Earnings Management? Erroneous Inferences Based on Earnings Frequency Distributions

A vast literature following Hayn [1995] and Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] attributed the so-called "discontinuities" in earnings distributions around zero to earnings management. Despite recent evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by other factors, researchers and teachers continue to point to the shapes of these distributions as evidence of earnings management. We provide three sets of further evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by factors other than earnings management: (1) we provide, as an example, a detailed analysis of the severe effects of sample selection in a recent study; this study erroneously concludes that the shape of an earnings distribution is evidence of earnings management, (2) we provide a simple explanation for the shape of the earnings distribution that is most often cited as evidence of earnings management; the relation between earnings and prices differs with the magnitude and the sign of earnings, and (3) we provide further examples that support the main point of our paper; evidence beyond the mere shape of a distribution must be brought to bear before researchers can draw conclusions regarding the presence/absence of earnings management.     

Discussion of “Implications of the integral approach and earnings management for alternative annual reporting periods”

The paper by Gunny, Jacob, and Jorgensen (Rev Account Stud, 2013) provides evidence on whether the earnings volatility induced by year-end adjusting entries results from the integral method of accounting or from purposeful earnings management. The authors find that the variance and negative skewness of annual fiscal-year earnings is greater than the corresponding attributes of alternative annual earnings ending in the first three quarters and interpret these findings as evidence consistent with earnings management rather than settling up annual earnings under the integral method of accounting. While it is difficult to assess the usefulness of their conclusion due to problematic assumptions inherent in the research design, Gunny et al. (2013) reinforce the importance of assessing earnings performance using rolling annual windows. Specifically, they find that the quality of earnings for the alternative annual earnings is greater than that of fiscal-year earnings, highlighting that financial statement users may benefit from using alternative annual earnings to assess current and future performance.     

利润操纵行为影响会计稳健性吗?——基于季度盈余不同汇总方法的经验证据

本文使用季度盈余的方法研究会计稳健性。以往文献主要使用会计年度(即公历年度)盈余分析我国上市公司的会计稳健性,相对无法有效地分离或控制利润操纵行为对会计稳健性的影响。本文使用不同的方法对季度盈余进行汇总,得到会计年度盈余及其他三种受利润操纵行为影响较弱的年度盈余。研究发现,我国上市公司的会计年度盈余和其他三种年度盈余都表现出了稳健性特征。这一经验证据表明,我国上市公司的报告盈余具有实质意义上的稳健性,利润操纵行为并未影响会计盈余的稳健性。     

Earnings Management in Australian Corporations

This article surveys the literature examining the earnings management behaviour of Australian corporations. While numerous motivations for earnings management are proposed in this literature, current period CEO turnover is the only phenomenon for which there is consistent empirical support. A number of studies report discontinuities in the distribution of earnings around benchmarks such as the zero profit level. However, there is no evidence that these discontinuities are associated with abnormal accrual behaviour. Evidence regarding the ability of various governance mechanisms to constrain earnings management is also mixed. While several studies report a negative relation between auditor size and earnings management, no Australian studies attempt to control for the likely endogenous nature of this relationship. Papers report that board independence and audit committee independence constrain earnings management in Australian corporations, although evidence is not consistent across studies. The article shows that many Australian studies of earnings management use very noisy and, in some cases, biased measures of abnormal accruals which may partly explain the inconsistency of results across studies, adding further uncertainty regarding the implications of this field of research for standard setters, investors and scholars.     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

Earnings and Impression Management in Financial Reports: The Case of CEO Changes

This article examines earnings management, as well as the presentational format of graphs (impression management) in the financial reports of sixty-three Australian listed public companies that changed chief executive officers (CEOs). Prior U.S. evidence generally suggests downward earnings management in the year of senior management changes and upward earnings management in the following year (Pourciau, 1993). We argue that new managers not only have incentives to manage earnings but also have similar incentives to manipulate the impressions created by graphs in financial reports. Examining earnings and impression management at the same time also provides an opportunity to distinguish between alternative explanations for any observed earnings management. In the year of CEO change, we hypothesize and find evidence of downward earnings management and some limited evidence of unfavourable impression management of the key financial variables (KFVs) graphed. As posited, we find evidence of upward earnings management and some evidence of favourable impression management in the year after a CEO change. These results are strongest for the subsample in which the CEO change was prompted by a resignation rather than a retirement.     

