CEO过度自信与企业创新投资影响研究

随着传统的理性人假设无法解释很多实际现象而受到质疑,越来越多的学者开始接受不完全理性假设,开始研究人的非理性因素对企业管理的意义。正是在这种背景下,过度自信作为人类最稳固的心理特征开始受到国内外学者的重视,也逐渐形成了管理者过度自信理论。本文正是基于管理者过度自信理论,着眼于探讨企业最高管理者CEO的过度自信特性会对企业的创新投资的影响。在实证数据研究的基础上,本文发现过度自信的CEO会增加创新投资。     

管理者过度自信、现金流量与投资决策

随着投资行为的多元化和复杂化,关于人类理性的严格假设在实践中遭到质疑。过度自信是基于非理性的一种主观心理行为。投资决策是公司在给定资本约束情况下对可能的投资项目进行有效选择,以实现投资收益最大化。在针对公司管理者的研究中发现,管理者在进行投资项目决策时,往往会表现出过度自信,同时管理者的自信度也可以在特定投资机会下改变企业现金流的成本和收益。本文研究了在资金充裕的情况下,管理者过度自信对投资决策的影响。本文在以管理层持股数变化作为衡量过度自信的标准,在对管理者过度自信、现金流量和企业投资决策的关系进行实证分析的基础上,得出了管理者过度自信与公司的投资水平呈正相关关系。即管理者过度自信会带来投资过度,损害企业价值。本文假设现金流量在一定程度上会影响投资支出,但是经过严格的实证检验,发现结果并不显著,所以出于尊重数据的考虑,本文认为在特殊时期(金融危机),且样本量有限的情况下,现金流量不会对投资决策产生显著影响。     

管理者非理性行为与非效率投资关系研究

本文基于有限理性假设,以中国A股上市公司2009-2015年财务数据作为研究样本,研究管理者的三种非理性行为(管理者过度自信、管理者风险偏好和管理者从众行为)对企业非效率投资的共同影响。结果表明:管理者过度自信与管理者从众行为会导致上市公司非效率投资;过度自信和非过度自信管理者的从众行为均会加剧企业非效率投资,非过度自信管理者的从众行为对非效率投资的影响尤为严重;过度自信管理者的风险偏好与非效率投资显著正相关,而非过度自信管理者的风险偏好与非效率投资显著负相关,即非过度自信管理者适当的风险偏好行为在一定程度上会缓解企业非效率投资。因此,要想提高公司非效率投资管理应从管理者的心理素质培养入手,重点培养其避免从众心理,积极主动地根据自己企业的实际情况进行投资;对非过度自信的管理者还需要培养其适当的风险偏好。     

管理者过度自信对企业过度投资影响的实证研究

本文以非金融类A股上市公司为研究样本,主要考察了管理者过度自信与企业过度投资之间的关系。研究发现,过度自信的管理者倾向于过度投资。本文还对过度自信管理者的过度投资行为对现金流的敏感性进行了分析,但其结果并不显著。     

管理者行为、企业生命周期与非效率投资

本文从企业生命周期视角研究管理者代理行为和管理者过度自信对企业非效率投资的动态影响。选取2012-2015年深沪主板上市公司数据进行实证检验,结果表明:随着企业生命周期的发展,管理者代理行为逐渐加强,管理者过度自信水平却逐渐减弱。管理者代理行为和过度自信共同导致企业非效率投资,成长期阶段的企业非效率投资主要受管理者过度自信的显著影响,管理者代理行为对企业非效率投资影响不显著;成熟期阶段的企业非效率投资既受管理者代理行为的显著影响,也受管理者过度自信的显著影响;衰退期阶段的企业非效率投资则主要受管理者代理行为的显著影响,管理者过度自信对企业非效率投资影响不显著。     

管理者过度自信、 会计稳健性与制造业投资效率 ——基于我国制造业上市企业异质性研究

本文以2010—2020年沪深两市制造业上市企业为样本,建立动态面板模型,实证检验了制造业企业管理者过度自信、会计稳健性与企业投资的关系.研究发现:当企业存在过度投资时,管理者过度自信将会进一步加剧过度投资程度;当企业存在投资不足时,管理者过度自信将会凭借积极的负债策略,一定程度上缓解投资不足.调节效应检验发现会计稳健性可以抑制制造业企业过度投资行为,缓解投资不足,降低管理者过度自信对制造业过度投资的推动作用,增强其对制造业投资不足的缓解效应.异质性检验发现会计稳健性的调节效应在非国有企业、东部地区、小规模企业表现更明显.     

管理者过度自信与企业风险承担

本文检验管理者过度自信是否影响企业的风险承担,以及风险承担的经济后果。我们以沪深A股上市公司2001～2010年的数据作为样本,研究结果发现,管理者过度自信与企业风险承担水平显著正相关。对风险承担经济后果的检验发现,更高的风险承担水平有利于提高企业的资本配置效率和企业价值。以上研究结论意味着,管理者过度自信在企业投资决策中的作用并不完全是消极的。同时,我们也为风险承担能促进经济的持续增长提供了微观层面的证据。本文丰富和拓展了管理者过度自信和企业风险承担的相关研究,对企业的管理者聘任决策以及对企业应重视风险性项目的投资都有一定的现实启示意义。     

管理者过度自信文献综述

随着行为金融理论的兴起,过度自信现象越来越受到关注。本文梳理了影响管理者过度的因素以及管理者过度自信对企业投资、财务结构以及盈余管理的影响。并对国内外关于过度自信的文献进行了对比分析,找出了更符合我国国情和实际情况的衡量指标。     

