上市公司法律风险与审计收费——来自中国上市公司的经验证据北大核心

本文实证检验了法律风险对审计收费的影响。结果发现:上市公司的法律风险和审计收费显著正相关。进一步研究表明,国内会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费显著正相关,而由"四大"会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费相关性不显著。这可以用审计质量溢价来解释,比起国内会计师事务所,"四大"会计师事务所存在明显的审计质量溢价,在审计定价时,法律风险不是主要影响因素。     

内部控制与审计定价研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

企业的内部控制质量直接影响着注册会计师的审计投入和审计风险,进而影响到其审计定价水平。本文以我国2008—2009年深沪两市1395家上市公司作为研究样本,实证考察了企业内部控制质量与注册会计师审计定价之间的关系。研究结果表明:注册会计师的审计收费与企业的内部控制质量之间存在着不显著的负相关性。通过在模型中引入相关公司治理变量,本文还发现合理的公司治理机制可以提高企业内部控制的整体质量,从而显著地降低注册会计师的审计收费水平。本文的启示意义在于:完善企业的内部控制制度有助于注册会计师开展风险导向审计,从而降低审计风险和审计成本,提高审计质量。     

风险基础观下的审计收费补偿研究

基于风险基础观,从企业的内部管理、外部监管两个层面,研究重大错报风险与审计收费的关系。对于内部管理中存在的风险采用了综合绩效风险、内部治理风险来衡量,外部监管选取了公司违规处理指标,研究发现:公司综合绩效风险、董事长与总经理两职合一与审计收费显著正相关,第一大股东持股比例与审计收费呈U型关系,而前十大股东关联度、独立董事比例、监管风险与审计收费没有显著关系。说明,会计师事务所在确定审计收费时给予公司内部风险更多的关注,重大错报风险在审计收费中得到了一定程度的补偿。     

我国上市公司财务报告内部控制审计的现状分析及政策建议

<正>随着我国社会主义市场经济的深入发展,传统的内部审计面临巨大挑战,而加强企业财务报告内部控制审计,对提供更为可靠和真实的会计信息,具有十分重要的影响。我国部分上市公司开始重视内部控制建设,并自愿聘请审计机构对财务报告内部控制进行审计或审核。一、财务报告内部控制的具体内涵《企业内部控制鉴证指引》(征求意见稿)中指出,"本指引所称企业内部控制鉴证,是指会计师事务所接受委托,对企业与财务报告相关的内部控制的有效性进行鉴证,并发表鉴证意见。"美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的定义,财务报     

诉讼风险、内部控制质量与审计收费

审计收费的高低受审计风险和审计成本的影响,内部控制质量高低则直接影响审计风险和审计成本.本文以2010-2013年主板A股上市公司为样本,从注册会计师审计角度讨论内部控制质量与审计收费的关系.研究发现:(1)内部控制质量越高,审计收费越低,内部控制与外部审计存在相互替代作用;(2)在引入诉讼风险后发现,当公司发生诉讼时,内部控制质量与审计收费的负相关关系被削弱.     

中注协约谈部分证券资格事务所负责人提示上市公司内部控制审计风险

正2013年12月11日,中国注册会计师协会以"防范上市公司管理层凌驾于内部控制之上风险"为主题在京约谈瑞华会计师事务所,就其承接的部分上市公司2013年度内控审计业务可能存在的风险进行提示。瑞华会计师事务所主任会计师、负责质量控制的合伙人以及执行有关上市公司2013年度内控审计业务的签字注册会计师等接受约谈。中注协相关负责人指出,内部控制审计业务既可以推动被审计单位加强内部控制建设、完善内部治理机制,又能促进被审计单位主动识别、评估和应对财务报告相关风险,合理保证财务报告     

审计风险的价格补偿:基于公司内部管理与外部监管视角

基于风险基础观,从企业的内部管理、外部监管两个层面,研究审计风险与审计收费的关系。对于内部管理中存在的风险采用了综合绩效风险、内部治理风险来衡量,外部监管选取了公司违规处理指标,研究发现:公司综合绩效风险、董事长与总经理两职合一与审计收费显著正相关,第一大股东持股比例与审计收费呈U型关系,而前十大股东关联度、独立董事比例、监管风险与审计收费没有显著关系。说明,会计师事务所在确定审计收费时给予公司内部风险更多的关注,审计风险在审计收费中得到了一定程度的补偿。     

