浅析我国上市公司债务融资现状及优化对策

上市公司的债务融资对公司治理具有正面效应,但我国上市公司债务融资对公司治理效应发挥的作用比较薄弱.文章通过分析我国上市公司的债务融资现状,找到其问题和可能的原因,并提出一些优化对策.     

债权融资结构与公司治理效率——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

从债务规模、债务期限、债务来源三个维度对上市公司的债权融资治理效率进行实证检验,结果表明,资产负债率与公司绩效显著负相关,债权融资没有发挥应有的治理效应;长期债务和企业债券融资的治理效用是显著的,而商业信用融资与银行借款均不能对上市公司经营者形成有效监督和制约,反而一定程度上加重了上市公司的代理冲突。     

负债融资的公司治理效应研究综述

西方的经典理论早已证明负债融资是一种外部治理机制。根据上市公司的融资结构,目前我国上市公司资产负债率的均值在50%左右,债权人作为公司重要的利益相关者,应该要发挥其治理效应。本文对负债融资的公司治理效应进行了全面的文献综述。     

负债融资的公司治理效应研究综述

西方的经典理论早已证明负债融资是一种外部治理机制。根据上市公司的融资结构,目前我国上市公司资产负债率的均值在50%左右,债权人作为公司重要的利益相关者,应该要发挥其治理效应。本文对负债融资的公司治理效应进行了全面的文献综述。     

我国上市公司融资结构的治理效应分析

融资结构具有一定的公司治理效应 ,本文在阐述不同融资契约治理效应的基础上 ,着重分析了我国上市公司融资结构治理效应弱化的原因 ,并提出了以下改进建议 :建立经理人持股激励机制 ;建立有效的偿债保障机制 ;发展企业债券市场 ;培育机构投资者并创造使他们能有效发挥作用的条件 ;加强银行对企业的监控力度 ;加强经理人的外部约束机制。     

商业银行持股与信贷配置效率

银企关系是影响公司债务融资以及债务融资治理作用的重要因素。本文以1999-2008年A股公司为样本,实证检验了银行持股是否影响公司投资行为与公司债务融资之间的关系,发现:在债务融资与投资效率的敏感度上,银行持股公司高于非银行持股公司;银行持股公司的银行债务对投资行为的治理效应比非银行持股公司更为明显。结果表明,银行持股提高了信贷配置效率,并改善了债务的投资治理效应。     

债务融资与代理理论研究评述

20世纪50年代,Modigliani和Miller探讨了完美市场下债务对公司价值的影响,此后国外学术界不断就公司债务融资与公司价值进行探讨,并将债务融资与代理理论结合起来,探讨了债务融资的公司治理作用。而我国对债务融资的治理作用的研究还不充分,债务融资的公司治理效应在我国还未充分发挥。本文拟围绕债务融资与代理理论,对国内外探讨债务融资治理作用的相关文献进行回顾。并在此基础上,提出对现有文献的评述。     

高铁开通、银行竞争与公司债务融资成本

本文以2009-2016年A股上市公司为样本,采用双重差分模型研究高铁开通对公司债务融资成本的影响.研究表明,高铁开通提高开通地的银行竞争水平,从而降低公司债务融资成本.进一步研究表明,对于面临较强融资约束的公司,高铁开通对公司债务融资成本的降低作用更加显著.对处于金融市场化水平较低地区的公司,高铁开通对公司债务融资成本的降低作用更加显著.     

上市公司负债融资的公司治理效应分析——考虑环境因素

负债对公司治理发生作用是受一定的环境条件制约的,是依赖于一定环境的.本文在考虑环境因素的情况下,以中国上市公司为研究对象,对负债融资的公司治理效应进行实证分析.通过实证分析证明,我国上市公司负债融资的公司治理效应是弱化或恶化的,并且无论环境如何都是如此,负债融资对公司绩效的负面作用与环境因素无关.     

地区金融发展差异与我国公司债务期限结构——来自上市公司的经验证据

一、引言 公司债务期限结构选择是公司债务融资决策整体的必要组成部分,然而我国上市公司债务期限存在明显不合理:资产负债率较发达市场经济国家公司偏低;短期负债是我国上市公司主要资金来源,部分公司完全依靠短期债务进行公司运营和投资.     

The impact of divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt

This paper examines the debt ownership structure of firms with corporate governance problems associated with the divergence in the controlling shareholders' voting and cash-flow rights. Previous studies suggest that debt can play an important role in mitigating corporate governance problems. However, not all debt can effectively manage the corporate governance problems associated with the financing of poorly governed firms. In this study, we find that firms with higher divergence in voting and cash-flow rights use significantly more bank debt financing. Moreover, the effect of the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt is greater in countries with weaker legal protection for investors. Overall, our findings suggest that bank debt has a comparative advantage in financing poorly governed firms.     

Exploring the Agency Cost of Debt: Evidence from the ISS Governance Standards

Corporate governance is usually viewed in the context of strengthening shareholder rights and enhancing shareholders’ welfare. However, the impact of corporate governance on bondholders is much less understood. We explore how corporate governance influences the cost of debt financing. Using broad governance metrics encompassing fifty governance attributes reported by The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we document that stronger corporate governance is associated with a higher cost of debt. As governance strengthens by one standard deviation, the cost of debt rises by as much as 11 %. The results are robust even after controlling for both firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. Our results are important because they suggest that corporate governance has a palpable effect on critical corporate outcomes such as credit ratings and bond yields. More importantly, we show that, while corporate governance may mitigate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, it appears to exacerbate the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders (the agency cost of debt).     

