INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Information Asymmetry is usually assumed in most explanations of the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). In Baron's (1982) model, the underwriter is better informed than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the IPO. The greater uncertainty associated with the demand will lead to a greater underpricing due to the enhanced value of the underwriter's expertise. In the case that the issuer is also an informed investment banker, Baron's hypothesis predicts no underpricing. Our results based on Canadian investment bankers do not support Baron's hypothesis.     

Issuers’ incentives and tests of Baron’s model of IPO underpricing

This paper reexamines the validity of Baron’s (J Financ 37:955–976, 1982) model of IPO underpricing, in which IPO underpricing is caused by asymmetric information between issuers and investment bankers. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (J Financ Econ 24:125–135, 1989) find that lead-manager IPOs are significantly more underpriced than non-self-marketed IPOs and conclude that their empirical results do not support Baron’s model. We compare self-marketed underwriters’ IPOs with non-self-marketed underwriters’ IPOs and with IPOs they lead. Our empirical results show that it is premature to reject Baron’s model of IPO underpricing when we take issuer incentives into account.     

THE PRICING OF EQUITY CARVE‐OUTS DURING THE 1990s

We examine the level of underpricing and characteristics of equity carveouts (ECOs) from 1990 to 1998 (the 1990s) and from 1999 to 2000 (the bubble period). For a sample of 458 ECOs, we find a mean initial return of 8.75% for the 1990s and 47.76% for the bubble period. The results suggest that, similar to other initial public offerings (IPOs), ECOs have been more willing to accept underpricing through time because of an increased importance in analyst coverage and the increased use of spinning, the practice where investment bankers allocate IPOs to high‐profile customers to garner potential future business.     

REGULATORY AND PROCEDURAL EFFECTS ON THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

In this paper, the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is examined from the underwriter's point of view. It is shown that because of the regulations and procedures governing the underwriting and pricing of IPOs, underwriters can maximize expected income by underpricing IPOs. Thus, it is argued that in addition to other feasible explanations of the underpricing phenomenon (e.g., compensation to uninformed investors, insurance against legal liability, etc.), regulatory and procedural factors contribute to the underpricing of IPOs. This is shown to be true both when uninformed investors are present and absent from the market for IPOs.     

Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns

The Chinese stock market with its unique institutions is rather different from western stock markets. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247%, the highest of any major world market. We model this extreme underpricing with a supply-demand analytical framework that captures critical institutional features of China's primary market, and then empirically test this model using a sample of 1377 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1992 and 2004. We find that Chinese IPO underpricing is principally caused by government intervention with IPO pricing regulations and the control of IPO share supplies. Besides the regulatory underpricing, this paper also documents some specific investment risks of IPOs in China's stock market.     

A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

Litigation risk and IPO underpricing

We examine the relation between risk and IPO underpricing and test two aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis: (1) firms with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of insurance (insurance effect) and (2) higher underpricing lowers expected litigation costs (deterrence effect). To adjust for the endogeneity bias in previous studies, we use a simultaneous equation framework. Evidence provides support for both aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis.     

On the marketing of IPOs

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.     

The Pricing of Equity Carve-Outs

This article examines the pricing of stock for 251 equity carve‐outs during the 1986–1995 period. We document a mean initial‐day return of 5.83% and a mean one‐week return of 5.43%. Among carve‐outs, the initial underpricing is lower for issues represented by high prestige investment bankers and those that have a lower offer price. In comparison with 251 initial public offering (IPO) firms matched by size and book‐to‐market ratio of equity, carveouts exhibit significantly lower initial‐day returns, but their buy‐and‐hold returns for sixmonth and one‐year periods are not significantly different from IPOs. The IPO firms have a three‐year return of 28.82% which is significantly higher than the 21.07% return for the carve‐out firms.     

The Wealth Effect of Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Property-Liability and Life Insurance Industries

This study examines the wealth effect of demutualization initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating underpricing and postconversion long‐run stock performance. Our results suggest that there is more “money left on the table” for demutualized insurers than for non‐demutualized insurers. We show that higher underpricing for demutualized firms can be explained by greater market demand, market sentiment, and the size of the offering. Further, contrary to previous research reporting an average underperformance of industrial IPOs, we show that demutualization IPOs outperform non‐IPO firms with comparable size and book‐to‐market ratios and non‐demutualized insurers. We present evidence that the outperformance in stock returns is mainly attributable to improvement in post‐demutualization operating performance and demand at the time of the IPOs. The combined results of underpricing and long‐term performance suggest that the wealth of policyholders who choose stock rather than cash or policy credits is not harmed by demutualization. Stockholders who purchase demutualized company shares either during or after the IPO have earned superior returns. Our findings are consistent with the efficiency improvement hypothesis.     

Cycles in the IPO market

We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs.     

