Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

影子银行体系与流动性管理

影子银行体系具有特殊的形成机理,是金融抑制制度背景下的博弈产物。目前,影子银行体系在金融市场上以证券化的方式创造流动性,容易在短期内出现从流动性过剩到流动性紧缩的转变,造成宏观经济的不稳定,需要作出必要的监管安排。     

中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算

2008年国际金融危机以后,中国金融体系发生的重大变化之一是影子银行的较快发展,其规模迅速膨胀,交易结构日趋复杂,各类市场主体都牵涉其中。这些变化吸引了政策制订者和学术界的广泛关注。本文给出了中国影子银行的功能性定义,即依赖于银行信用、从事银行业务、但又没接受严格的银行业监管的金融业务,具体指传统的银行表内贷款和债券投资以外的,具备完整的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换功能的金融业务。本文逐项分析影子银行业务,详细总结各类型业务的交易结构、业务主体、业务实质、资金来源、法律基础、资产负债表表示,准确测算了2002年至今影子银行总量和资产负债表结构月度数据。只从资产负债表的负债端着手加总,既完整地涵盖了影子银行的全部业务,得到其宏观总量,又剔除了重复计算。本文测算数据为后续研究打下了基础。     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

Uncertainty,market structure,and liquidity

In this study we show that market uncertainty [measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX)] exerts a large market-wide impact on liquidity, which gives rise to co-movements in individual asset liquidity. The effect of VIX on stock liquidity is greater than the combined effects of all other common determinants of stock liquidity. We show that the uncertainty elasticity of liquidity (UEL: percent change in liquidity given a 1% change in VIX) has increased around regulatory changes in the US markets that increased the role of public traders in liquidity provision, reduced the minimum allowable price variation, weakened the affirmative obligation of NASDAQ dealers, and abolished the specialist system on the NYSE.     

Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking

What ties together the traditional commercial banking activities of deposit‐taking and lending? We argue that since banks often lend via commitments, their lending and deposit‐taking may be two manifestations of one primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. There will be synergies between the two activities to the extent that both require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets: If deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are imperfectly correlated, the two activities can share the costs of the liquid‐asset stockpile. We develop this idea with a simple model, and use a variety of data to test the model empirically.     

土地资产价格波动与经济中的流动性供给——基于以地融资视角的研究

本文通过构建理论模型探讨土地资产价格波动与流动性供给之间的关系。在本文模型中,土地兼具生产资本与抵押资产属性,银行贷款同时受到投资需求、抵押品价值与信贷额度的约束。本文主要结论是:(1)土地资产价格在低于一个由基础货币供给决定的临界值后,能影响企业的抵押品价值并反映投资需求变化,故而与存款货币流动性供给正相关。这也使土地资产价格变化与企业杠杆周期一致且具有“预期自我实现”特征。(2)基础货币供给能够通过影响土地的流动性价值的方式来引导土地资产价格,前提是央行可掌握土地资产价格外生变化的原因。(3)信贷资产证券化会提高存款货币供给与土地价格的关联度,但也会削弱基础货币供给对土地价格的引导能力。本文的研究有助于认识土地资产价格与货币政策效果以及系统性金融风险的关联机制,为房地产调控政策提供启示。     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

State contingent banking and asset price bubbles: The case of Islamic banking industry

This paper examines how state contingent banking can help neutralize challenges like debt overhang and lack of optimal risk takings, problems associated with conventional banking that can eventually manifest in the creation of asset price bubbles and a financial crisis. Our analysis also contributes to the literature on Islamic banking which considers state contingent contracts as ideal from a religious perspective. We develop a model of banking with state contingent contracts on the liability and asset sides. Our model shows that in state contingent banking, the returns for the depositors, bank and the borrowers are more aligned with the real economy, which reduces the incentive for excessive borrowing, lending and investing. Our model also shows that with the state contingent banking on the liability side, during periods of heightened macroeconomic risk, depositors' payoff would be more volatile reducing the liquidity influx from the real economy to the banking sector. This neutralizes the pressure on state contingent banks to excessively lend on the asset side. Our model further demonstrates that state contingent contracts on the asset side can help avoid too much (or too little) lending by reducing the managerial discretion in charging low (or high) interest rates. With returns linked to the prices of the underlying assets, state contingent contracts may prevent lack of optimal risk taking.     

美国的影子银行系统

影子银行是指游离于传统商业银行体系之外的、从事与传统银行相类似的金融活动但却不受监管或几乎不受监管的金融实体。次贷危机爆发前,美国的影子银行体系发展达到巅峰状态。在本次金融危机中,影子银行系统备受诟病,被认为是此次危机的罪魁祸首。文章对美国影子银行系统的构成、业务流程及投融资活动等进行了梳理,以期为理解次贷危机前美国金融体系的运行特征提供启示。     

Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: A Mechanism Design Approach

We investigate the effects of monetary policy on asset prices in economies where assets are traded periodically in bilateral meetings. The trading mechanism is designed to maximize social welfare taking as given the frictions in the environment and monetary policy. We show that asset price “bubbles” emerge in a constrained‐efficient monetary equilibrium only if liquidity is abundant and the first‐best allocation is implementable. In contrast, if liquidity is scarce, assets are priced at their fundamental value in any constrained‐efficient monetary equilibrium, in which case an increase in inflation has no effect on asset prices, but it reduces output and welfare.     

