推行环境污染强制责任保险的经济学分析

环境保护部和中国保监会联合发布了《关于开展环境污染强制责任保险试点工作的指导意见》,首次正式提出实施环境污染强制责任保险,体现出我国政府对环境污染问题的重视以及我国解决环境问题的紧迫性。文章从经济学角度分析了环境污染责任保险市场中存在的市场失灵问题,作为任意责任保险的环境污染责任保险难以自动实施,需要以强制责任保险的形式来推行环境污染责任保险。     

中国食品行业特征与食品安全责任保险机制设计——基于信任品理论

基于行为经济学中的信任品理论,针对我国食品行业特征,对我国食品安全问题进行分析,将我国的食品安全责任保险机制设计作为研究对象,认为保险这一金融创新手段的介入,存在主客体体量倒挂下监督作用失效、行业社会形象信任危机下信号显示失灵、收入分配不均下消费者食品质量特性需求混同、分散市场结构与流通程序增加下的可验证性与质量控制困难、强制模式试点瞄准方式与理论不相符、归责原则与食品安全危害的极大负外部性不匹配六类问题,并借鉴国外先进经验,依据帕累托改进与社会福利最优原理,给出了对应的政策建议。     

责任保险:市场失灵、立法强制与道德风险管理

责任保险看起来能够解决安全事故受害者的补偿问题,但单靠市场力量很难形成有规模的责任保险交易.为保证对受害人的赔偿,政府可以在一些关乎百姓生存权的领域实行强制责任保险.不幸的是,强制责任保险会带来被保险人(致害人)的道德风险问题,从而可能降低整个社会的安全水平.鉴于保险人控制被保险人(致害人)道德风险的目标与社会安全目标的一致性,政府和社会应该允许保险人使用社会已有的风险监控系统、支持建立有效的信息共享系统、给予保险人拒绝承保的权利以及由保险人对特殊行业进行强制风险监控.     

金融创新如何促进社会和谐?——来自中国医疗纠纷的证据

社会矛盾(如医患矛盾、债务纠纷等)影响经济和社会的高质量发展。理论上，社会矛盾本身可以被视为一种金融风险(市场不完全问题),引入相应的保险合约和市场(如责任保险等)会使市场更加完全，从而有效化解社会矛盾，促进社会和谐，实现帕累托改进。但由于缺乏足够的政策反事实，这个理论命题尚未得到理想的实证检验。本文利用中国渐进式医疗责任强制保险试点政策这一准自然实验，使用医疗纠纷数据和双重差分方法，识别出责任保险化解医患矛盾的因果效应和传导机制。研究发现，医疗责任强制保险由于使得市场更完全而增进医患双方的信任，显著降低了医疗纠纷，是一种帕累托有效的制度安排。这表明，金融创新可为化解社会矛盾、促进社会和谐及高质量发展提供有效解决方案。     

我国食品安全责任强制保险制度之构建——以强制自治为视角

对于食品安全责任保险,在商业保险“供求双冷”的背景下,推行食品安全责任强制保险已是大势所趋。要实现其制度价值,必须进行科学的制度设计。强制自治为我国食品安全责任强制保险制度构建提供了新的思路和路径,以此进行分析可得出以下结论：食品安全责任强制保险制度构建的核心问题是正确处理政府强制与市场自治的关系;只有把政府强制规则与市场自治规则有机结合起来,才能兼顾食品安全责任强制保险的公益目标和效率目标;应完善立法体系,为食品安全责任强制保险制度构建提供完善的法律保障。     

论银行监管中的市场约束作用

由于政府监管的失灵和金融安全网所产生的严重道德风险问题,引起了西方学术界对金融监管体系改革的广泛争论,这一争论一直持续至今。其中, 由于 Kane(1983)在他的对存款保险改革的六点建议中特别强调市场约束的作用,使银行监管的三大支柱     

构建我国食品安全强制责任保险的现实选择

随着我国食品工业的快速发展,食品安全事件时有发生。通过对我国食品安全问题产生的原因及影响分析,食品安全强制责任保险是解决食品安全事件中受害人赔偿问题的有效途径。构建完善的食品安全强制责任保险,要以政府立法推动为主,保险公司积极参与的模式,并应注意增强消费者的维权意识和完善司法救济制度。     

开发性金融支持产业升级的效应分析

开发性金融是一种特殊的金融资源配置机制,是连接政府与市场,实现两种机制优势内在结合的有效途径,成为解决市场失灵和政府失灵的有效方式。本文研究了开发性金融支持产业升级的作用机理,借鉴日本开发性金融经验与教训,通过分析我国开发性金融实践对产业升级的支持效应,总结提出在当前现代化赶超的关键性历史阶段,开发性金融是弥补我国投融资体制不足和推动产业升级的重要力量,并就其进一步发展提出对策建议。     

责任保险参与社会治理研究

全面依法治国背景下，责任保险成为社会治理的重要抓手。本文首先阐释责任保险参与社会治理的现实基础；其次分析具体责任保险参与交通安全、食品安全、医疗纠纷、环境污染治理的发展现状，发现责任保险参与社会治理还存在法律法规不够完善、责任保险产品创新不足、民众风险意识淡薄等问题；再次总结不同法系国家责任保险参与社会治理的经验做法；最后提出完善法律法规、推行强制责任保险，注重风险管理、加强产品创新，加大财政补贴、增强跨部门合作等建议，以促进责任保险深度参与社会治理，提升我国社会治理现代化水平。     

