Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Decision‐making capabilities of a hybrid system applied to the auditor's going‐concern assessment

The purpose of this study is to evaluate a hybrid system as a decision support model to assist with the auditor's going‐concern assessment. The going‐concern assessment is often an unstructured decision that involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative information. An expert system that predicts the going‐concern decision has been developed in consultation with partners at three of the Big Five accounting firms. This system is combined with a statistical model that predicts bankruptcy, as a component of the auditor's decision, to form a hybrid system. The hybrid system, because it combines the use of quantitative and qualitative information, has the potential for better prediction accuracy than either the expert system or statistical model predicting separately. In addition, testing of the system provides some insight into the characteristics of firms that experience problems, but do not necessarily receive a going‐concern modification. Further investigation into those firms that have problems could reveal factors that may be incorporated into decision support systems for auditors, in order to improve accuracy and reliability of these decision tools. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is an Auditor's Propensity to Issue Going Concern Opinions a Valid Measure of Audit Quality?

A number of previous studies use auditor propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) as a proxy of audit quality when examining a sample of financially distressed firms. This study examines whether audit quality (measured by discretionary accruals) influences the probability of financially distressed firms receiving GCOs using a non‐specific sample of 2937 firm‐year observations from Australia over the period 2011–2015. The study first investigates the association between financially distressed firms and the issuance of GCOs. This association is then re‐tested after separating the total sample into low and high audit quality subsamples. The results indicate that financially distressed firms are more likely to receive GCOs, confirming the application of ASA 570 Going Concern. However, financially distressed firms that receive GCOs from their auditors are limited to firms that have higher‐quality audits.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

The civil justice system and going concern audit reports: Comments on “Auditors’ decision-making under going concern uncertainties in low litigation risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong”

Lam and Mensah [Lam, K., Mensah, Y.M., 2006. Auditors’ decision-making under going concern uncertainties in low litigation risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong. J. Account. Public Pol. 25 (6), this issue] provide some valuable insight on auditors’ choice of going concern audit reports in an environment where the civil justice system affords, from the standpoint of the plaintiff, fewer remedies and is more difficult to file a complaint than it is in the US. Hence, from the auditor’s standpoint, this environment can appropriately be described as a “low litigation risk environment”. In this comment, I first question whether a disclaimer of an opinion is any indication of either a quality audit or professionalism. Secondly, three alternative explanations for the empirical regularities are discussed. The Gatekeeper Story suggests auditors are simply not willing to risk reducing their reputational capital by acquiescing to clients that are not likely to survive their own financial distress. The Herding Story suggests that, when auditors are faced with uncertainties or a gap in the authoritative literature, auditors will herd together to form a common response that mimic one-another. The Value of Incumbency Story holds that as the value of incumbency declines with the client’s inability to survive, auditors will have fewer incentives to incur the incremental costs to gather sufficient competent evidential matter necessary to support an unqualified opinion.     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

The effect of SOX on small auditor exits and audit quality

We find that over six hundred auditors with fewer than 100 SEC clients exit the market following SOX. Compared to the non-exiting auditors, the exiting auditors are lower quality, where quality is gauged by: (1) avoidance of AICPA peer reviews and failure to comply with PCAOB rules, and (2) severity of the peer review and inspection reports. In addition, clients of exiting auditors receive higher quality auditing from successor auditors, as captured by a greater likelihood of receiving going concern opinions. Our results suggest that the PCAOB inspections improve audit quality by incentivizing low quality auditors to exit the market.     

