年报风险披露与权益资本成本

本文从权益资本成本视角探究了中国上市公司年报风险披露的价值相关性及信息性质。基于2007-2014年A股上市公司的研究发现:(1)年报风险披露长度及其变化值越大,公司权益资本成本及其变化值越小,说明披露的风险越多,市场给予的信任越多,因而要求的风险溢价越小,从而支持了风险披露的同质观;(2)风险披露与权益资本成本的负相关关系主要体现在信息环境差、显性风险较小的公司;(3)投资者对增加披露风险信息具有正向市场反应,且投资者异质信念降低,表明风险信息异质性较弱,而信息不对称是风险披露影响权益资本成本的不完全中介;(4)风险披露变化值越大,公司股权再融资的可能性越大、折价率越低,债券利差越小。本文首次检验了我国年报风险披露对权益资本成本的影响,得到与国外文献不一致的结论,丰富了信息披露与资本成本关系相关的文献。     

年报风险信息披露有助于提高分析师预测准确度吗?

年报风险信息披露既可能提高信息质量而对分析师预测行为产生积极影响,又可能因增加分析师的风险感知而对分析师预测行为产生消极影响。本文通过文本分析法量化年报风险信息披露,进而探讨其对分析师预测准确度的影响。基于公司层面的证据表明:风险信息披露频率越高,分析师预测准确度越高,而且这种积极影响主要体现在非国有企业、盈余质量较高及公司治理较好组。基于分析师层面的证据表明:风险信息披露频率越高,分析师预测准确度越高,这种积极影响主要体现在非明星、行业专长较低、对公司追踪时间较少的分析师中。这说明我国年报风险信息异质性较弱,有助于提高分析师预测准确度,从而支持了风险信息披露的信息观。本文结论有助于丰富信息披露以及分析师预测文献。     

研发文本信息:真的多说无益吗?——基于分析师预测的文本分析

本文采用文本分析技术提取年报研发文本信息,并从分析师预测角度解读其信息价值.研究发现:(1)R&D文本信息显著降低了分析师预测偏差及分歧度,而且信息透明度发挥了中介效应.(2)R&D文本信息披露越多,未来三年的创新产出以及政府研发补助越多,说明企业倾向于选择性披露有利于企业的研发信息.(3)企业披露动机越强,分析师获取私有信息的能力越弱,R&D文本信息对分析师预测偏差和分歧度的降低作用越显著.以上结论说明我国年报R&D文本信息具有一定信息含量,对分析师来讲“多说有益”.本文从研发文本视角以及分析师预测角度验证了我国年报文本信息的积极效应,有助于丰富R&D以及分析师预测文献.     

审计师关心年报前瞻性文本信息吗？

此前研究主要关注历史信息与审计师决策,本文考察年报前瞻性文本信息对审计定价的影响。研究发现,年报前瞻性文本信息与审计定价显著负相关。机制检验发现,年报前瞻性文本信息能传递企业未来持续经营信号,降低审计师所感知的持续经营风险,进而降低审计定价。异质性检验发现,当年报披露语调更积极、披露未来经营计划内容更丰富时,二者负向关系更显著;且这种负向关系仅在企业未来盈余反应系数更高和分析师关注更多以及审计师行业专长较低和忙碌程度更高的样本中才显著。进一步研究发现,年报前瞻性文本信息披露能够显著降低企业被出具持续经营不确定性审计意见的概率。本文为理解审计师决策依据提供了新的理论参考,并为现有审计定价影响因素的研究作出增量贡献。     

银行风险管理、贷款信息披露与并购宣告市场反应

风险管理已经成为商业银行稳健经营的关键问题,本文对银行风险管理与资本市场的关系进行研究。通过对2001～2010年435个交易金额在1000万元以上的以现金方式支付的股权收购样本的分析,发现接近50%的收购公司在并购前披露了银行贷款信息,披露贷款信息的收购公司可以取得更高的并购宣告收益;银行风险管理水平的提升使贷款信息披露对并购宣告收益的影响更显著。研究认为,银行风险管理增加了贷款中的信息含量;贷款信息披露降低了股票投资者的逆向选择,避免了高质量公司遭受价值低估的损失;加强银行风险管理不仅有助于商业银行的稳健经营,而且还对资本市场产生正的外部性影响,提高了资本市场的定价效率。     

