外部冲击、人民币汇率波动和短期跨境资本流动——基于MS-VAR模型

当前我国面临较为复杂的国际形势,全球市场不确定性增多,外部冲击将对我国汇率波动和短期跨境资本流动产生重要影响。本文构建了MS-VAR模型对外部冲击、人民币汇率波动和短期跨境资本流动的动态关系进行实证检验。实证结果表明:全球风险因素、美国数量型以及价格型货币政策调整会对我国汇率市场和短期跨境资本流动产生重要冲击效应;当我国金融市场遭受次贷危机、欧债危机、美国货币政策调整和美联储加息等外部冲击时,人民币汇率和短期跨境资本的波动性显著增强,并形成非对称效应。基于研究结果,本文提出将跨境资本流动纳入宏观审慎管理范畴、协调使用多种资本管理工具、不断完善跨境资本流动的监测和预警体系等政策建议。     

美联储非常规货币政策退出对中国金融市场的外溢效应 ——基于LT—TVP—VAR模型的实证分析

根据美联储数据特征构建LT—TVP—VAR模型,从加息和缩表两个层面实证研究美联储非常规货币政策退出对中国金融市场的外溢影响.理论分析和实证结果表明:美联储加息将主要通过流动性供给冲击和跨境资本流动渠道导致我国货币和债券市场利率上行以及人民币对美元汇率的贬值,对我国股票市场的影响有限;美联储缩表的目的是回收过剩流动性,并促进货币政策正常化,短期内对我国金融市场的影响有限,其长期外溢效应取决于缩表的速度和力度.美联储非常规货币政策退出对我国金融市场外溢影响的长期效应,大于短期效应,要积极应对美联储非常规货币政策退出的外溢效应,提升金融市场应对非预期冲击的能力,防范外部冲击造成的系统性金融风险.     

美联储加息对中国资本流出的时变影响研究

本文基于国际货币政策溢出效应理论,选取中美两国1998-2017年度的季度数据,建立TVP-VAR模型,分析美联储加息对中国资本流出影响的时变特征和结构性变动;采用蒙特卡洛抽样法、脉冲响应分析和时点脉冲响应分析,从汇率、利率和资产价格三个渠道分析美联储加息对中国资本流出的影响。结果表明,美国利率和美联储加息通过利率的传导渠道在短期内对中国资本流出的溢出效应明显,正向作用在加息后第二季度达到峰值;而汇率和资产价格传导渠道对中国资本流出的影响呈现出结构性变化,对资本流出溢出效应较弱。由结果可知,通过在国内保持稳健的货币政策,并加快金融市场的开放可以有效地减轻因美联储加息给我国资本流出带来的压力。     

美联储加息冲击下跨境资本流动监管的“双支柱”调控研究

后疫情时代美国超宽松货币政策导致其通胀高企,美联储开启史诗级加息周期,国际资本大幅快速回流美国,导致全球金融风险显著上升,人民币汇率波动加剧,亟须加强跨境资本流动的宏观审慎监管。本文构建一个包含无息外汇准备金逆周期调节跨境资本流动的小型开放动态随机一般均衡框架,研究“双支柱”调控应对美联储加息冲击的效果。结果表明：第一,美联储加息冲击下,国内产出和通胀下滑,人民币贬值;此时采取降低外汇存款准备金政策能稳定汇率并降低经济波动,主要机制是下调外汇存款准备金能增加国内金融机构外汇贷款的资金供给,降低国内企业融资成本。第二,提升利率政策虽然有助于稳定汇率,但会增大经济波动且削弱货币政策有效性;而“双支柱”调控不仅能降低产出和汇率波动,还不会降低货币政策有效性。第三,“双支柱”政策最优组合是货币政策盯住国内产出和通胀波动,宏观审慎政策盯住国际资本流动。据此,本文认为,我国应采用“双支柱”调控应对美联储激进加息,降低利率以应对通胀和产出下滑,降低外汇存款准备金率以促进汇率稳定。     

对近期人民币汇率形势的几点认识和判断北大核心

美联储时隔3年再度加息,2000年以来首次50个基点的大幅加息,后续还将伴随缩表等系列紧缩货币政策。这将会影响国际金融市场稳定,收紧全球金融环境,加速新兴市场资本外流与货币贬值。本文认为,美联储紧缩货币政策将从减缓外资流入、市场风险偏好下降、加速外需增长拐点到来、刺激资本回流、增加中国海外资产负债安全风险等五个溢出渠道影响中国经济。近期人民币汇率波动行情是市场纠偏而非政策引导所致。本文进一步研究发现,在较大的贸易顺差、官方与民间外汇储备充足、有力的宏观审慎措施,以及必要的资本外汇管理情况下,中国完全有信心、也有条件保持人民币汇率在合理均衡水平上的基本稳定。鉴于当前外资已持有相当规模人民币金融资产,在稳慎推进人民币国际化的进程中,保持汇率政策的灵活性应是题中之义。     