Narcissistic managers and IPO underpricing

Using hand-collected data on the signature size of managers in Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2007 to 2019 as a proxy for managerial narcissism, we examine how IPOs with narcissistic managers (narcissistic IPOs) affect IPO underpricing. The findings suggest that narcissistic IPOs have higher underpricing than non-narcissistic IPOs. Specifically, we find that on average, a narcissistic IPO exhibits approximately 11.3% higher underpricing than a median IPO firm. Our results are robust to alternative metrics of narcissism and underpricing after controlling for endogeneity. Additional analyses suggest that narcissistic IPOs are more likely to engage in earnings management than non-narcissistic IPOs. The former exhibits excessive risk-taking behavior, gauged by earnings volatility pre-IPO and a higher beta post-IPO. In the cross-sectional analyses, we document that the impact of managerial narcissism on IPO underpricing is more salient for IPOs facing unsophisticated investors, high market sentiment, or poor corporate governance.     

Underpricing, Subsequent Equity Offerings, and the Long-Run Performance of Japanese IPOs

Using data on IPOs that are issued in Japan during January 1975–March 1989, we examine the deliberate underpricing and overreaction hypotheses to explain high initial returns at offering dates. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional pattern of the short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The obtained results indicate that the deliberate underpricing theories which we examine are unable to explain the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs. Furthermore, for the average of the IPOs, the empirical results are not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that for a certain minority group of IPOs, the high initial returns occur due to overreactions by investors. We interpret the overall results as indicating that the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs can be attributed to a mixture of both underpricing and investor overreaction. We conjecture that the binding regulations in Japan led to underpricing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Initial Public Offerings in Australia 1994 to 1999, Recent Evidence of Underpricing and Underperformance

This paper analyses whether financial and non financial characteristics of Australian initial public offerings (IPOs) can explain observed underpricing and long term underperformance over the period 1994 to 1999. A number of previous Australian studies have investigated initial day underpricing and longer term underperformance of IPOs and this study updates those papers. We find that initial day underpricing can in part be explained by market sentiment, forecast dividend per share yields, underwriter options and share options. Our longer term analysis supports the finding of previous studies in that IPOs on average, underperform the market in the first year following their listing.     

THE UNDERPRICING OF “SECOND” INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity represents a well-documented empirical phenomenon. One prominent explanation for this underpricing relies on the uncertainty investors feel about the value of the issuer. In this paper, this asymmetric information hypothesis is tested by examining the underpricing of IPOs of seventy-four firms for which the uncertainty about the value of the firm is likely to be substantially reduced. These firms were once publicly owned, then taken private, and subsequently returned to public ownership. Findings show that the IPOs of these “reverse leveraged buyouts” are significantly less underpriced than typical IPOs. These results support the asymmetric information hypothesis.     

风险投资对创业板IPO折价影响的实证研究

本文以截至2011年6月30日在我国创业板上市的236家公司作为研究对象,研究风险投资对创业板IPO折价的影响。研究发现：（1）有风险投资参与的企业IPO折价显著高于无风险投资参与的企业,支持声誉效应假说,即风险投资机构以IPO折价来提早退出投资项目,以此来建立自己的声誉,从而吸引更多的资金流入;（2）在对有风投参股的投资公司做进一步分析后发现一一随着风投参与度的增大,IPO调整折价率并未出现明显的提升,创业板企业IPO时风险投资机构的数量、风险投资机构持股比例与调整折价率关系不显著。     

Underpricing,ownership dispersion,and aftermarket liquidity of IPO stocks

Booth and Chua [Booth J., Chua L. Ownership dispersion, costly information, and IPO underpricing. Journal of Financial Economics 1996; 41; 291–310] hypothesize that IPOs are underpriced to promote ownership dispersion, which in turn increases aftermarket liquidity of IPO stocks. We examine a sample of 1179 Nasdaq IPOs and find that underpricing is positively correlated with the number of non-block institutional shareholders after IPO but negatively correlated with the changes in the total number of shareholders. Firms with many non-block institutional shareholders tend to have high liquidity in the secondary market. These results provide support to Booth and Chua's hypothesis. Underpricing also has direct effects on secondary market liquidity after controlling for ownership structure and other factors.     

Adverse selection, public information, and underpricing in IPOs

This paper generalizes the informational environment of the Rock model to address empirical evidence and conjectures that cannot be addressed within the standard model based on informed and uninformed investors such as underpricing being positively related to market returns observed prior to the IPO, the number of IPOs being positively related to market returns, underpricing being partly predictable based on public information, and the return to uninformed participation being negative overall but positively related to market returns observed prior to the IPO. Finally, the model suggests that a positive relation between market returns and underpricing need not represent an inefficiency in the pricing of IPOs.     

Underpricing in the Corporate Bond Market

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings(IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market.We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution toan information problem or a liquidity problem. We find thatunderpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings andis highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggeststhat information problems drive underpricing, with support forboth the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetricinformation theory. We do not find evidence in favor of theRock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquiditycauses underpricing.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.