上市公司内部控制、诉讼风险与异常审计费用

本文以2012至2021年国内上市公司为研究样本，基于风险导向审计理念，研究了上市公司内部控制水平与异常审计费用之间的关系，并从诉讼风险角度探究了内部控制对异常审计费用的影响机制。研究结果表明上市公司的内部控制水平越高，异常审计费用越低，并且该关系在会计师事务所为非四大会计师事务所时更为显著。此外，本文还发现诉讼风险在内部控制与异常审计费用的关系中发挥着部分中介作用，因此，企业不断加强内部控制建设不仅能够降低诉讼风险，还有助于降低审计人员对风险的感知。     

高管审计背景、盈余管理与异常审计收费

利用2004~2012年中国A股上市公司财务数据,考察高管审计背景对公司盈余管理行为和审计定价决策的影响。研究中,将高管审计背景分为高管审计经历与事务所关联两个维度。研究发现,高管具有审计背景的公司为了实现较低风险水平下的私有收益最大化,有从应计盈余管理转向实施真实盈余管理的倾向,事务所可能采取的策略是增加额外的审计收费以弥补过高的审计风险,而"校友效应"却使事务所显著减少该类公司的审计收费。研究表明,高管审计背景可能会导致公司财务报告信息质量下降、审计风险上升,证实了其对公司财务报告信息质量及事务所审计质量的不利影响。本研究为加强对高管审计背景公司的监管及完善审计师跳槽的"冷却期"政策提供经验证据。     

公司治理结构对内部控制有效性的影响

本文以2006年12月31日以前在中国上市的1162个上市公司为样本,用实证方法研究公司治理结构对内部控制有效性的影响。研究发现:年终股东大会出席率与公司内部控制有效性显著正相关;国有控股公司在财务报告质量上显著优于其他公司;董事会实际规模和监事会规模与公司绩效显著正相关;董事长兼任总经理会显著降低财务报告质量;设立审计委员会与公司绩效显著正相关;管理层的诚信和道德价值观念与公司内部控制有效性显著正相关;管理者的风险偏好与内部控制有效性呈显著的 U 型关系;管理层对员工胜任能力的重视程度与公司经营绩效和对法律法规遵循显著正相关;董事会监事会两会会议频率和第一大股东的控制力对内部控制有效性没有显著影响。     

Auditor Independence,Non‐Audit Services,and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?*

Do fees for non‐audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non‐audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low‐quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non‐audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.     

How Effective Is Internal Control Reporting under SOX 404? Determinants of the (Non‐)Disclosure of Existing Material Weaknesses

We study determinants of internal control reporting decisions under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX 404) using a sample of restating firms whose original misstatements are linked to underlying control weaknesses. We find that only a minority of these firms acknowledge their existing control weaknesses during their misstatement periods, and that this proportion has declined over time. Further, the probability of reporting existing weaknesses is negatively associated with external capital needs, firm size, non‐audit fees, and the presence of a large audit firm; it is positively associated with financial distress, auditor effort, previously reported control weaknesses and restatements, and recent auditor and management changes. These results provide evidence that detection and disclosure incentives play a role in whether existing material weaknesses are reported, which has implications for the effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing investors with advance warning of potential accounting problems.     

Extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees

This study investigates whether sudden and severe reductions in total CEO compensation affect auditor perceptions of risk. We argue that extreme CEO pay cuts can incentivize the CEO to manipulate the financial reports or make risky operational decisions in a desperate attempt to improve firm performance. This incentive, in turn, is likely to impact auditor assessments of audit risk and auditor business risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive and highly significant association between extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees. The results suggest that audit fees are 4.6% higher when there is an extreme CEO pay cut, which corresponds to an audit fee that is $111,458 higher for the average firm-year observation in our sample.     

Risk in Audit Pricing: The Role of Firm-Specific Dimensions of Risk

This chapter investigates the impact of the firm-specific dimensions of risk suggested in the finance literature, the financial risk, operating leverage and business risk on audit fees. It is hypothesized that audit fees are related to these three dimensions of risk, size, audit complexity and a set of the agency theory based control variables. The hypothesis is empirically tested using a sample from the U.K. audit market. The results of the study show that audit fees as hypothesized are positively related to financial leverage, operating leverage and business risk of a firm and that the control variables behave according to expectations. This implies that the three dimensions of the firm-specific risk are taken into account in audit pricing decisions and should therefore be incorporated into models when investigating the audit pricing issues.     

Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts,Audit Effort,and Audit Opinions on Internal Control

We examine the economic impact of analysts’ cash flow forecasts by looking at how external auditors respond to financial analysts’ issuance of cash flow forecasts. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we find that financial analysts’ initiation of cash flow forecasts leads to reduced auditor fees and audit report lags. Moreover, after cash flow forecast initiation, firms report fewer Section 404(b) internal control weakness disclosures. These findings suggest that cash flow forecasts constrain earnings manipulation and improve management accounting behavior, thereby reducing inherent and control risk and strengthening firms’ internal control over financial reporting.     

Auditors' Perceived Business Risk and Audit Fees: Analysis and Evidence

This study analyzes the relation between auditors' perceived business risk and audit fees to determine whether audit firms or their clients bear the expected legal costs of business risk. We predict that hourly audit fees and the number of audit hours are increasing in business risk. Using confidential survey data collected by a large international accounting firm for 422 audits, we find that high business risk increases the number of audit hours, but not the fee per hour. This implies that firms perceive firm-level differences in business risk and obtain compensation through billing additional hours, not by raising the hourly charge.     

AUDITOR CHOICE AND AUDIT FEE DETERMINANTS

An analytical model predicts that cross-sectionally (1) the marginal cost of auditor quality is inversely related to the strength of client companies' internal control. (2) In the short run, clients with stronger control, lower business risk, or less complex audits choose higher quality auditors; but whether they pay higher audit fees is indeterminate. (3) In the long run, client companies have both lower quality auditors and weaker controls as risk or complexity increase, so less precise financial reporting is expected from them. (4) The effects of risk and complexity on fees are indeterminate, because the price and quantity components of fees tend to vary inversely as risk or complexity change. The predictions are consistent with findings that have been viewed as empirical anomalies.     

Audit committee quality indices,reporting quality and firm value

We investigate the relation between audit committee (AC) quality indices, financial reporting, internal control quality and firm value using a US dataset for the period 2002–12. The indices are developed by linking firm value with principal component analysis (PCA) factors based on a broad set of 82 AC variables, some of which influence the quality of the AC, but are not addressed in prior literature. Significant AC factors include ‘overlapping directors’, ‘busyness’ and ‘foreign director’, and we use these factors to develop ‘high’ and ‘low’ AC quality indices. We show that low AC quality firms are more likely to manage earnings, be external auditor dependent with respect to non‐audit tax services, and switch to a lower quality auditor. Low AC quality firms are also more likely to have internal control concerns disclosed by predecessor auditors, including accounting issues, financial restatements, audit opinion concerns and deficiencies that undermine internal control effectiveness. Further, they are more likely to receive an audit report containing additional explanatory notes. Conversely, high AC quality firms are significantly less likely to have these concerns. Our findings highlight the value of using AC quality indices in delivering greater oversight of the financial reporting process.     

The effects of corporate governance and audit and non-audit fees on IPO Value

This paper examines the effects of non-executive board members, audit committee composition and financial expertise, and fees paid to audit firms on the value of 375 UK initial public offerings (IPOs). Empirical findings show that underpricing decreases in audit fees whereas it increases in non-audit fees. A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the firm’s board and audit committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and financial accounting expertise of their members positively moderate the inter-relationships between underpricing and both audit and non-audit fees paid by companies going through an IPO. Further investigations using the adjusted price-to-book value as a proxy for firm value at IPO confirm our main findings that internal governance mechanisms may complement services provided by the auditors in terms of generating higher valuations. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees, our results remain consistent.     

The Importance of Business Risk in Setting Audit Fees: Evidence from Cases of Client Misconduct

Previous research provides evidence that, for the clients of a large audit firm, audit clients with higher perceived business risk bear the expected costs of this risk with higher audit fees. We extend the literature, which focuses on the relation between litigation risk and audit fees, by examining alleged client misconduct that is not illegal but possibly increases business risk. In particular, we examine the relation between audit fees and business risk for audit clients doing business in developing countries where bribery of top government officials has been an accepted business practice. We hypothesize that bribery‐paying clients are riskier because of both client business risk and audit business risk. Using data collected from Securities and Exchange Commission filings and audit fee data in the 1970s, before the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, we provide evidence that audit fees were higher for clients that disclosed paying bribes. This evidence is consistent with an audit market where auditors assess business risk at the client level, then pass their expected costs to the client in the form of higher audit fees.