货币政策、信息披露质量与公司债务融资

信息透明度是影响企业债务融资成本的重要因素。本文以2002-2010年深圳A股公司为样本,研究发现:信息披露质量较好的公司在货币政策趋紧时获得了更多的银行借款,且随着融资需求的增大,获得的银行借款更多,银行借款的利率也更低。结果表明,较高的信息披露质量有助于降低银企间的信息不对称程度,增强企业获得银行贷款的资信度,降低企业的债务融资成本,从而减轻货币政策变动对企业债务融资带来的不利影响。     

证监会处罚、分析师跟踪与公司银行债务融资——来自信息披露违规的经验证据

证监会处罚公告释放的"坏消息"具有风险预警的作用,可能导致违规公司银行债务融资下降。分析师跟踪可能具有信息效应和声誉效应,影响证监会处罚公告与公司银行债务融资之间的关系。在中国资本市场强化监管的背景下,本文考察了证监会处罚对于违规公司非公开市场融资的经济后果。我们的研究发现,证监会处罚公告后,违规公司的银行贷款签约概率、银行贷款签约率和新增银行贷款规模均下降;并且,处罚等级越高,下降越显著。银行预期违规公司的信息成本与违约风险上升,而非公司真实的财务状况恶化是公司银行债务融资下降的主要原因。此外,分析师跟踪的信息效应而非声誉效应,缓解了证监会处罚公告与公司银行债务融资之间的负向关系。本文拓展了资本市场处罚和分析师跟踪对于公司非公开市场融资的经济后果研究,也为新兴市场国家的资本市场监管提供了经验证据。     

社会责任信息披露与股价崩盘风险--基于信息效应与声誉保险效应的路径分析北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文从企业信息不对称和投资者情绪两个角度探讨了企业股价崩盘风险的形成机理,并以2009-2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,分别从社会责任信息披露的信息效应和声誉保险效应两条路径考察了对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,社会责任信息披露与未来股价崩盘风险显著负相关,说明企业披露社会责任信息降低了未来股价崩盘风险。对影响路径的分析发现,社会责任信息同时通过信息效应和声誉保险效应降低股价崩盘风险,但声誉保险效应占据主导地位。在通过一系列稳健性检验后,以上结论仍成立。拓展分析表明,自愿社会责任信息披露相对于应规披露,对股价崩盘风险的约束作用更强,且上述关系在企业违规这一特定情境下仍成立。本文不仅丰富了企业股价崩盘风险形成机理的理解和分析范式,为股价崩盘风险的预防提供了新的经验支持,对于深入理解社会责任信息披露的经济后果也具有重要的理论与现实意义。     

问询函监管与银行信贷决策的改善

近年来,证券交易所推行的问询函监管逐渐成为保障和改善上市公司信息披露质量的重要机制,其实施效果自然成为监管者和学者关注的焦点。本文从银行的角度研究问询函监管对外部利益相关者的溢出效应,具体考察问询函监管对银行信贷决策的影响。研究发现,在公司被出具问询函后,银行的贷款利率显著更高,贷款期限显著更短,银行贷款要求提供担保的可能性和比例更高。进一步研究发现,当公司处于信息风险和信用风险相对较高的情境中,或银行对信息风险和信用风险较为关注的情况下,银行贷款利率上升幅度更加显著,不过,贷款期限、担保要求等非价格条款并没有显著差异。同时,问询函对银行信贷决策的影响在银企之间存在较强的信息不对称时更加显著。最后,本文发现公司收到问询函以后,分析师预测分歧度显著提高,这表明信息风险是问询函监管影响银行信贷决策的一个可能渠道。     