中美国债利差走势分析、影响及应对建议

2022年以来,美国国债收益率快速上行,4月份中美利差开始倒挂,引起市场广泛关注。中美国债利差是中国和美国宏观经济走势、货币政策取向、通货膨胀变化等各种因素同步或错位、一致或分化的综合反映。文章认为中短期内中美利差或将持续倒挂,且倒挂幅度存在震荡走升的可能,或将对资产价格、跨境资本流动和人民币汇率产生影响;金融机构应加强宏观研判,做好微观安排,努力使风险研判与应对走在市场曲线前面。     

美国量化宽松货币政策退出对我国金融资产价格的影响

随着美国经济的复苏,美联储逐渐退出了其自2008年来采取的量化宽松货币政策,美国经济进入加息周期.在美联储加息预期下,全球金融资产价格波动频繁.美国量化宽松货币政策退出对我国金融资产价格影响如何?本文以2013年11月至2016年6月美联储的持债规模和上证指数、美元兑人民币汇率中间价、一年期Shibor数据为样本,采用VAR模型实证分析了美国量化宽松货币政策退出对我国金融资产价格的影响.结果显示,美国量化宽松货币政策退出对美元兑人民币汇率中间价有显著的正向冲击,人民币具有贬值的压力;对上证综合指数有负向冲击,我国上证综合指数在美国量化宽松货币政策退出期间会降低;对一年期的Shibor有正向冲击,一年期的Shibor在美国量化宽松货币政策退出期间会上浮.     

中国短期资本流入将下降

美联储逐步退出量化宽松,将可能导致中国从2013年第一季度起所面临的短期资本的大幅流入显著放缓,但短期内转变为资本流出的可能性不大。近来,关于美联储可能提前退出量化宽松的预期,已经导致全球风险资产价格大跌、美国国债收益率上行、部分新兴市场国家转为面临短期资本大举流出。     

美国货币政策溢出效应与中国资产价格波动研究

美国在全球经济中的地位决定了其货币政策调整势必对我国产生溢出效应。在美联储进入加息周期的背景下，本文研究美国货币政策对我国资产价格的溢出效应，有助于我国及时调控和降低国内经济波动。通过构建DCC-GARCH模型和TVP-VAR模型，本文发现美国货币政策与中国资产价格之间具有较强的相关性，且相关性随着美国货币政策的调整而变化。短期内美联储加息或缩表会对国内房地产市场、股票市场和债券市场带来明显的负向冲击，但在中长期对国内资产价格产生的冲击有限。本文的研究对于加强我国宏观调控具有较强的现实意义。     

浅析人民币国际化过程中的汇率风险防控——以日元国际化的经验教训为鉴

近几年来,随着中国改革的深入和对外开放程度的不断提升,人民币在中国周边国家和地区的使用越来越广泛,人民币国际化已然大势所趋。然而,自2015年末美联储摒弃量化宽松的货币政策以来,美国进入新一轮加息周期,人民币汇率随之波动较大。近期,受诸多因素影响,人民币国际化的脚步明显放缓甚至停滞不前,汇率风险已构成当前人民币国际化发展的一大障碍。本文以新一轮美联储加息周期为背景,结合当前国际经济金融环境的发展变化,同时借鉴日元国际化的经验教训,积极探索防控汇率风险的措施和方法,以期为人民币国际化献计献策。     