管理者过度自信与企业价值研究综述

在传统财务理论研究中加入了对行为和心理学的考虑,放开了理性人假设,行为财务理论产生。此理论中最重要的一个方面就是过度自信。相对于普通人,管理者过度自信的心理表现的尤为明显。本文从管理者过度自信基本内涵、衡量方法以及管理者过度自信对企业价值的影响几个方面总结了国内外学者的理论研究,进而对未来研究提出了展望。     

管理者过度自信、过度投资与公司经营业绩的文献综述

投资一直都是拉动我国经济发展的"三驾马车"之一,但是大部分企业过度注重投资,不利于经济的健康可持续发展。本文从行为金融的角度出发,对管理者过度自信与企业过度投资关系,以及对公司经营业绩带来的影响进行了文献综述,进一步理清了三者的关系。     

Managerial Overconfidence,Self-Attribution Bias,and Downwardly Sticky Investment: Evidence from Korea

The extant literature on behavioral corporate finance has explored the effects of overconfidence on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICS) to explain overinvestment, yet it has overlooked the asymmetric behavior of investments in relation to changes in cash flow levels. This study examines whether investments behave asymmetrically responding to changes in cash flows and, if so, how managerial overconfidence affects asymmetric ICS. Using a sample of KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms in Korea, we find the incidence of downwardly sticky ICS in unconstrained firms. We then find that overconfident managers encourage ICS to be stickier than their rational peers do in unconstrained firms. Finally, we find that managerial overconfidence intensified by self-attribution bias induces ICS to get even stickier, suggesting more explicit evidence of corporate investment distortions. The results of alternative tests using the asymmetric models of Homburg and Nasev (2008) are qualitatively consistent with prior results. Overall, our findings imply a higher incidence of excessive investment commitments driven by overconfident managers.     

股权激励对企业非效率投资行为的影响研究——基于高管过度自信中介效应的视角

基于高管过度自信的视角考量我国上市公司股权激励实施对企业非效率投资行为的影响,结果表明,我国上市公司普遍存在过度投资和投资不足的现象,股权激励能有效抑制过度投资行为,但对企业投资不足现象具有显著的促进作用,同时,高管过度自信会导致企业过度投资行为的发生,相应地会降低投资不足行为的产生;高管过度自信是导致股权激励效果弱化的重要原因,股权激励的实施会在高管过度自信的作用下加剧企业过度投资行为,而对投资不足表现出不显著的抑制效果;良好的公司治理环境能有效抑制高管过度自信概率,也是激励效果得以发挥的重要前提。     

On the concentration of mutual fund portfolio holdings: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper tests the alternative hypotheses of investment selection skills versus overconfidence of equity mutual funds managers in Taiwan. We find that fund holdings’ concentration levels are high and positively related to funds’ risk-adjusted returns in tranquil market periods; however, the concentration levels are low and more negatively related to risk-adjusted returns in turmoil market periods. The time varying concentration-performance relation is not driven by fund size. Our finding implies that fund managers have superior investment selection skills when the market is less volatile, but they exhibit overconfidence when the market is in turmoil, suggesting an investment strategy of shifting from concentrated funds to more broadly diversified funds when market condition becomes worse.     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.     

Time-varying managerial overconfidence and pecking order preference

This paper examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. firm investment and directors’ trading) overconfidence measures. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (J Financ Econ 51:219–244, 1999) regression framework. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance deficits. This new evidence is consistent with the proposition that overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of future earnings believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing. Thus, managerial overconfidence can lead to a reverse pecking order preference. We also find that managerial overconfidence significantly weakens pecking order preference especially in firms with high earnings volatility and small firms.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves

This study investigates the relation between managerial overconfidence and loss-reserving practices in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We find robust evidence that CEO overconfidence is significantly associated with relatively low loss reserves, resulting in relatively high reported earnings. This finding is consistent with the theoretical predication that overconfident managers overestimate the returns on their investment projects and underestimate losses. Our result contributes to the literature linking CEOs' personality traits and firms' accounting policy as well as to the literature on insurer loss-reserving practices.     

管理者过度自信、市场竞争与商业信用

基于行为金融视角,考量沪深两市2007～2011年上市公司管理者过度自信与商业信用的关系。结果表明,管理者过度自信与提供的商业信用正相关。民企面临的市场竞争大于国企,使得过度自信的管理者会提供更多的商业信用,而国有企业不存在这样的关系;同时,在竞争行业与管制行业之间,也表现出这种显著性关系。     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Managerial overconfidence and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from primary and secondary data

The corporate finance literature argues that overconfident managers tend to hold less cash, and this leads to a significant deviation from optimal cash levels. We analyse the impact of executive overconfidence on the corporate cash holdings of listed Vietnamese firms. To quantify managerial overconfidence, a novel core measure used in our analyses is voice pitch, which is obtained from interviews with top-line managers. Other measures of managerial overconfidence are also used to support the results and confirm the validity of the voice pitch measure. Our empirical evidence, with economically significant results, reveals that higher levels of overconfidence amongst managers are associated with lower cash holdings. Surprisingly, the findings show that overconfident managers tend to be associated with a low level of deviation from optimal cash holding levels. In addition, our findings also provide evidence that managerial overconfidence can increase cash levels and deviations from target cash holdings for overinvesting firms.