can be beneficial for mutual fund holders under certain conditions.     

Are hedge fund managers skilled?

This study measures the skill of hedge fund (HF) managers by calculating the value added that they extract from capital markets. Applying bootstrapping to control for luck, we find that HF managers are skilled, with the magnitude of the value added depending on the benchmark. Compared to the Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund and a set of eight Vanguard index funds, HF managers add on average $3.24 million per year and $2.88 million per year, respectively, although these values were higher before the financial crisis of 2007–2008 than afterwards. Finally, we find no evidence that HF managers share this value added with their investors.     

The economics of hedge funds

Hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation. Money flows, managerial restart options, and management ownership increase the importance of high-water-mark-based incentive fees but management fees remain the majority. Investors' valuation of fees are highly sensitive to their assessments of the manager's skill.     

Venture capital funds: Flow-performance relationship and performance persistence

This paper finds that venture capital funds that are expected to be backed by more skilled investors show no performance persistence but a significant flow-performance relationship. In contrast, funds that are expected to be backed by less skilled investors show performance predictability and have a non-significant flow-performance relationship. These results suggest that only skilled investors use all available information to adjust their capital allocation and, as a result, eliminate performance predictability as argued theoretically by Berk and Green (2004). Results also show that Kaplan and Schoar (2005) overstate the persistence in fund performance by not using an ex ante measure of the performance of earlier funds. Whether or not an ex ante measure is used, however, the persistence is largely due to unsophisticated investors. When investors are sophisticated, the performance of earlier funds, sequence and fund size do not help predict the performance of the focal fund.     

Best-performing US mutual fund families from 1993 to 2008: Evidence from a novel two-stage DEA model for efficiency decomposition

When analyzing relative performance, especially at the institutional level, the traditional data envelopment analysis (DEA) models do not recognize vastly different and important activities as separate functions and therefore cannot identify which function may be the main source of inefficiency. We propose a novel two-stage DEA model that decomposes the overall efficiency of a decision-making unit into two components and demonstrate its applicability by assessing the relative performance of 66 large mutual fund families in the US over the period 1993–2008. By decomposing the overall efficiency into operational management efficiency and portfolio management efficiency components, we reveal the best performers, the families that deteriorated in performance, and those that improved in their performance over the sample period. We also make frontier projections for poorly performing mutual fund families and highlight how the portfolio managers have managed their funds relative to the others during financial crisis periods.     

Analyst forecasts and European mutual fund trading

This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Results show that mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when any of the consensus forecast measures increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. Furthermore, mutual fund managers primarily attribute high information value to consensus forecast revisions that contain positive information, that are based on a sufficiently high number of inputs, and with more unanimous inputs to the consensus. Finally, following sell-side research seems to be beneficial for mutual fund managers since our results show that stock trades that are in line with analyst forecast revisions significantly outperform trades that are contrary to analyst research.     

Predicting hedge fund performance when fund returns are skewed

We show that fund-specific return skewness is associated with managerial skill and future hedge fund performance. Specifically, skewness in fund returns reflects managerial skill in avoiding large drawdowns. Using a new measure of investment skill that accounts for this managerial ability, we demonstrate that traditional performance measures underestimate (overestimate) managerial performance when returns exhibit positive (negative) fund-specific skewness. Our new measure is particularly valuable during periods of economic crisis, when the annual risk-adjusted outperformance is 5.5%.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

On short-term institutional trading skill,behavioral biases,and liquidity need

Are portfolio managers skilled or do they trade too much? Using a marked-to-market based “fair-value” method for measuring fund manager skill, we find that institutional managers can potentially earn +42 (+33) basis points benchmark-adjusted return before transaction costs after a holding period of four weeks on their buy (sell) trades. After transaction costs, the benchmark-adjusted return for the buy (sell) trades is +1 (-8) basis points. Pension fund managers outperform money managers. We are unable to detect evidence for overconfidence among pension fund managers over this short-horizon. In addition, we are unable to find evidence of disposition effect among mutual fund managers. Institutions tend to engage in short-term trades with holding period of four weeks (or less) despite only breaking-even or making economically insignificant (modest) benchmark-adjusted losses after round-trip transaction costs for liquidity, risk-management, or tax-minimization reasons. Among these, evidence for liquidity trading motive is the strongest.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.     

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.