信息过载是否影响投资者对公开信息的使用——来自季度盈余的实证证据

首季季报之所以可能导致投资者的信息过载原因有二 :一是许多公司在同一天披露其季报 ;二是公司的年报和季报有可能同时披露。我们的结果说明了信息的集中披露本身并不妨碍投资者对信息的及时利用 ,这些发现对我国资本市场上信息披露监管机构有着直接的政策性含义。     

Optimal certification policy,entry, and investment in the presence of public signals

We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.     

Reporting Frequency, Information Precision and Private Information Acquisition

Abstract:  This study examines whether the choice between quarterly and semiannual reporting affects the precision of investors' information and their private information acquisition activities. In the first part of this study, we show that a firm's reporting frequency has no effect on the average precision of investors' information. However, our analysis of announcement-period price variance and share turnover shows that an increase in reporting frequency does make interim and annual financial reports a more important component of investors' information set, relative to other sources of information. In particular, the results of this analysis suggest that investors of semiannual reporters hold more precise pre-announcement information than investors of quarterly reporters. In the second part of our study, we test one explanation for this finding. We argue that an increase in a firm's reporting frequency reduces investors' incentives to acquire private information between consecutive announcement dates and, consequently, should reduce information asymmetry among investors, increase share liquidity, and stimulate trading. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that quarterly reporters have lower average bid-ask spreads and higher abnormal share turnover than semiannual reporters.     

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.     

会计信息披露需求:来自证券研究机构的分析

证券市场投资者决策需建立在有效信息基础之上,会计信息是证券市场信息披露的重要内容。能否满足投资者信息需求,成为会计信息能否在投资者信息渠道竞争中获胜的关键所在。本文采用调查问卷的方法,以证券研究人员为调查对象,详细分析了投资者对当前披露的会计信息的评价,认为管理会计信息应该并且能够成为信息披露的重要内容。     

公允价值的价值相关性:B股公司的证据

本文研究了B股公司按国际会计准则第39号(IAS39)披露公允价值的股价反映,以及公允价值揭示对会计信息价值相关性的影响。本研究发现,公允价值披露显著地增加了会计盈余的价值相关性。按公允价值计量的投资持有利得(损失)具有较弱的增量解释能力。而投资的公允价值调整没有显示出价值相关性。公允价值调整及持有利得(损失)对股价的影响存在差异,原因可能在于我国投资者对盈余的关注程度要高于对账面净值的关注程度。公允价值调整及持有利得(损失)缺乏很强的价值相关性的原因在于,公允价值存在计量误差,而投资者也看穿了这一计量误差。     

Pricing and Mispricing Effects of SFAS 131

Abstract:  We investigate the effects of the introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) on the market's valuation of foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) documents that investors discount the value of foreign earnings for US multinational companies. He conjectures but does not test the possibility that this finding is due to poor disclosure related to foreign operations. We find strong evidence that the introduction of the standard is positively associated with the pricing of foreign earnings. In addition, we use both the Mishkin (1983) test and a zero-investment hedge portfolio test and find that investors' mispricing of foreign earnings lessens (and in fact disappears) after SFAS 131. This study is one of the first attempts to show that improved disclosure reduces mispricing.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization

The so-called disclosure principle is a 'puzzle' in the accounting literature: Game theoretic models of financial markets show that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. Yet, the result is not convincing. Researchers have therefore built sophisticated models in order to demonstrate for which reasons the disclosure principle might fail. This note shows that even in the original model there are multiple equilibria. In those equilibria good types disclose and bad types do not. The commonly known full disclosure equilibrium is a limit point of the equilibrium set.     

First‐price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure

Although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two‐bidder first‐price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret, the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed. Nevertheless, we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure. Thus, if the bidders follow this equilibrium, the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

The Costs, Wealth Effects, and Determinants of International Capital Raising: Evidence from Public Yankee Bonds

This paper examines the costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising for a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-U.S. firms in the Yankee bond market. We find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that are located in countries that do not protect investors' rights and do not have a prior history of ongoing disclosure. The results provide support for the literature that suggests better legal protections and more detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F3, G1.     

