基于扩展的KMV方法的短期融资券信用溢价分析

本文通过扩展KMV模型对公司违约的定义,实证研究了我国上市企业短期融资券的信用溢价。结果表明,由模型得出的信用溢价只能解释样本债券总价差的一部分,但总体上与短期融资券价差存在一定的正相关关系。模型能够反映短期融资券信用风险的变化,为短期融资券的定价提供一定参考。     

短期融资券信用价差分析

短期融资券的信用价差初具分化趋势,不同评级机构给出同一信用等级的信用价差不同,说明各评级机构在评级标准和评级理念的把握上存在一定的差异。A-1 、 A-1信用等级之间没有形成明显不同的信用价差影射区间。短期融资券的发行利率的大幅上升主要是由于一级市场收益率微薄、流动性风险加剧以及作为定价基准的央行票据利率不断上调等直接原因造成的。     

中国信用风险缓释工具创新试点最新进展

信用风险缓释工具（CRM）是2010年我国债券市场最重要的信用风险管理创新工具,它将短期融资券、中期票据等信用类债券的信用风险剥离定价,并转移给愿意承担风险的投资者。本文通过对CRM试点过程中存在的投资主体单一、市场机制不完善及外部环境建设滞后等问题进行了深度剖析,并有针对性地从投资者培育、信用评级与定价、做市商机制、交易信息披露、信用事件处理、以及监管会计税收法律制度建设等方面提出政策建议,以利于CRM市场的可持续发展。     

保险公司债券投资信用级别限制对债券市场流动性的影响

2005年12月,保监会发布《保险机构投资者债券投资管理暂行办法》,对符合保险公司购买条件的债券信用级别作出严格限制。保险公司的债券投资对象仅限于指定的信用级别债券上,不同信用级别的债券可能因为保险公司能否参与投资导致市场流动性水平出现较大的差别。本文通过分析52只发行额度为10亿元的短期融资券市场流动性水平,认为保险公司的参与对提高债券流动性水平有一定的正面影响。     

短期融资券的信用风险与商业银行投资策略

本文在分析短期融资券价格构成（发行价格和交易价格）的基础上．对短期融资券的信用风险和信用补偿以及所导致的市场风险进行了深入分析．在此基础上．作者提出了商业银行对于短期融资券而言相对可行的投资策略．即市场转换策略、持有到期策略．价差交易策略和待售交易策略，以及在交易策略执行中所应关注的重点问题。     

公司股票和债券价格中的信用风险信息效率研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

有效市场假说认为,金融市场上金融资产的价格变化是对各种信息的反应,如果这种反应是即刻而充分的,那么市场就是有效的。本文基于我国上市公司股票和债券的价格数据,应用KMV模型和信用价差模型度量上市公司股票和债券价格变化所反映的公司信用风险大小,在此基础上检验并比较上市公司股票和债券价格对其信用风险信息反应的效率。结果表明,从短期信息有效性方面看,股票价格能够更加及时有效地反映公司信用风险信息,公司债券价格对信用风险信息的反应存在滞后性,但随着实际信用风险增加,滞后时差缩短;从长期来看,股票价格和债券价格在反映公司信用风险信息上存在一致性,公司的实际信用风险大小是影响两者存在一致性的重要因素,实际的信用风险越大,两者的一致性越强。     

短期融资券对商业银行的挑战和机遇

目前，企业短期融资券的发行期限已覆盖到一年以下的所有短期品种。作为一种非政府性质的信用品种，企业短期融资券的发行使短期货币市场利率更加全面，进而将带动长期债券定价的市场化，推动我国利率市场化改革得以向纵深发展。     

基于KMV模型的中国短期融资券信用风险评级研究

针对短期融资券主体信用评级未能完全准确地反映出短期融资券信用风险的问题,本文引入信用风险计量的KMV模型,运用Matlab软件计算出短期融资券的违约距离,按照违约距离的大小通过聚类分析将样本划分为六组。在此基础上,以信用利差表示投资者对短期融资券信用风险的认可,将各组信用利差与其违约距离对应起来,对各组的信用利差进行方差分析,结果显示各组之间的差异非常显著,表明分组状况比较理想,按违约距离判断短期融资券的信用风险是合适的,实现了对短期融资券的信用风险评级。     

中国信用风险缓释工具创新试点最新进展研究

信用风险缓释工具是中国银行间市场2010年创新试点推出的信用风险管理工具,它将短期融资券、中期票据和贷款等信用产品的信用风险剥离定价,并转移给愿意承担风险的投资者,其推出从根本上改变了商业银行等金融机构信用风险管理的传统特征。通过对信用风险缓释工具试点中投资主体培育、市场定价、做市商机制、信息披露、市场外部环境建设等问题进行研究,有利于信用缓释工具功能的充分发挥,有利于完善债券市场信用风险分担机制、有利于商业银行等投资者动态、专业地管理信用风险。     

银行间债券市场新型企业信用债券的发展和利率市场化

<正>一、我国银行间债券市场企业信用债券的发展历史(一)银行间市场企业信用债券简介按照债券品种分类,我国的债券可以分为公债和企业债,公债是指具有国家信用或者类国家信用的债券,主要包括国债、政策性金融债以及地方政府债券。企业债券可分为狭义企业债券和广义企业债券,我国的狭义企业债券具有中国特色,专指由发展改革委员会核准发行的企业债券。而广义企业债券则包括除狭义企业债券以外的公司债券、短期融资券、中期票据以及中小企业集合债券等。公司债券发行由证监会核准,发行主体为上市公司。短期融资券、中期票据等的发行则实行注册制,由银行间市场交易商协会负责管理。企业债券、公司债券和短期融资券等统称企业信用债券,又叫公司信用债券。     