Efficiency in Turkish banking: post-restructuring evidence

Turkish banking sector went through a significant restructuring process in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000–2001. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of banking performance using a novel approach due to Ray [(2007). “Shadow Profit Maximization and a Measure of Overall Inefficiency.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 27, 231–236]. We derive ‘shadow unrealized profit scores’ as well as ‘shadow input–output prices’ for each year and bank in the sector from 2002 to 2011. We argue these scores operationalize the Hicksian concept of ‘monopolistic quiet life’. We provide some evidence the sector came closer to the ‘zero profit condition’ as well as displaying a closer approximation to the ‘law of one price’ over time. We show the variability of these ‘shadow prices’ essentially coincides with that of corresponding actual prices. We utilize shadow price information to show that business models and competitive choices of banks differ across ownership types with foreign banks competing on the broadest front compared to state-owned and privately owned Turkish banks.     

Clearing and Collateral Mandates: A New Liquidity Trap?

All too often, legislative solutions to some financial crisis have serious consequences that are both unwanted and unintended. The author of this article foresees several possible negative consequences arising from Title VII of the Dodd‐Frank Act, which mandates that eligible derivatives be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs) that require initial and variation margin. The new legislation also requires that the remaining non‐cleared derivatives that are traded by some market participants be more heavily collateralized. The Act's authors have argued that derivatives pose uniquely dangerous systemic risks because of the leverage and counterparty risk associated with them. Increased collateralization, their thinking goes, would reduce derivatives‐related leverage and the systemic risk to the financial system associated with such leverage. The author argues that these hopes are unduly optimistic because they fail to recognize how market participants can substitute other forms of leverage, such as bank lines of credit or collateral transformation trades, for the leverage derivatives provided previously. The author also believes that the larger collateral mandates and frequent marking‐to‐market will make the financial system more vulnerable since margin requirements tend to be “pro‐cyclical.” And more rigid collateralization mechanisms can restrict the supply of funding liquidity, and lead to spikes in funding liquidity demand that can reduce the liquidity of traded instruments and generate destabilizing feedback loops. The fragmentation of CCPs across jurisdictions and products will lead to greater demand for CCP‐eligible collateral to maintain the same level of hedging transactions. This demand will likely be met by using riskier assets as collateral and encourage the shadow banking system to create new assets that can be posted as collateral (for example, via collateral transformation services). In sum, although the Dodd‐Frank rules are intended to reduce systemic risk, their expected impact on liquidity makes it a very open question as to whether they will achieve this goal. Although they may reduce some risks, they will simply shift others while possibly creating new ones.     

Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System

Through the profiling of institutional cash pools, this paper explains the rise of the “shadow” banking system from a demand‐side perspective. Explaining the rise of shadow banking from this angle paints a very different picture than the supply‐side angle that views it as a story of banks’ funding preferences and arbitrage. Institutional cash pools prefer to avoid too much unsecured exposure to banks even through insured deposits. Short‐term government guaranteed securities are the next best choice, but their supply is insufficient. The shadow banking system arose to fill this vacuum. One way to manage the size of the shadow banking system is by adopting the supply management of Treasury bills as a macroprudential tool.     

Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery

This paper examines the implications of market microstructure for asset pricing. I argue that asset pricing ignores the central fact that asset prices evolve in markets. Markets provide liquidity and price discovery, and I argue that asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to incorporate the transactions costs of liquidity and the risks of price discovery. I argue that symmetric information‐based asset pricing models do not work because they assume that the underlying problems of liquidity and price discovery have been solved. I develop an asymmetric information asset pricing model that incorporates these effects.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

流动性的度量及其与资产价格的关系

本文将流动性划分为货币流动性、银行系统流动性和市场流动性三个层次,总结了相应的可操作的度量方法,并通过中国数据进行了度量,从一个侧面论证了货币流动性是市场流动性的基础,以及市场流动性高时资产价格一般也较高的观点。基于货币流动性的基础性地位,本文进一步考察了货币流动性与资产价格的关系,发现超额货币流动性不仅影响股票的名义回报,还影响股票的真实回报;货币流动性在长期内受到股票真实回报的反作用,但这种作用可能是相对微小的。     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

Liquidity and asset prices: A new monetarist approach

When lenders cannot force borrowers to repay debts, assets are often pledged to secure loans. In this paper borrowers lose collateral once they renege on debts, and exclusion of defaulters occurs probabilistically, with a higher probability implying better enforcement. Increased efficiency in enforcement reduces asset prices, while raising loan-to-value ratios. If the rise in loan-to-value ratios is the dominant effect, aggregate liquidity and output increase with the advance in enforcement. Inflation raises the repayment cost by increasing the loan rate, while raising the default cost through exclusion. Consequently, inflation raises loan-to-value ratios and output only when enforcement is sufficiently efficient.     

我国影子银行发展及其对经济金融的影响研究——以山东省为例

本文基于我国对影子银行的定义测算其规模,并在此基础上采用2002—2014年的月度数据和结构VAR模型(SVAR)实证研究了影子银行对宏观经济发展和金融体系的影响。结果表明,近些年我国影子银行发展规模均以较为平稳的速度增长;影子银行短期内对经济增长有负面影响,但总体来看其发展对我国宏观经济具有积极作用;影子银行发展对我国金融发展具有一定的促进作用,但其规模过度扩张将会增加商业银行流动性风险,弱化其信用中介功能,对金融稳定产生负向冲击效应。最后在总结研究结论的基础上提出政策建议。