中国证券市场投资者关系管理的发展逻辑

面对日益高涨的市场信任危机,引进投资者关系管理是中国证券市场重要的现实抉择。证券市场中的诸多制度缺陷对投资者关系管理的发展构成了障碍,因此,中国证券市场投资者关系管理的发展需要推动融资市场制度安排向投资市场制度安排过渡、改善股权结构,改进公司治理、构建以信息披露为主的监管架构等多方面的制度创新。     

Limited Information and the Sustainability of Unlisted-Target Acquirers' Returns

Abstract:  Relaxed disclosure requirements of unlisted firms, as compared to publicly listed companies, lead to limited quality and quantity of information at bid announcements, causing difficulty in valuing gains from mergers. This raises the question: are the frequently reported superior announcement-period gains to unlisted-target acquirers sustainable in the long run? Our results for the UK show that unlisted-target acquirers gain on announcement, but suffer a substantial loss in the long run. This reversal in fortune of unlisted-target acquirers is in sharp contrast to the performance of listed-target acquirers in the UK. Therefore, short-run gains for unlisted-target acquirers may result from investors' excessive optimism when faced with limited and biased information.     

The Development of Accounting and Reporting in Ghana

In this paper, we examine the economic, political, and legal systems as well as the institutional factors that influence the accounting and disclosure practices in Ghana. The impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on disclosure is also investigated, as Ghana has recently completed full adoption. We find that the accounting and reporting practices are significantly influenced by legal, political, institutional, and economic factors and that the regulatory environment is neither effective nor efficient due to the weak monitoring and enforcement of compliance. Although there has been some recent progress, the Companies' Code, which is the corporate legal framework of Ghana, must be updated to reflect the dynamic nature of world operations. This study advances the course of standards setters, regulators, accounting practitioners, and policymakers to improve the corporate reporting and accounting practices. Urgent measures need to be undertaken to reform and build the capacities of institutions charged with the responsibility of regulating and monitoring Ghanaian accounting and reporting practices to ensure best practices and build investors' confidence.     

Managerial Ownership and Accounting Disclosures: An Empirical Study

This study examines empirically the effect of managerial ownership on firms' disclosures. Agency theory predicts that investors' information requirements increase with the agency costs of the firm. Managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and therefore should reduce investors' information needs. This study tests the hypothesis that firms with lower levels of managerial ownership provide more extensive disclosures by examining analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures. In contrast to the proxies used in prior studies that test this relationship, such as the earnings-return correlation and management earnings forecasts, these ratings provide a more direct measure of firms' overall disclosure practices.I find that the relationship between managerial holdings and disclosures depends on the type of disclosure. Consistent with the hypothesis of this study, firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosures provided in their annual and quarterly reports, even after controlling for size, performance, volatility of returns, the frequency of securities offerings and proprietary costs. The more informal and flexible aspects of disclosures, however, as measured by the investor relations rating, are not influenced by the level of managerial ownership. These results are consistent with prior research that predicts that firms lower their costs of capital by signaling a commitment to maintain a more open disclosure policy. Because annual and quarterly reports are less flexible, and therefore less likely to change, they may represent a more credible commitment to provide more informative disclosures.     