The Fed's Communications: Suggestions for Improvement

The chief economist of Berenberg Capital Markets proposes three broad ways of improving the Fed's communications: (1) establish a more systematic approach to achieving its dual mandate; (2) clarify the proper role of monetary policy in achieving those objectives by distinguishing what is within the scope of monetary policy from what is clearly beyond it; and (3) articulate the Fed's goals and role in achieving macro‐prudential risk management and financial stability. With these three ends in view, the author begins by urging FOMC members to refrain from making public comments immediately following government data releases and, when making public speeches and statements, to relate their comments on the economy to the Fed's dual mandate. The author also suggests three modifications of the Fed's official Policy Statement following FOMC meetings. First, each statement should start with an assessment of monetary policy and its consistency with achieving the Fed's statutory mandate, rather than the Fed's assessments of the economy and its subsectors with which such statements now begin. Second, the Fed should communicate separate explicit risk assessments of inflation and of the prospects for employment and the economy. (The Fed's current practice of sometimes dropping the risk assessments from statements and replacing them with nuanced language—for example, on changes in inflation and inflationary expectations—can be a source of confusion.) Third, all statements should discuss as clearly as possible the Fed's strategy for its balance sheet and unwind policy. The Fed's quarterly Summary of Economic Projections (SEPs) should be redesigned to include FOMC estimates of forecast uncertainties and what they imply for monetary policy, and such alternative forecasts should be presented in place of the current central tendency and range of forecasts. The redesigned SEPs should be (1) based on a rigorous Fed assessment of expected monetary policy under different situations and contingency planning, and (2) as transparent as possible about the Fed's economic and inflation outlooks, the uncertainties in forecasting, and the conditionality of monetary policy. An illustration is provided of the alternative SEPs that would replace the current “dot plots” and include the Fed's forecasts of nominal GDP, calculated confidence intervals around the FOMC's median forecasts, and three separate forecasts of the Fed's perceived appropriate Fed funds rate. Finally, the author views the “optimal solution” as a more systematic approach in which the Fed publishes a single forecast based on a model consistent with its dual mandate that shows how the appropriate Fed funds rate path would be expected to vary under different economic and inflation outcomes. Such an approach, by thus mapping likely monetary policy responses to alternative plausible economic and inflation outcomes, would increase the Fed's accountability as well as its transparency.     

Monetary Policy Implementation: Making Better and More Consistent Use of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet

Since December 2015, the Federal Reserve has operated a new “floor system” in which it brings about desired changes in its targeted federal funds rate by managing the interest rate it pays on bank reserves and other short‐term liabilities. The design of this new system reflects the tendency of Fed officials to view monetary policy as affecting the economy through Keynesian” interest rate channels. From this Keynesian perspective, policy actions that change the size of the balance sheet are seen as tools for influencing credit market conditions that operate in addition to and independently of the Fed's monetary policy stance. The alternative monetarist framework proposed by the author views monetary policy and its effects as operating through the interaction between money supply and demand. Use of this framework makes clear that, even under a floor system, monetary policy actions designed to affect the aggregate price level and the rate of inflation must be accompanied sooner or later by traditional open market operations that have implications for the size and composition of the Fed's balance sheet. Use of the monetarist framework also underscores the likelihood that the Fed, by paying interest on reserves, has unknowingly contributed to the restrictiveness of its own monetary policies since the financial crisis, a period during which inflation has run consistently below target. More generally, the monetarist framework downplays the importance of the zero lower interest rate bound and suggests that monetary policy could be conducted more effectively by adopting and adhering to a consistent, rule‐like manner during good times and bad.     

中国企业去杠杆需考虑美联储货币政策变化吗?——加息和缩表的比较分析

本文构建了一个包含货币政策微观溢出效应的两国开放经济模型,提出企业结构性去杠杆需考虑开放经济因素,并在模型中引入企业融资约束机制,利用2002年第四季度-2018年第三季度中国沪深A股1023家上市公司平衡面板数据,实证检验美联储加息和缩表两类货币政策对我国企业杠杆率的差异性影响。研究发现,美联储缩表在初期对我国企业杠杆率的影响程度较大,但不存在长期溢出效应;而加息在初期影响程度相对较小,但对我国企业杠杆率存在长期溢出影响。在溢出方向上,美联储紧缩性货币政策会显著降低我国企业杠杆率。在溢出结构上,企业融资约束越严重,美联储货币政策对我国企业杠杆率溢出效应越明显。     

次贷危机后美联储非常规货币政策及退出机制分析——基于美联储资产负债表的视角

次贷危机发生后,很多国家中央银行都采取了大量的非常规货币政策来确保金融系统的稳定和促进经济增长,尤其以美联储的非常规货币政策最具代表性。虽然非常规货币政策复杂多变,但是通常在央行资产负债表中清晰记录。借助于美联储资产负债表,能够全面梳理次贷危机后美联储的非常规货币政策,有助于深入理解非常规货币政策的实施和退出机制。     

