会计信息可比性与债务契约定价研究

以2008-2019年A股上市公司为样本,基于风险溢价视角,运用普通最小二乘法(OLS)实证考察会计信息可比性对债务契约定价的影响效应.结果表明:可比性具有债务契约冲突的协调功能,金融机构对高会计信息可比性予以正面评价,倾向于为高会计信息可比性企业提供长期债务融资,且高会计信息可比性有助于降低企业债务融资成本.机制检验表明,资本市场能够识别企业的盈余管理行为,盈余管理与财务风险在会计信息可比性对债务契约定价的影响中发挥中介效应.进一步研究发现,高质量审计会弱化会计信息可比性对债务契约定价的影响效应.     

家族控制与企业债务融资：基于我国上市公司的实证分析

以2017年1647家上市家族企业为研究对象,从企业控制人持有公司控制权比例对上市家族企业债务融资的影响切入,引入债务代理成本,运用中介效应模型,分析家族控制对企业债务融资变动的解释能力。研究发现家族企业家族控制水平对于上市家族企业债务融资具有负面影响,家族控制权的提高会提升企业的债务代理成本,而债务代理成本对家族控制权与企业债务融资的关系具有完全中介效应。     

基于代理成本的企业债务融资契约安排研究

通过债务融资能够缓和股东与经营者的冲突 ,进而降低股权融资的代理成本 ,然而 ,债务融资契约的引入又会产生债务融资的代理成本 ,因此 ,最佳债务融资比例的确定需要在股权融资与债务融资的代理成本之间进行权衡。本文依据代理理论 ,就基于代理成本的企业债务融资契约安排进行了研究。     

企业社会责任与债务违约风险——基于ISO26000社会责任指南的原则和实践的分析

基于 ISO26000社会责任指南的原则和实践经验,分析企业社会责任降低债务违约风险的内在机制及我国企业社会责任表现与其债务违约风险的关系。研究发现：社会责任表现较好的企业债务违约风险较低,因债务事项被提起仲裁和诉讼的可能性较小,企业积极承担社会责任可以促进债务契约的履行,降低债务违约风险。进一步分析发现,经营能力和信息质量在企业社会责任与债务违约风险的关系中发挥部分中介传导作用,而经营风险的中介效应不明显。     

债务融资与代理成本研究综述

企业的发展离不开资金,其中债务融资作为企业重要的资金来源,并且可以降低权益融资的代理成本,发挥治理效应.本文在系统回顾和梳理了国内外有关债务融资与代理成本相关的研究成果的基础上,指出了未来研究的方向,以其对理论和实践有参考意义.     

论高质量审计与提升负债的治理效应——基于代理成本与代理效率视角的经验检验

以2007～2010年我国A股上市公司为样本,分别从代理成本和代理效率的视角考察了高质量审计是否有助于提升负债的治理功效。研究发现:高质量审计与短期借款之间存在协同治理效应,该效应有助于提升代理效率但无助于降低代理成本;进一步地,高质量审计与短期借款之间的协同治理效应仅显著存在于金融发展水平高地区的上市公司中。此外,附加检验的结果显示,高质量审计有助于透过改进代理效率提升商业信用的治理功效且这一效应只在法治化程度较高地区的上市公司中存在。上述研究结论揭示了我国当前制度环境下高质量审计提升债务治理功效的路径及影响因素。     

法制环境、管理者能力与企业债务契约

本文从管理者能力的视角出发,选取2010-2018年沪、深A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了管理者能力对债务契约的影响及其影响路径。研究证明:管理者能力越强,企业的债务期限结构越短、债务融资成本越低。进一步研究发现,在不同的法制环境中,二者的关系存在异质性,即管理者能力对债务期限结构、债务融资成本的影响在法制环境较高的地区较为显著。本文丰富了企业债务契约的影响因素,探寻了管理者能力影响债务期限结构、债务融资成本的路径。     