Reexamination of earnings management before and after SOX: Evidence from SEC staff accounting bulletins 99-100

A substantial literature suggests that earnings management improved for U.S. firms in the post-2002 time period as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (henceforth, SOX) (Coates and Srinivasan, 2014) which was passed in the latter part of 2002. However, few papers have explored the impact of the Security and Exchange Commission’s Staff Accounting Bulletins (SABs) 99-100 in the year 2000 following their passage in late 1999. As a result, some of the reductions in earnings management that prior research attributes to SOX may have been due to these two SABs. We find that in 2000 there was a significant decline in the zero earnings discontinuity in quarterly earnings considered by prior research to be evidence of earnings management to avoid small losses. Surprisingly, we find only mixed evidence that SOX provided an incremental impact to that of the SABs, which occurs mainly in the quarterly distribution of EPS rather than in scaled quarterly earnings. We also find evidence that the passage of the SABs significantly reduced the practice where firms take write-offs in the fourth quarter that turn a profit for the year into a loss. Overall, our findings suggest that the decline in quarterly earnings management started well before SOX due to the SEC’s initiatives.     

Are Accruals during Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic?

We find evidence that initial public offering (IPO) firms, on average, have high positive issue-year earnings and abnormal accruals, followed by poor long-run earnings and negative abnormal accruals. The IPO-year abnormal, and not expected, accruals explain the cross-sectional variation in post-issue earnings and stock returns. The results are robust with respect to alternative abnormal accruals and earnings performance measures. IPO firms adopt more income-increasing depreciation policies when they deviate from similar prior performance same industry non-issuers, and they provide significantly less for uncollectible accounts receivable than their matched non-issuers. The results taken together suggest opportunistic earnings management partially explains the new issues anomaly.     

Earnings management and long-run stock performance following private equity placements

We investigate whether the documented earnings management preceding public equity offerings applies to private placements of equity. We also investigate whether earnings management can help explain long-run stock performance following private placements. Our main findings are: (1) little evidence of upward earnings management around private equity placements, and (2) little predictive power of abnormal accruals for long-run stock performance following private equity placements. These results suggest that earnings management is not responsible for post-offering underperformance, if any, for firms issuing equity privately. Our results are robust to two alternative measures of earnings management and three measures of abnormal returns estimated over two sample periods.     

Investor sentiment and management earnings forecast bias

This study investigates whether investor sentiment is associated with behavioral bias in managers’ annual earnings forecasts that are generally issued early in the year when uncertainty is relatively high. I provide evidence that management earnings forecast optimism increases with investor sentiment. Furthermore, I find that managers’ annual earnings forecasts are more pessimistic during low‐sentiment periods than during normal‐sentiment periods. Since managers lack incentives to further deflate stock prices during a low‐sentiment period, this evidence indicates that sentiment‐related management earnings forecast bias is likely to be unintentional. In addition, I find that the relationship between management earnings forecast bias and investor sentiment is stronger for firms with higher uncertainty, consistent with investor sentiment having a greater influence on management earnings forecasts when uncertainty is higher.     

The use of earnings and operations management to avoid credit rating downgrades

Firms placed on negative credit watch face the threat of a credit rating downgrade. At the same time, they are given the opportunity to put recovery efforts in place to retain their current credit rating. In this paper, we test to what extent firms use earnings management as a short-term recovery strategy. We find that both accruals-based and real earnings management are associated with firms avoiding credit rating downgrades, and that these alternative earnings management strategies tend to be complements rather than substitutes. However, following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, only real earnings management is significantly associated with the credit watch outcome. We find evidence that firms which maintain their rating via earnings management are better able to afford the inevitable earnings reversals, and that in the year following the credit watch period, the credit rating performance of these firms is significantly better than firms which undergo a downgrade, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this period. Our results also imply that credit rating agencies are not misled by earnings management but rather allow for some discretion in reporting earnings that facilitates the dissemination of private information about future firm performance.     