How to Promote Fed Independence: Perspectives from Political Economy and History

In two short histories of the independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank since its creation in 1913—the first with respect to the Fed's monetary policymaking, the second focused on its regulatory policymaking—the author shows that the range of the Fed's powers has varied greatly over time, and that changes in those powers have had major effects on the extent of Fed independence. Moreover, the shifts over time in Fed powers reflect, to a significant degree, conscious trade‐offs by Fed leaders. A large number of somewhat surprising Fed positions on important regulatory matters can be explained as more or less deliberate attempts to preserve the Fed's monetary powers from political interference by yielding some of its independence in exercising its regulatory authority. In a case involving one of the most destructive U.S. financial regulatory policies, the Fed's effective neutrality on, and thus failure to support, the elimination of restrictions on interstate branch banking is seen as contributing to the chronic instability of the U.S. banking system, which has suffered some 20 major crises since the early 1800s (as compared to the crisis‐free Canadian system, with its nationwide banking from its inception). The Fed's reluctance to intervene is attributed to its unwillingness to antagonize powerful Congressional supporters of state banking interests and, more generally, to a “game of bank bargains” that can be seen at work in the political economy of virtually all countries. In more recent times, the most costly episode in this time‐honored game features a series of implicit or, in some cases, explicit agreements between large U.S. banks and urban activist groups—under the aegis of the Community Reinvestment Act, and with the oversight and implicit blessing of the Fed—to make on the order of $4.6 trillion loans to “subprime” borrowers in exchange for the activists’ (and the Fed's) support in Congressional merger hearings. The resulting nationwide debasement of mortgage underwriting standards and sheer volume of “toxic assets,” in combination with clearly inadequate capital requirements (which the Fed also failed to correct), are viewed as if not the principal cause of the crisis, a far bigger contributor than, say, the Fed's widely criticized unwillingness to tighten monetary policy in the early 2000s. To prevent the Fed from continuing to sacrifice its independence in regulatory matters to preserve its freedom to conduct monetary policy, the author proposes that authority for regulatory and monetary policy be vested in two separate regulatory bodies. If carried out, such a policy change would enact a proposal made by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in 2008, just before the global financial crisis hit.     

A Limited Central Bank

The President of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank from 2006–2015 discusses the Fed's essential role as preserver of the currency's purchasing power and how the institution might be improved to better fulfill that role. To that end, the author proposes the imposition of four limits on the central bank that, by restricting its discretion, can be expected to improve outcomes and accountability.

• First, limit the Fed's monetary policy goals to a narrow mandate in which price stability is the sole, or at least the primary, objective;
• Second, limit the types of assets that the Fed can hold on its balance sheet to Treasury securities;
• Third, limit the Fed's discretion in monetary policymaking by requiring a systematic, rule‐like approach; and
• Fourth, limit the boundaries of its lender‐of‐last‐resort credit extension.

These changes, by creating a more limited central bank, would help preserve the central bank's independence, thereby improving the effectiveness of monetary policy. They would also make it easier for the public to hold the Fed accountable for its policy decisions.     

美联储货币政策对我国资产价格的影响

本文利用事件研究法考察了美联储货币政策对我国资产价格的影响。研究发现美联储货币政策会显著影响我国资产价格,美联储加息会降低我国债券和股票回报,降息则会提高债券和股票回报。将美联储货币政策进行细分后发现,预期到的货币政策调整对债券市场和股票市场的回报都有显著影响,而未预期到的货币政策调整和前瞻性指引只影响债券市场。进一步的研究表明,未预期到的美联储货币政策调整和前瞻性指引还会加剧我国金融市场的波动率。本文的研究结论为美联储货币政策对我国经济金融的影响提供了新的证据,对于投资者提高投资收益、降低投资风险以及货币当局完善我国货币政策调控和维护我国金融市场稳定具有重要意义。     

The Asymmetric Impact of Monetary Policy on Currency Markets

This study examines whether tightening and easing actions of the Federal Reserve symmetrically influence currency markets. Using daily data on four exchange rates from 1989 to 2001, we find that changes in the Fed's interest rate target are positively related to changes in the value of the dollar. Surprises associated with monetary tightening have a larger announcement effect as compared to monetary easing for the British pound, German mark, and Canadian dollar, whereas the opposite is true for the Japanese yen. The results appear to be driven by the reactions of foreign central banks to Fed actions, the Fed's credibility as a policymaker, and by the change in the Fed's disclosure policy beginning in 1994.     

What Asset Prices Should Be Targeted by a Central Bank?

This paper investigates the monetary policy design for restoring equilibrium determinacy. Our interests are whether a central bank should respond to asset price fluctuations, and if so, what asset prices should be targeted. We show that a monetary policy response to the price of a productive tangible asset (capital price) is helpful for equilibrium determinacy, while that to the price of an intangible asset that reflects a firm's profit (share prices) is a source of equilibrium indeterminacy. This result comes from the two assets' prices moving in opposite directions in response to a permanent increase in inflation.