Model Predictions and Auditor Assessments of Going Concern Status

This paper compares the predictions of a bankruptcy prediction model and the assessments of auditors on the going concern status of a sample of 165 bankrupt companies and 165 matched non-bankrupt companies. Data from US companies for the period 1978 to 1985 were used. Probit analysis (with the weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood procedure) was applied to estimate the model parameters. The Lachenbruch U method hold-out accuracy rates of the model are 85.45% for bankrupt firms, 100.00% for non-bankrupt firms, and 99.91% overall. The corresponding accuracy rates of the auditors based on their audit reports are 54.37% for bankrupt firms, 100.00% for non-bankrupt firms, and 99.73% overall. The sensitivity of optimal cut-off points to misclassification costs of Type I and Type II errors was also considered. Results of the study suggest that bankruptcy prediction models can be useful to auditors in making going concern assessments. Further, such models can serve as analytical tools and defensive devices.     

我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析

本文分析了中天勤会计师事务所原来的63家客户的走向。作者的主要发现是:上市公司在选择会计师事务所时,对地域因素考虑较多,同时,经办的注册会计师与上市公司选择同一家事务所的比例相对比较高。这些现象都与高质量审计市场的特征存在一定的差异。此外,作者还发现国际五大在承接原中天勤客户的行为上,存在一些值得关注的现象。     

Challenges of using RPA in auditing: A socio-technical systems approach

The use of Robotic Process Automation (RPA) is rapidly growing in the professional services sector such as auditing. Despite the great benefits RPA can offer, RPA failure rates are still high. In this research, we draw on socio-technical systems theory to examine the challenges of using RPA in the various phases of auditing and how auditors address these challenges. By interviewing experienced partners and auditors in auditing firms and technology companies, we show that challenges arise when there is a lack of fit between the technical requirements of the RPA tool (technical subsystem) and the skills and knowledge of the auditors and clients (social subsystem). We discuss our findings and provide valuable practical implications and opportunities for future research.     

Acquirers’ abnormal returns and the non-Big 4 auditor clientele effect

I analyze the effect of auditor choice on acquirers’ values around merger announcements and the factors affecting the interaction between auditor size and the market reaction to merger announcements. I find that acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms outperform those audited by Big 4 firms. This effect is more pronounced when the targets are privately held and when the likelihood of the auditors playing a prominent advisory role increases. While the largest auditing firms are usually assumed to offer superior services, the study suggests that smaller firms have a comparative advantage in assisting their clients in merger transactions.     

True and Fair': UK Auditors' View

An earlier paper surveyed the behaviour of finance directors of the 900 largest UK companies with respect to giving a true and fair view in annual accounts. This present paper results from personal interviews with technical partners of all the 20 largest UK auditing firms (which includes the auditors of nearly all the companies in the previous survey). The paper examines the operational meaning of ‘true and fair’ to large auditing firms, and how it fits into the context of law and standards. It is concluded that one effect of the requirement as it works in practice is to give support to auditors' views in areas not yet covered by accounting standards. Contrasts emerge between the interpretations of directors and those of auditors.     

Public Attention and Auditor Behavior: The Case of Hurun Rich List in China

Adverse client publicity can entail regulatory scrutiny over audited financial statements and impose political costs on auditors. We use the changes in client publicity caused by their controlling owners’ presence on the Hurun Rich List (the rich listing) in China to test the hypothesis that auditor conservatism increases with client publicity. Our evidence indicates auditors issue more adverse audit opinions to clients and charge higher fees following the rich listing events. Moreover, we observe that auditors strategically respond to clients with different attributes—for clients whose owners accumulated wealth in a more questionable manner, auditors choose more stringent audit reporting to better defend themselves from regulatory scrutiny; for clients without such attributes, auditors primarily rely on increasing audit fees to cope with any post-listing increase in audit risks. Our analyses also suggest the impacts of rich listings tend to be concentrated among large audit firms with stronger reputation concerns or among engagement auditors with more conservative reporting styles. By showing how auditors manage political risks associated with heightened public scrutiny, we contribute to both the auditing and political cost literature.     

Trends in Auditor Reporting in Australia: A Synthesis and Opportunities for Research

The purpose of this review is to synthesise the existing research literature regarding audit reporting and, in particular, the going concern decision. We consider the findings of research conducted in Australia and New Zealand on these issues. We then analyse trends in audit reporting from 2005 to 2013. We identify an increase in auditors’ reports highlighting going concern issues well beyond the global financial crisis period confirming that this period represents a period of prolonged economic uncertainty. We identify trends by audit firm type, by industry and company size. We analyse the subsequent year outcomes for firms receiving going concern opinions. We also identify opportunities for future research.     