Earnings Management and Annual General Meetings: The Role of Managerial Entrenchment

We examine earnings management around the annual general meeting (AGM) and assess the influence of managerial entrenchment. Consistent with prior research, we show positive and statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding AGMs regardless of the level of managerial entrenchment. We find evidence of significant earnings manipulation primarily among entrenched managers. Specifically, they manage abnormal accruals downward two quarters prior to the AGM and significantly increase abnormal accruals in the quarter immediately before the AGM. Our evidence is consistent with AGMs triggering managers to disseminate information in a manner that shapes the market's perception of the firm.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Value Relevance of Accounting Information

This study investigates whether opportunistic earnings management affects the value relevance of net income and book value in determining stock price. We document a decrease in the value relevance of earnings in the year of an equity offering for a group of firms with ex post evidence of earnings management. This decrease is greater for the discretionary component of earnings than for the non‐discretionary component. These results are robust to model specification and the type of offering. However, the results are sensitive to firms' disclosure activity prior to the offering.     

Loss aversion and financial reporting: A possible explanation for the prevalence of discontinuities in reported earnings

We formalize the notion, first suggested by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), that earnings discontinuities can be caused by reference dependence. We extend the signaling model by Guttman et al. (2006) to include loss-averse investors. The presence of loss aversion causes the separating equilibrium (without discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings) to disappear, while the partially-pooling equilibrium (exhibiting discontinuities) may prevail. This implies that the presence of loss-averse investors will cause earnings discontinuities around reference points. The prime candidates for investors’ reference points are earnings benchmarks such as zero earnings, last year’s earnings and analyst forecasts. Our model provides an explanation for why earnings discontinuities appear around earnings benchmarks.     

Asymmetric Trading Costs Prior to Earnings Announcements: Implications for Price Discovery and Returns

We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.     

Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital

We investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. We find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures (as proxied by a self‐constructed index of coded items found in 677 firms' annual reports and 10‐K filings in fiscal 2001) than firms with poor earnings quality. In unconditional tests, we find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. However, consistent with the complementary association between disclosure and earnings quality, we find that the disclosure effect on cost of capital is substantially reduced or disappears completely (depending on the cost of capital proxy) once we condition on earnings quality. Extensions probing alternative proxies show that our findings are robust to measures of earnings quality and cost of capital, but not to other measures of voluntary disclosure. In particular, we find opposite relations for voluntary disclosure measures based on management forecasts and conference calls, and we find no relations for a press release based measure.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.     

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.     

The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs

We examine the relation between audit quality and the earnings management activities of IPO firms. The impact of high quality auditors on real earnings management has been researched in a number of settings e.g. SEOs. However, to date, there has been no work on the effect of high quality auditors on real activities-based manipulation around IPOs. We examine UK IPOs between 1998 and 2008 and find evidence that high quality auditors constrain the use of real activities manipulation that occurs via the management of discretionary expenses. We also find evidence, consistent with prior research, that high quality auditors constrain the manipulation of discretionary accruals. Crucially, we find IPO firms audited by high quality auditors undertake sales-based manipulation in order to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year. The presence of high quality auditors is not, therefore, sufficient to constrain all forms of earnings management.     

Managerial discretion in distressed firms

This study examines the earnings management behaviour of 455 distressed US firms that filed for bankruptcy during the period 1986–2001. We examine (a) possible earnings management during the years prior to bankruptcy-filing, (b) whether qualified audit opinions cause conservative earnings management behaviour, (c) whether earnings management differs between firms that discontinued operations and firms that survived thereafter, and (d) the effect of earnings management on subsequent stock returns. Our results are consistent with downwards earnings management 1 year prior to the bankruptcy-filing. Results also show that (a) firms receiving unqualified audit opinions 4 or 5 years prior to the bankruptcy-filing event manage earnings upwards in subsequent years, consistent with Rosner [2003. Earnings manipulation in failing firms. Contemporary Accounting Research 20, 361–408], (b) more conservative earnings management seems to be related to the qualified audit opinions rendered in the preceding year, (c) firms with long-term negative accruals the year of bankruptcy-filing have a greater chance to survive thereafter, and (d) more pronounced (negative) earnings management is associated with more negative (next year's) subsequent returns.