Do corporate tax cuts increase investments?

This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth.     

Debt, taxes, and international equilibrium

This paper employs an extended Miller model to analyze capital structure decisions of individual firms in a two-country setting. Miller equilibria are generally not consistent with an international equilibrium if the tax subsidy of debt differs across countries. The most obvious reason for differential tax subsidies is differences between national corporate tax rates. We also identify differential tax subsidies of debt if inflation rates differ across countries. For both cases we examine the adjustment process from national equilibria to an international equilibrium without and with barriers to international investment. We derive the relationship between the equilibrium yields on debt and equity in the two countries and discuss the Fisher hypothesis that real returns do not depend upon inflation in a two-country Miller world.     

Mitigating political uncertainty

This study examines whether firms that establish political connections gain differential access to relevant information over legislative developments, thereby mitigating the negative consequences of uncertainty. I find that political connections (partially) offset the negative relation between investment and political uncertainty documented in prior research. My results do not appear to be driven by connected firms pursuing investments that are insensitive to uncertainty. I perform additional tests to address concerns over correlated omitted variables. First, I identify a setting around a tax policy development designed to provide new investment incentives to firms. In this setting, I predict and find that reduced information asymmetry for connected firms results in delaying investment in anticipation of future lucrative tax incentives. Second, I perform a falsification test and document that political connections do not mitigate the effects of general economic uncertainty. Finally, I continue to find support for my hypothesis within a propensity matched sample.     

Profit tax competition and formula apportionment

We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas. JEL Classification H77 · H25 · F23     

Foreign competition and the durability of US firm investments

How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? We study if firms have an incentive to shift investments toward more short‐term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Based on a stylized firm investment model, we derive a within‐firm estimator using variation across investments with different durabilities. Exploiting the Chinese World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, we estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of US firm investments. Firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures toward investments with a shorter durability. This effect is larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.     

Do corporate taxes affect employee welfare? Evidence from workplace safety

We examine the impact of tax policy on worker safety that exploits spatial discontinuity in treatment and control establishments stemming from state-level corporate tax changes. The granularity of our data and econometric approach allows us to exploit within-firm, across-establishment variation in worker safety shedding light on the real effects of headquarter versus plant-level decisions. Plant-level injury rates increase with tax hikes in establishment states, but not with those in headquarter states, highlighting the importance of plant-level decisions. We explore three plausible non-mutually exclusive mechanisms to help explain these findings ─ safety investment, leverage, and labor stress channels. We find that in the presence of a tax hike, firms reduce safety-related investments, and the tax effect on injury rates is exacerbated for firms that increase leverage and for firms where employees work longer hours and seasonal workers are used. Overall, our findings suggest that tax increases lead to negative welfare outcomes for employees, with no similar benefit accruing for tax cuts.     

When are preferred shares preferred? Theory and empirical evidence

This paper demonstrates that preferred stock may arise as an optimal security in a tax-induced equilibrium. This result is driven by graduated tax schedules and by uncertainty. In a more general sense, our results can be interpreted as a template for including any security with a different tax treatment in a firm's capital structure. The first part of the paper demonstrates that the Miller equilibrium framework can accommodate more than two securities if different investor classes are taxed differently on each security and the tax schedule for each investor group is upward sloping. We then simplify the tax schedule, but introduce uncertainty, which implies the possibility of bankruptcy and the possible loss of tax shelters. The interaction of tax rates and seniority now affects the contribution of each security to after-tax firm value, as in some states the firm may not be able to pay either interest (or dividends) or even principal to its various claimholders. It is shown why and how these features, i.e. the various tax rates and seniority, determine the financing equilibrium, which is obtained by equating the expected marginal tax benefit of all securities. We demonstrate that non-profitable firms will tend to issue preferred shares whereas profitable firms will not find preferred stock advantageous in our framework. Comparative statics with respect to various tax rates are derived as well. These predictions are tested using a large sample of firms for the last 25 years. The empirical testing broadly confirms the theoretical predictions.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and theirliberalization on the activities of US multinational firms.These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducingreported local profitability and increasing the frequency ofdividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impactof local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27%higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countriesimposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliatesto remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliateslocated in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higherinterest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of thesame parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls.Capital control liberalizations are associated with significantincreases in multinational activity—property, plant, andequipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations.The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interestrates discourages investment in countries with capital controls,and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls.(JEL F21, F23, F36, F42, G15, G32, G34)     

税率锚定效应与企业投资决策

已有文献证实了高管过度自信等非理性因素对企业投资决策的影响,但尚未有文献研究锚定心理在投资决策中的作用。税收政策连续性不足会使得企业实际税率充满不确定性,高管在预测未来实际税率时很可能会非理性地锚定当期的高税率,进而产生税率锚定行为。本文研究这种非理性的税率锚定行为对企业投资决策的影响,结果发现:企业投资决策中存在显著的税率锚定行为,对高税率的锚定显著降低了企业未来的投资支出,且内在锚效应(纵向对比)强于外在锚效应(横向对比)。进一步地,我们发现经验更丰富的高管有助于缓解投资中的税率锚定效应,但更大的税率波动性加剧了这种效应,最终降低了公司业绩和价值。本文研究表明,控制投资中的税率锚定行为,有利于提高投资效率和企业价值,同时也表明保持宏观税收政策连续性有利于促进企业健康可持续发展。     