上市公司披露客户名称真的有益吗——基于投资者感知的视角

本文基于2012-2019年沪深A股上市公司的研究样本，实证检验了公司披露其客户名称对投资者的影响。本文利用长期盈余反应系数度量投资者对风险的感知，分析自愿性信息披露的利弊。结果发现：公司在年报中同时披露前五大客户名称以及明细金额，相比于只披露了明细金额的公司，有显著更低的长期盈余反应系数；异质性检验发现，当公司的专有成本更高、投资者专业能力更强或者市场交易风险更高时，会加剧这种负向关系；经济后果检验发现，披露客户名称后，公司下期的市场表现、经营业绩以及盈余持续性都显著更差。由于专有成本的存在，客户名称的披露会增强投资者对公司未来经营风险的感知，投资者能够理性预期到上市公司披露客户名称并非完全有益。鉴于客户、特别是大客户对公司的重要影响，本文的研究结论有助于分析目前客户信息披露规定的政策效果，也为后续制定相关披露政策提供了依据。     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior

We test a new hypothesis that may help explain the procyclicality of bank lending. The institutional memory hypothesis is driven by deterioration in the ability of loan officers over the bank's lending cycle that results in an easing of credit standards. We test this hypothesis using data from individual US banks over 1980–2000: over 200,000 bank-level observations on commercial loan growth, over 2,000,000 loan-level observations on interest rate premiums, and over 2000 bank-level observations on credit standards and loan spreads from bank management survey responses. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis, although there are differences by bank size class.     

Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements

We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.     

所有权、产业政策指导与银行贷款利率

以上市公司披露的银行信贷数据为样本,实证分析产业政策指导对企业贷款利率的影响。结果表明:产业政策指导中的重点支持类企业和一般支持类企业往往获得了银行贷款的利率优惠,商业银行较好地落实了国家的产业政策;相比于民营企业,与政府有密切关系的国有企业获得了较低的贷款利率,商业银行的信贷决策表现出一定程度的所有权金融歧视。     

Banks' option to lend,interest rate sensitivity,and credit availability

Interest rate risk is a major concern for banks because of the nominal nature of their assets and the asset-liability maturity mismatch. This paper proposes a new way to derive a bank's interest rate sensitivity, by examining separately the effects of interest rate changes on existing loans(loans-in-place) and potential loans (loans-in-process). A potential loan is shown to be equivalent to an American option to lend, and is valued using option theory. An increase in interest rates generally has a negative effect on existing loans. However, if both deposit and lending rates rise by the same amount, the value of a potential loan generally increases. Hence a bank's lending slack (or ratio of loans-in-process to loans-in-place) will determine its overall interest rate risk. Empirical evidence indicates that low-slack banks indeed have significantly more interest rate risk than high-slack banks. The model also makes predictions regarding the effect of deposit and lending rate parameters on bank credit availability. Empirical tests with quarterly data are generally supportive of these predictions. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Do banks price their informational monopoly?

Theory suggests that banks’ private information lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since new information about a firm is revealed at the time of its bond IPO, it follows that banks will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards after firms undertake their bond IPO. We test this hypothesis and find that firms are able to borrow at lower interest rates after their bond IPO. Importantly, firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. We also find that it is costly for firms to enter the public bond market.     

The usefulness of firm risk disclosures under different firm riskiness,investor-interest,and market conditions: New evidence from Finland

To date, there is only meager research evidence on the usefulness of mandatory annual report risk disclosures to investors. Although it has been argued that corporate disclosure decreases information asymmetry between management and shareholders, we do not know whether investors benefit from high-quality risk reporting in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment. In this paper, we performed association tests to examine whether the quality of firms' mandatory risk disclosures relate to information asymmetry in the Finnish stock markets. In addition, we analyzed whether the usefulness of risk disclosures depends on contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition. We demonstrate that the quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on information asymmetry. We also document that risk disclosures are more useful if they are provided by small firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst coverage. We also found that momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of firms' risk reports.     

财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。     

财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.