审计师对信息风险区别对待了吗?——基于“调增式变脸”与审计意见关系的证据

借鉴Francis等(2005)将信息风险区分为基本面、信号传递、机会主义行为与纯噪音四方面风险的思路,本文研究审计师是否对信息风险的不同构成进行了区别对待。结合相关理论,本文选择了管理层预测报喜的公司为样本,以报喜"无变脸"代表信号传递风险或无风险,以"调增式变脸"代表基本面与机会主义披露策略的混合风险,实证发现"调增式变脸"更容易得到非标意见。进一步地选择"调增式变脸"的公司为分样本,以"扭亏型变脸"代表基本面风险,以"其他调增式变脸"代表机会主义披露策略风险,实证发现"扭亏型变脸"更容易得到非标意见。研究结果表明,审计师对信息风险的不同构成进行了区别对待,且最关注基本面风险。     

理论·实践·创新:洞悉国际前沿 推进会计发展——2010北美华人会计教授年会述评

北美华人会计教授年会(CAPANA,以下简称年会)是海内外会计学者分享最新研究成果、探讨热点会计问题、创新会计理论的学术盛宴。第三届年会由北美华人会计教授协会主办,西南财经大学承办,本次年会收到大量海内外学者的研究论文,内容涵盖了目前北美实证会计领域的最新动向,包括了股票期权、信息披露、盈余管理以及债券投资者保护等在学界长期存在争议的一系列理论问题。本文以摘选出的八篇会议论文为基础,扼要介绍了这些蕴涵重要学术价值和深刻实践意义的最新研究成果,并结合国内外研究现状加以简短评述。最后总结了此次年会对于中国会计学界在会计理论、实务研究等方面所带来的启发与思考。     

信息税及其对证券市场会计信息披露问题的治理

随着我国证券市场的发展,证券市场的法定信息披露、信息披露监管、会计准则建设等信息的公共服务越来越重要,而证券市场现行较为单一的证券交易税收制度作为公共服务开支的来源很难保证这些公共服务的有效提供。开征信息税所产生的收入、支出和调节等作用会产生一定的政策效应,如提高证券市场信息披露利益相关者对虚假信息披露问题进行治理参与的积极性,提高信息披露监管、信息披露规则建设和合法信息权利保障工作的财力支持,从而有利于证券市场信息披露质量、信息监管质量的提高,有利于证券市场有效性的提高和信息披露利益相关者合法权益的维护。     

The Relevance of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts in Japan

Abstract:   This study examines the role of financial analysts in equity valuation in Japan by comparing the relevance of financial analysts' earnings forecasts, over financial statement information, to investors' decisions. We find that the value‐relevance of a set of accounting variables is very modest, but the incremental contribution of analysts' forecasts is very significant. This is in line with the expectation that the skill and expertise of analysts are more valuable in markets with poor financial disclosure, such as Japan. We also find that the importance of the financial statements increases over time while the importance of the analysts' forecasts does not change. We also provide evidence of the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu, on the informativeness of accounting signals and earnings forecasts. The results show that the contribution of accounting variables to valuation is lower for keiretsu firms, which supports the exclusionary hypothesis that companies which are a part of keiretsu, disclose less information than do non‐keiretsu companies. The analysts' forecasts are equally important for investors in both types of firms.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Information in a Setting in which Endowment of Information has Productive Value

Abstract:  This paper introduces a model capturing managers' disclosure policies in settings in which disclosure is rewarded by the financial market because disclosure implies that managers are endowed with information and endowment of information may potentially improve the firm's productive efficiency. It provides sufficient condition for a threshold disclosure equilibrium to obtain and compares disclosure policies in a setting in which endowment of information improves the firm's productive efficiency with disclosure policies in a setting in which endowment of information has no impact on the firm's productive efficiency. Managers' disclosure policies are shown to depend crucially on whether the endowment of information is exogenous or endogenous. When the endowment of information is exogenous, an increase in the usefulness of information in improving the firm's productive efficiency leads to a decrease in the disclosure threshold and hence an increase in the amount of information disclosed. In contrast, when the endowment of information is endogenous, an increase in the usefulness of information in improving the firm's productive efficiency has no effect on the disclosure threshold but leads to a decrease in the probability with which information is acquired and hence a decrease in the amount of information disclosed. As, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium, the net present value of information acquisition arising from any increase in production efficiency is negative, an increase in the usefulness of information in improving the firm's productive efficiency thus reduces the inefficiency caused by information acquisition.