What determines the financing decision in corporate takeovers: Cost of capital,agency problems,or the means of payment?

How is a takeover bid financed and what is its impact on the expected value creation of the takeover? An analysis of the sources of transaction financing has been largely ignored in the takeover literature. Using a unique dataset, we show that external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are in fact quite distinct. Acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with debt. The takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder's pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. The choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing also depends on the bidder's strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment.     

经济周期、金融周期动态演变下企业杠杆率探析 ——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

：将经济周期和金融周期的变化同时纳入杠杆率模型,分别建立中国上市公司的衰退模型和扩张模型,结合企业融资约束,研究经济周期、金融周期的周期异步性对企业杠杆率的直接效应和间接效应。研究发现：周期异步性对企业杠杆率的直接效应呈逆周期性特征,间接效应呈顺周期性;衰退期时,再融资企业杠杆率对周期性变动比融资受限企业更为敏感。研究对于监管当局综合经济周期、金融周期,制定、调整、完善企业债务融资政策,帮助企业深入理解债务融资环境,提升债务融资能力具有参考和借鉴意义。     

Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?

We examine the influence of corporate governance quality on firms' choice between convertible debt, straight debt, and equity using a Western European sample of security offerings made between 2000 and 2010. We find that weaker firm-specific and country-specific corporate governance quality increases firms' likelihood of issuing convertible debt instead of straight debt and common equity. We also find that stockholder reactions to convertible debt announcements are more favorable for firms with weaker corporate governance. Our results suggest that corporate governance quality is a significant security choice determinant, with firms using convertible debt as a substitute for high quality governance mechanisms.     

债务结构优化与企业创新——基于企业债券融资视角的研究

本文在我国保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景下,从债券融资的视角,探讨债务结构优化对企业创新的影响。研究发现,债券融资与企业创新之间显著正相关,表明债券融资优化企业债务结构、提升企业创新能力的积极作用占据主导地位。进一步研究表明:(1)债券融资能够通过降低整体债务融资成本并延长整体债务期限促进企业创新;(2)债券融资对于银行贷款存在溢出效应,即企业通过债券融资,还能降低银行贷款利率、延长银行贷款期限,进而促进企业创新;(3)产品市场竞争和代理问题会在一定程度上削弱债券融资对企业创新的促进作用;(4)不同类型的债券对企业创新能力的作用存在异质性,债券发行的便利性是其影响企业创新的一个重要因素。     

Currency hedging and corporate governance: A cross-country analysis

This paper examines the impact of the strength of governance on firms' use of currency derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 30 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, we find that strongly governed firms tend to use derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external financing. On the other hand, weakly governed firms appear to use derivatives mostly for managerial reasons. These results are robust to alternative measures of corporate governance, various subsamples, the use of foreign denominated debt as an alternative strategy to hedge currency exposure, and a potential selection bias. Overall, the results serve as the first comprehensive evidence of the impact of firm- and country-level corporate governance on firms' use of derivatives.     

Debt contracts in the presence of performance manipulation

Empirical evidence suggests that firms often manipulate reported numbers to avoid debt covenant violations. We study how a firm’s ability to manipulate reports affects the terms of its debt contracts and the resulting investment and manipulation decisions that the firm implements. Our model generates novel empirical predictions regarding the use and the level of debt covenant, the interest rate, the efficiency of investment decisions, and the likelihood of covenant violations. For example, the model predicts that the optimal debt contract for firms with relatively strong (weak) corporate governance (i.e., cost of manipulation) induces overinvestment (underinvestment). Moreover, for firms with strong (weak) corporate governance, an increase in corporate governance quality leads to tighter (looser) covenant, more (less) frequent covenant violations and lower (higher) interest rate. Our model highlights that the interest rate, which is a common proxy for the cost of debt, neither accounts for the distortion of investment efficiency nor the expected manipulation costs arising under debt financing. We propose a measure of cost of debt capital that accounts for these effects.     

Do shareholder protection and creditor rights have distinct effects on the association between debt maturity and ownership structure?

This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by country-level governance factors that enhance outside monitoring by minority shareholders and debtholders. Our investigation is based on a dataset of 50,599 firm-year observations from 38 countries. We use a propensity-score matching approach and find that the effect of ownership concentration on debt maturity is conditional to country-level governance attributes. Ownership concentration has a negative effect on debt maturity in countries where both shareholder protection and creditor rights are weak. Ownership concentration, however, tends to lengthen debt maturity as protection increases, and this positive effect on the length of debt maturity is stronger in countries enhancing protection towards debtholders (instead of shareholders). We also explore other characteristics of ownership structure, such as the identity and presence of controlling shareholders. These results corroborate the view that entrenched shareholders may use debt maturity opportunistically. Our study provides new insights into the interplay between firm- and country-level governance mechanisms and a deeper understanding of cross-country differences in the association between ownership structure and debt financing.