高管文化背景与企业债务成本——基于劳模文化的视角

目前,文化对各种经济活动影响的研究日益增加,但有关文化对债务契约的研究才刚刚起步.本文在既有高管文化背景的研究成果基础上,从劳模文化的视角切入,基于精神利益和物质利益动机,考察高管的劳动模范身份对企业债务成本的影响及机理.结果 表明:高管劳模身份有助于降低债务成本.进一步考察融资环境的影响并发现,在市场化程度更高和金融生态环境更好的地区该效应被削弱,表明劳模文化对正式制度规范企业经济运行产生了替代效应.机制检验发现,高管劳模身份通过降低资金供需双方的信息不对称和提供声誉担保来降低债务成本.最后,在排除金融关联和政治关联的影响后,本文发现高管劳模身份对债务成本的降低效应依然显著.     

ESG表现、年报文本语调与债务融资成本

在当下绿色经济与高质量发展的背景下，研究企业环保责任、社会责任与公司治理责任（ESG）的整体表现对债务融资成本的影响，具有重要的现实意义。本文以2015—2022年我国非金融行业A股上市公司为研究对象，深入探析ESG表现对企业债务融资成本的作用机理。研究发现，良好的ESG表现对企业债务融资成本具有显著的降低效应，且结果稳健可靠。经传导路径检验发现，良好的ESG表现能够通过提升年报文本语调的积极性来引导和改善债务契约关系，进而使企业获取低成本的债务融资。另外，通过分组检验发现，ESG表现对债务融资成本的降低效应，在非国有企业、融资约束低的企业和会计信息披露质量高的企业尤为明显。     

契约条款、债务融资与企业成长——基于中国公司债的经验研究

本文从股东与债权人的代理冲突出发,基于手工搜集的公司债券契约条款信息,创新性地将企业成长能力与财务杠杆、债务期限、契约条款三个财务政策变量视为联合内生,研究企业成长能力与财务政策选择之间的交互作用机制。研究发现,契约条款保护程度随着企业成长能力的提升而增加,同时契约条款保护债券投资者的力度越大,对企业的成长和发展就越有利;契约条款作为缓解股东-债权人代理冲突的一种机制,对短期负债具有替代效应;而且契约条款和短期负债可以减弱成长能力与财务杠杆之间的反向关系。该研究对于我国企业如何通过契约条款缓解代理冲突、优化财务政策,进而促进企业创新和成长具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。     

Debt contract strictness and auditor specialization

The conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders and creditors resulting in agency costs, can be mitigated by restricting managers’ adverse behavior, through financial covenants to better align the various stakeholder interests. Thus, debt contract strictness represents an important aspect of agency costs between creditors, shareholders, and management that is not always captured by interest rates. The contract setting provides a unique opportunity to investigate how creditors may rely on auditors to alleviate information uncertainty stemming from reliance on management's financial reporting and thus alleviate the creditor's potential loss of invested capital. After controlling for borrower risks, loan characteristics, and audit factors, we show that auditor industry specialization is significantly associated with a reduction in the strictness of debt contracts, consistent with creditors viewing certain industry expert auditors as effective monitors against financial reporting manipulation aimed at the avoidance of debt covenant triggers that protect creditors against potential loss. Further, we find that the association between loan strictness and auditor specialization is attenuated by stronger corporate governance systems, external monitors, and prior lender relationships.     

The choice of maturity and additional covenants in debt contracts: A panel data approach

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis for the choice of contract terms in UK Eurobonds. Typically, the theory associates the choice of debt contract terms to firm and market characteristics, arguing that an adequate choice of these terms allows for the reduction of debt contracting costs. We use a panel data approach to examine the validity of extant predictions concerning the choice of maturity, call options, convertible options and protective covenants. Findings provide support to the agency prediction that debt contract terms function as alternative control mechanisms. Additionally, complementary role is found for the use of convertible and call options. Evidence that managers follow a maturity-matching rule, favour capital structure's flexibility in high growth scenarios and use protective covenants when firm's credibility is low corroborates further agency predictions.     