浅析金融衍生品监管失灵

金融衍生品市场失灵是政府监管当局干预衍生品市场的根本依据,但政府对金融衍生品市场的监管也未必是万能的,同样面临着失灵的风险。本文首先分析了一下金融衍生品监管失灵的几种常见表现,然后就治理金融衍生品市场失灵和政府衍生监管失灵做了些思考。     

中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

保险法损失补偿原则规范功能之重塑——以“禁止得利”向“充分补偿”之学说演进为中心

损失补偿原则的规范功能具有"二元性",即禁止被保险人不当得利和充分填补被保险人的损失。但在传统保险法理论和实践中,为了达到防范道德风险的功能,损失补偿原则完全被禁止不当得利原则所取代。随着保险技术与保险观念的进步,传统理论下的保险制度难以满足被保险人充分补偿需求并容易造成保险合同效率的低下,因此损失补偿原则规范之重心应完成从"禁止得利"向"充分补偿"的转变。在制度设计及保险合同中,应恰当缩减合同条款对补偿金额的限制、重视发展重置成本保险、重复保险中应完成分摊中按份责任向连带责任之转变、优先实现被保险人的剩余损害赔偿请求权,以更全面保障被保险人的利益。     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Can compulsory liability insurance reduce agency costs? Evidence from China

This paper discusses the impact mechanism of compulsory liability insurance on agency costs. Studying the companies listed in China’s food manufacturing industries in 2011–2018, we find that compulsory liability insurance significantly reduces the two types of agency costs, namely, alleviating the principal-agent problem and the principal–principal problem. Robustness tests confirm this finding. The reduction of information asymmetry and the improvement of internal control quality are the mechanisms leading to this result. Compulsory food safety liability insurance plays a significant role in reducing agency costs when company ownership is concentrated or when media coverage is high. This paper provides empirical evidence for joint regulation by the public and private sectors, also provides theoretical reference for further optimizing food safety governance mode.     

论机动车第三者责任保险中“第三者”的界定

先根据合同相对性原理对机动车第三者责任保险中的“第三者”作出一般性解释,然后介绍我国机动车第三者责任保险对“第三者”外延的界定,再对相关界定作进一步的分析和评价,认为根据我国当前的相关立法环境可以将机动车第三者责任保险的被保险人调整为车辆实际使用人;被保险人不应该是机动车第三者责任保险中的“第三者”;从事驾驶工作的雇用...     

Insurance Market Effects of Risk Management Metrics

We extend the classical analysis on optimal insurance design to the case when the insurer implements regulatory requirements (Value-at-Risk). Presumably, regulators impose some risk management requirement such as VaR to reduce the insurers’ insolvency risk, as well as to improve the insurance market stability. We show that VaR requirements may better protect the insured and improve economic efficiency, but have stringent negative effects on the insurance market. Our analysis reveals that the insured are better protected in the event of greater loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured or the insurer perspective. However, in the presence of the VaR requirement on the insurer, the insurer's insolvency risk might be increased and there are moral hazard issues in the insurance market because the optimal contract is discontinuous.     

预收保费与保险责任承担制度研究

目前,在审理保险人预收保费至保险人承保前发生保险事故的赔偿纠纷案件时,审理法院通常认为：保险人预收保费的事实与保险合同成立没有直接关系,预收保费不能证明保险合同成立,保险人对在预收保费后至承保前发生的保险事故不承担保险责任。大多数国家的保险法根据契约公平原则,规定了暂保险和强制临时保险制度。对预收保费后至承保前发生的保险事故,要求保险人依约定或法定承担保险责任。在我国保险市场已经成为国际保险市场的有效组成部分的今天,应当建立以保险立法和司法方式干预保险责任承担机制,为投保人和被保险人提供法律救济。     

On Compulsory Per-Claim Deductibles in Automobile Insurance

The purposes of this paper are to analyze the theoretical characteristics of the compulsory deductible system and to verify the rationality of an increasing per-claim deductible in automobile insurance. We derive the optimal variable per-claim deductible by assuming the insurers are financially balanced and the expected utility of the insured is maximized in the absence of moral hazard. Our result suggests that a variable per-claim deductible increasing with the number of claims per year is not optimal. Instead, deductibles should be charged in a decreasing rate forming a second-best solution.     

Wird der vom Regierungsentwurf eines VVG geplante Direktanspruch des Geschädigten gegen den Pflichthaftpflichtversicherer ein stumpfes Schwert? Zur Notwendigkeit eines Informationsanspruchs des Geschädigten in der neuen Pflichthaftpflichtversicherung

The amendment of the German Act on Insurance Contracts comprises a number of substantial modifications regarding liability insurance. The most important modification is the introduction of a direct claim against the insurer with regard to all compulsory insurances. Such a direct claim is up to now only known from the motor vehicle liability insurance. Yet, a direct claim will be advantageous for the aggrieved claimant only if he manages to identify the proper insurer. As a result of the structural differences to the motor vehicle liability insurance the act of identifying the insurer is almost utterly impossible for the claimant without any help by the insured. Thus the claimant must also be given a claim against the insured to be furnished with all necessary information regarding the insurer. This right originates from sec. 242 of the German Civil Code.