Explaining auditors’ propensity to issue going‐concern opinions in Australia after the global financial crisis

We document an increase in auditors issuing going‐concern opinions in Australia over a prolonged period since the Global Financial Crisis that is not fully explained by changes in client risk. Overall, our evidence is consistent with auditors reporting more conservatively with the increased level of scrutiny from Australian Securities and Investments Commission inspections and other increased regulation, and in particular, the negative attention following the 2011–2012 inspections. As a result, auditor reports with reference to going‐concern issues have become less informative regarding future corporate failure.     

Auditors’ going concern reporting accuracy during and after the global financial crisis

Motivated by concerns that one of the reasons for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is poor quality auditing, this study examines the accuracy of going concern modifications for a sample of United States (U.S.) companies in the pre-GFC (2005–2006), GFC (2007–2008), and post-GFC (2009–2010) periods. The results show that the type I misclassification is lower during the GFC but not different in the post-GFC period compared with the pre-GFC period. The type II misclassification is not significantly different in the GFC and post-GFC periods compared with the pre-GFC period. Additionally, the results suggest that non-Big 4 auditors, compared with Big 4 auditors, have become more conservative on clients’ going concern problems in the post-GFC period, which reduces their type II misclassification.     

Creating a profession ‘out of nothing’? The case of the Belgian auditing profession

This paper presents the results of a study on the emergence and development of an auditing profession in Belgium in the late 1940s and 1950s. Recent research on Anglo-Saxon professions stresses the role of the state in their development. In continental European contexts, the state played an even more significant role, and civil servants in public administration often served as a model for professional organization and behaviour. The main parties that were involved in the creation of the Belgian auditing profession were the state, the employers and the unions. The state maintained a separation between the Belgian profession of independent auditors, the reviseurs d'entreprises, and the associations of accounting professionals, the experts comptables, who tried first to prevent the creation of an auditing profession and then to obtain control over it. This paper demonstrates that the parties in the debate supported different professional models, depending on what they considered the main role of the auditors to be. The debates preceding and following the introduction of the profession focused on the autonomy and structure of the profession, the services to be provided by the auditors, and access to the profession.     

‘Obedience’ in the classroom

The second general standard of the AICPA states “In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.” Despite assertions that the ultimate responsibility of independence rests with the individual auditor, emphasis is typically placed on the AICPA's code of ethics in the auditing classroom. But, does such an approach reflect and accentuate the ultimate moral responsibility of the individual? The purpose of this paper is to discuss the use of Milgram's film “Obedience,” which portrays a psychological experiment on response to authority, as a means of dramatizing the subtle nature of “mental independence” to auditing students.The paper describes the use of this film in auditing instruction and the corresponding response of students. Recommendations for effective administration of the film are offered.     

Auditors’ decision-making under going-concern uncertainties in low litigation-risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study examines the audit opinions issued by auditors in a low litigation-risk environment at a time of high economic uncertainty – that of Hong Kong in the period immediately after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Empirical research using United States data has shown that, contrary to professional guidance which restricts the issue of “disclaimer of opinion” only to situations where existing uncertainties prevent the auditor from forming an opinion, auditors tend to use the “disclaimer” report (in the going concern context) to signal more extreme client firm’s distress. In the high litigation-risk environment of the US, researchers have attributed this tendency to the idea that “disclaimer of opinion” reports are used by auditors to provide some protection against potential legal liability. The results of this study provide evidence that, even in the low litigation-risk environment of Hong Kong, auditors still use “disclaimer” reports to signal more extreme client firm financial distress. Thus, the maintenance of a high litigation-risk environment does not appear to be a necessary pre-requisite for high quality audits.