董事会规模、多元化战略与企业风险承担

不确定的外部竞争环境和公司战略定位对企业的风险承担水平具有重要影响.以2005-2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,以董事会规模作为门槛变量,分析当董事会人数在不同区间下多元化战略的实施对企业风险承担产生的影响.研究表明:随着董事会人数的增加,多元化战略与企业风险承担呈现先增后减的变化趋势,且二者存在基于董事会规模的双重门槛效应.     

Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms

This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and non-multinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debt, but more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6951 firm–year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988–1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs have statistically significant negative effects on the firm's long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increased by the firm's degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm's increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. This result is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations (MNCs) are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs' lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.     

Prosocial CEOs and the cost of debt: Evidence from syndicated loan contracts

This paper investigates whether banks value the presence of prosocial CEOs when designing loan contracts. Using personal charitable donation behavior to identify prosocial CEOs, we find robust evidence that the presence of prosocial CEOs is negatively related to firms' cost of debt. We address endogeneity concerns by employing a difference-in-differences setting that exploits exogenous CEO turnover events. Moreover, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs mitigates the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, thereby reduces the agency cost of debt. In addition, we find that the effect of prosocial CEOs also extends to non-price loan contract terms. Finally, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs has positive implications for firm value and is associated with lower default risk.     

契约论视阈下债务融资治理效应研究

以我国沪深两市的A股上市公司为研究样本,运用契约理论,通过构建多元回归模型,对公司债务融资的治理效应进行实证研究。研究表明,我国上市公司的债务融资并不能对管理层发挥很好的激励和约束作用,从而不能显著地降低公司的代理成本,也没有提高公司绩效,即公司债务融资契约没有发挥出其应有的治理效应。     

Inside debt and firm risk-taking: Evidence from the UK pension reform

This paper provides new evidence on the relation between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking by exploiting the change in the tax treatment of UK pensions following two pension amendments. The 2006 pension reform introduces the annual and lifetime allowance for UK pension schemes, significantly increasing income taxes associated with CEO inside debt. The 2011 allowance cut, which substantially reduces the annual allowance introduced in 2006, further increases income taxes on inside debt. We find that CEO inside debt, in the form of executive pensions declines after the 2006 reform while cash-in-lieu increases significantly. This effect is more severe after the 2011 allowance cut than the 2006 pension reform. UK firms appear to substitute away from pensions towards cash-in-lieu, where income taxes are less punishing. If the association between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal, we should observe a change of risk-taking after the decline of inside debt. Our results, which exploit the exogenous nature of the reforms, show that the decline of CEO pensions does not lead to any change in firm risk-taking. This result suggests that no causal relationship exists between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. Our results extend the inside debt literature, where empirical evidence is mainly documented in the US. Contrary to findings in the US, our evidence suggests that the use of CEO inside debt is motivated to minimise income tax rather than a tool to moderate firm risk.     

两权分离度、信息不对称与债务融资选择 — 基于中国民营上市公司的样本分析

本文主要探讨了我国民营上市公司终极控制人的两权分离程度与银行借款和公开 发债选择之间的关系,以2011-2015年我国民营上市公司的面板数据为样本,利用多元回归分 析方法进行研究。结果表明两权分离程度越大,公司进行债务融资时越倾向于银行借款;当信 息不对称程度越低、信息透明程度越高时,公司倾向于选择公开发债,两权分离程度较大导致 的代理问题也会得到弱化。结论符合有效市场理论。     

我国系统性金融风险测度研究

本文以金融压力指数作为系统性金融风险测度指标,基于金融部门、宏观经济、 房地产市场、外部经济等方面构建系统性金融风险测度指标体系,集成分析金融体系整体风 险状况。测度结果显示,2014年至今,我国金融压力指数呈上升趋势,系统性金融风险压力增 大,但整体可控,需要把防控金融风险放到更加重要的位置,切实防范系统性金融风险。