中国实业部门金融化的异质性

本文基于实业和金融两类投资组合模型的构建,重点考察不同所有权性质和不同行业企业的金融化驱动机制是否具有异质性,并探究不同类别金融投资对应结果的差异性特征。实证结果与已有研究以及传统印象并不一致:我们发现,风险规避是中国非国有企业和制造业企业金融化的显著驱动因素,而国有企业和非制造业企业则不存在这一特征;同时,非制造业企业的金融投资主要由收益率差驱动,而在其他企业样本中均没有证据显示追逐利润是企业金融化的推动因素。不同企业样本的融资约束、杠杆率、成长性、流动性水平以及资产质量等因素对企业金融资产占比的影响也存在显著差异。进一步区分企业金融投资中货币和非货币类金融资产的不同特性并考虑企业的长期股权投资,结果表明货币类金融资产和非货币类金融资产的驱动机制存在明显差异:对于货币类金融资产投资,国有企业主要受资本逐利因素推动,其他企业则未体现这一特征;对于非货币类金融资产投资,非国有企业、制造业和非制造业企业均受到风险因素驱动,而国有企业则不受影响;将企业长期股权投资纳入金融资产后结果则未产生明显差异。     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

The Responsiveness of Corporate Investments to Changes in Corporate Income Taxation During the Financial Crisis: Empirical Evidence from Slovenian Firms

I examine the responsiveness of corporate investments to changes in corporate income taxation during the financial crisis. When investigating tax effects in financially constrained firms, the model of investment demand needs to be extended to include an additional channel through which taxes could affect investments. I model the tax effects via two transmission channels, the traditional user cost of capital channel and the cash flow channel, which is crucial for financially constrained firms. The empirical results show that corporate investments in financially constrained firms do not respond to changes in corporate income taxation through the user cost of capital channel, but there is strong evidence of the effect that materializes through the cash flow channel.     

How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation?

Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows among 11 OECD countries over 1984–2000, we show that, although agglomeration-related factors are strong determinants of FDI, tax differentials also play a significant role in understanding foreign location decisions. We further investigate non-linearities in the impact of tax differentials, and explore the impact of tax schemes. Our results are consistent with the imperfect competition literature which underscores the possibility of tax differentials across countries in equilibrium.JEL Code: F21, H25, H87     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

"特朗普税改政策"的溢出效应及中国的应对策略

特朗普税改使美国成为税收洼地,各国为争夺国际资本竞相效仿降税,加剧了全球税收竞争,为世界经济复苏增加了更多的不确定性.因此,有必要通过构建利润转移视角的税收竞争模型,揭示特朗普税改对全球经济产生溢出效应的作用机制及赤字约束问题,并运用一般均衡模型(CGE)模拟特朗普税改对世界经济溢出效应的长短期影响.特朗普税改是以邻为壑的经济政策,但长期内对中国等世界主要经济体的负面影响不断减弱,并会对出口产生一定的正面影响.因此,我国应构建国际税务交互管理体制,强化企业税收激励的法制保障,完善税改冲击的应急运行机制.     

International tax competition: do public good spillovers matter?

We study the impact of public good spillovers on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries with different levels of productivity. We show that international public good spillovers, by reducing the tax gap between countries, strengthen the agglomeration of firms in the most productive country. Then we carry on a welfare analysis. We first assume that governments are engaged in a redistributive tax policy. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the tax level in the high-productivity country is inefficiently high while it is inefficiently low in the other country. A different conclusion emerges when tax revenues are recycled in a public good provision: taxes are inefficiently low in both countries and public good spillovers increase the global welfare. Finally, for a given amount of total tax revenues, public good provision in the high-productivity country is inefficiently high compared to its level in the low-productivity country.     

Analysts’ earnings forecasting behavior surrounding uncertain regulatory events: evidence from the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This study examines analysts’ forecasting behaviour in the presence of significant tax policy uncertainty. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) was preceded by a lengthy debate, allowing us to investigate how tax policy uncertainty evolves over time. Our results are generally consistent with the intuition that uncertainty precedes the enactment of a proposed tax law while complexity manifests afterwards. Using the repeal of the investment tax credit to identify highly impacted firms, we find that the onset of disagreement among analysts during the debate occurred sooner for highly impacted firms than other firms. We also find that disagreement among analysts was concentrated among highly impacted firms before and after enactment. Given that our sample period precedes Regulation Fair Disclosure, our evidence suggests that analysts relied on private information from management to resolve the uncertainty associated with TRA86 but only for highly impacted firms.     

Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition

An agreement about a lower bound for admissible tax rates can reduce the equilibrium tax rate (and thus welfare) in tax competition among fully symmetric countries. This is shown in an infinitely repeated game where the stage game describes the standard tax competition model with source-based taxes and symmetric countries. Repeated interaction may allow countries to sustain cooperation through implicit contracts. Lower bounds on tax rates (‘minimum taxes’) restrict the ability of countries to punish deviators. This makes cooperation harder to sustain. The introduction of a lower bound on feasible tax rates may thus harm all countries.     

Law,Stock Markets,and Innovation

We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long‐run rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.