2013年中国债券市场发展报告

2013年中国债券市场收益率曲线平坦化上行,高评级信用利差收窄,信用债等级间利差拓宽。展望2014年,资金面仍将维持紧平衡,利率债供给压力将小幅增加,国债收益率曲线小幅陡峭化下移,下半年市场表现好于上半年;在信用债市场,随着下半年市场收益率水平下行和信用债供给的增加,高评级产品利差将会拓宽;中低评级债券受信用风险事件和交易所重启IPO影响,等级间利差也将拓宽。     

Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Reprint of: Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Illiquidity or credit deterioration: A study of liquidity in the US corporate bond market during financial crises

We investigate whether liquidity is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market. In particular, we focus on whether liquidity effects are more pronounced in periods of financial crises, especially for bonds with high credit risk, using a unique data set covering more than 20,000 bonds, between October 2004 and December 2008. We employ a wide range of liquidity measures and find that liquidity effects account for approximately 14% of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes. We conclude that the economic impact of the liquidity measures is significantly larger in periods of crisis, and for speculative grade bonds.     

What drives the cost of US dollar bond funding for banks?

This paper decomposes issue spreads on US dollar-denominated bonds issued by LIBOR panel banks into credit risk and liquidity premium components. We attribute the recent increase in issue spreads to the investor perception that banks are less creditworthy than in the past. Although the behaviour of the credit risk component is well-explained by a structural model of default, this mechanism is nullified by the introduction of government guarantees. The behaviour of the liquidity premium component is partially explained by the bid/ask spread in the secondary market and issue size. Government guarantees also reduce the liquidity component of the issue spread.     

Internal liquidity risk in corporate bond yield spreads

The recent global financial crisis reveals the important role of internal liquidity risk in corporate credit risk. However, few existing studies investigate its effects on bond yield spreads. Panel data for the period from year 1993 through 2008 show that corporate internal liquidity risk significantly impacts bond yield spreads (and changes) when controlling for well-known bond yield determinant variables, traditional accounting measures of corporate debt servicing ability, cash flow volatility, credit ratings, and state variables. This finding indicates that internal liquidity risk should therefore be incorporated into bond yield spread modeling.     

The interbank market after the financial turmoil: Squeezing liquidity in a “lemons market” or asking liquidity “on tap”

After August 2007 the plumbing system that supplied banks with wholesale funding, the interbank market, failed because toxic assets obstructed the pipes. Banks were forced to squeeze liquidity in a “lemons market” or to ask for liquidity “on tap” from central banks. This paper disentangles the two components of the 3-month Euribor–Eonia swap spread, credit and liquidity risk and then evaluates the decomposition. The main finding is that credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, while liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread and then reacted to the systemic responses of the central banks, especially in October 2008. Moreover, the level of the spread between May 2009 and February 2010 was influenced mainly by credit risk, suggesting that European banks were still in a “lemons market” and relied on liquidity “on tap” even before sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Europe.     

The effect of liquidity and solvency risk on the inclusion of bond covenants

Studies have analyzed the impact of firm and issue characteristics but not liquidity and solvency components of financial distress on the use of bond covenants. Using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from 2001 to 2012, we find that firm liquidity, measured by standardized Lambda, has a negative statistical and economic impact on the inclusion of all categories and sub-categories of restrictive bond covenants. Developed from financial statement information by Emery and Lyons (1991), Lambda is designed as a coverage ratio that, under certain distribution assumptions, maps into the probability of a firm being unable to pay its short-term bills. The strongest solvency proxy is the 10-year credit default swap (CDS) spread which is significant across the categories and sub-categories for investment and payment covenants, weakly significant for the subordinated debt sub-category of the subsequent financing covenant, but strongly significant for the control poison put sub-category of event covenants. This evidence supports a model that uses SLambda as a proxy for liquidity risk and the 10-year CDS spread as a proxy for solvency risk. The liquidity/covenant relationship is dampened when firms have access to commercial paper funding or bank loans. However, during the recent financial crisis liquidity event this liquidity/covenant relationship was enhanced especially for firms which were dependent on commercial paper during this time when the commercial paper market was deteriorating.     

A Multifactor Model of Credit Spreads

We represent credit spreads across ratings as a function of common unobservable factors of the Vasicek form. Using a state-space approach we estimate the factors, their process parameters, and the exposure of each observed credit spread series to each factor. We find that most of the systematic variation across credit spreads is captured by three factors. The factors are closely related to the implied volatility index (VIX), the long bond rate, and S&P500 returns, supporting the predictions of structural models of default at an aggregate level. By making no prior assumption about the determinants of yield spread dynamics, our study provides an original and independent test of theory. The results also contribute to the current debate about the role of liquidity in corporate yield spreads. While recent empirical literature shows that the level and time-variation in corporate yield spreads is driven primarily by a systematic liquidity risk factor, we find that the three most important drivers of yield spread levels relate to macroeconomic variables. This suggests that if credit spread levels do contain a large liquidity premium, the time variation of this premium is likely driven by the same factors as default risk.     

Liquidity risk and syndicate structure

We decompose syndicated loan risk into credit, market, and liquidity risk and test how these shape syndicate structure. Commercial banks dominate relative to non-banks in loan syndicates that expose lenders to liquidity risk. This dominance is most pronounced when borrowers have high levels of credit or market risk. We then tie commercial banks’ advantage in liquidity risk to access to transactions deposits by comparing investments across banks. The results suggest that risk-management considerations matter most for participants relative to lead arrangers. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure, for instance, are more than 50% larger at participants than at lead arrangers.