期货投机交易

作为期货新手,该如何做期货？ 作为期贷新手,特别是个人投资者,通常做期贷的目的是获取差价收益,即主要进行期贷投机交易。投机者根据自己对期贷价格走势的判断,作出买进或卖出的决定,如果这种判断与市场价格走势相同,则投机者平仓出局后可获取投机利润;如果判断与价格走势相反,则投机者平仓出局后承担投机损失。     

我国期货交易中过度投机的原因与对策

投机和套期保值是期货市场的两大交易行为,是期货市场的一对孪生子。但是长期以来,由于我国公众对期货市场性质的生疏,以及对“投机”这个在我国从古至今都是贬义词的名词的片面理解,使人们一直对投机交易仔在着种种偏见。其实,投机者的英文称谓是“Spcculater”即预测者的意思,投机者与期货交易有着不解之缘。 期货交易最重要的功能是为套期保值者转移价格波动所带来的风险。那么这种价格风险转移给谁了呢?在期货市场上价格风险的承担都主要是投机者。众多的投机者试图正确预测商品价格     

从“投机”中借鉴

金融就是人间江湖,几乎人人不可避免。站在金融投机或者金融危机的角度,不止一位金融学家强调过：“一部金融史也是一部金融投机史和金融危机史,更是一部不断出现危机、不断修正和不断完善监管体系的历史。”金融投机是一个历久而又充满了迷惑的话题,一些人认为,只有把投机关进笼子,财富方才安全。另一派则辩护说,投机者只是让新的信息最终反映到价格上,从根本上是一种良眭力量,如果没有金融投机,金融危机将会更加频繁。但问题是,投机的操纵者——投机者。该如何定义呢？     

对外汇期货交易会计处理的探讨

对外汇期货交易会计处理的探讨西南财经大学纳鹏杰虽然签订远期外汇合同也可以进行投机活动，但在汇率波动频繁的当今世界，通过签订远期外汇合同进行投机并不可取。对投机者来说，最有诱惑力的是外汇期货的买卖。这种买卖操作简单，又很少进行现汇交割，投机者投入少量资...     

制度创新是中国股市长治久安的唯一选择

中国股市的主要弊端 市场过度投机 股票市场是一个投资的场所,也是一个适度投机的场所,因为投机者的存在有助于股票价格达到理性价格.然而,中国股市的种种异化现象表明,中国股市已经是一个过度投机的场所.     

金融衍生品灾难中的长鞭效应

金融衍生品具有跨期性、联动性、高杠杆性等特点,使得高风险高收益的金融投机特质十分突出,因此吸引了很多投机者参与. 但是,在追逐高收益的投机者群体推波助澜下,金融衍生品原有的规避和对冲业务风险的作用被忽视.这造成金融衍生品在各领域盲目扩张,泡沫化程度加深.     

发挥复利威力理好你的财

安德烈·科斯托兰尼在《一个投机者的告白》书中提到“有钱的人，可以投机；钱少的人，不可以投机；根本没钱的人，必须投机。”普通32薪族刚好介于钱少和没钱之间，其实也不必投机，只要稳健踏实，从小额开始，拉长投资时间，发挥复利的威力，一样可以达到财富目标。     

税收政策与货币政策对稳定房价增长速度中的有效性探究

房价增长速度的非理性增长是近年来困扰我国政府的一个重大问题。原本为推进社会主义市场改革而进行的商品房改革却为投机者提供了赚取超额利润的投机空间,导致房价非理性的增长。如果不及时使之复归理性,则会重蹈发达国家泡沫经济的覆辙。政府政策的多次重拳出击旨在稳定房价,而其政策的结果却并未达到预期效果,反而形成了政府、开发商、投机者三方的非合作博弈。一、房地产市场中的投机行为     

石油期货市场投机行为的幕后推手

2000年之后,国际石油价格呈现出＂过山车＂式的变动,投机活动成为影响石油价格的不可忽视的因素。本文采用格兰杰非因果关系检验的方法寻找不同时期引起投机行为的格兰杰原因。研究发现,投机者对投机操作方向的选择主要受货币政策的影响,对投机规模的选择主要受金融市场风险状况的影响。     

股指期货推出不会形成过度投机

股指期货推出后是否会像权证一样形成过度投机呢?我们认为,股指期货推出后需要投机行为,但不会形成过度投机。第一,股指期货推出后,要使其顺利实现基本功能,就需要容许投机行为的存在。推出股指期货以后,参与者包括了套期保值者、套利者和投机者三种类型。在这三种类型中,套利和套保者主要由机构投资者组成,     

高利率能否捍卫汇率稳定：基于马尔科夫变换的世代交叠模型的分析

按照传统观点,在本国货币遭受投机攻击时,中央银行的典型做法是提高短期利率来捍卫货币和汇率制度。但批评者认为,提高利率会增加经济发展的成本,容易引发信用恐慌和产出减少。通过建立一个基于马尔科夫变换的世代交叠模型可以发现,利率被提的越高,汇率波动率也会随之相应增加。当高利率的货币政策使经济增长放缓甚至衰退,维持汇率稳定的可信度下降时,投机者就会发动对本币的投机攻击。最后在外汇储备耗尽的情况下,中央银行权衡得失后不得不实行浮动汇率制。     

Education spending: A glimpse of the mechanics of central government control

With its efficiency currently under constant attack, the virtues of the national health service can easily be overlooked. International comparisons are always hazardous, not least in health. But what they suggest is that the NHS does give relatively good value for money.     

The attack on share buybacks

Corporate share buybacks are under attack, mainly from the political left, but also to some degree from the right. Critics advocate increasing the tax on buybacks in the hope of inducing firms to invest more and in ways that benefit workers. This attack on buybacks reflects a misunderstanding of basic (textbook-level) finance principles. The approach advocated by critics will backfire at growth-stage firms, which will invest less, not more, because a payout-tax increase will reduce the supply of equity infusions. At mature firms that are generating ample free cash flow, managers can easily evade the (unattractive-for-shareholders) real investments that critics desire by investing retained cash in financial assets. Buyback critics should recognise that punishing cash payouts per se would be counterproductive, and should focus instead on making a case for legislation that creates incentives that directly promote the specific behaviours they desire.     

The role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model

This paper studies the role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model based on Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), who study stock market bubbles and crashes in a dynamic model with a continuum of rational small traders. We introduce a large trader into their model and apply it to currency attacks. In an attack against a fixed exchange rate regime with a gradually overvalued currency, traders lack common knowledge about the time when the overvaluation starts and need to coordinate to break a peg. Both the inability of traders to synchronize their attack and their incentive to time the collapse of the regime lead to the persistent overvaluation of the currency. We find that the presence of a large trader with perfect information induces small traders to attack sooner and leads to an accelerated collapse of the regime. But the presence of a large trader with noisy information may delay the collapse of the regime ex post. Moreover, a large trader with precise information tends to be at the rear of an attack. With noisy information, he could attack earlier or later than small traders. In both cases, the large trader affects market dynamics of the attack substantially.     

How Does the Corporate World Cope with Mega‐Terrorism? Puzzling Evidence from Terrorism Insurance Markets

Terrorist attacks that have succeeded abroad since 2001, as well as others that were prevented, indicate that the threat of a large‐scale attack is real and will be with us for a long time. Focusing on the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, this article analyzes the role that insurance can play in providing commercial enterprises with financial protection against the economic consequences of major terrorist attacks. The article begins by explaining the design and key features of terrorism insurance programs operating today in each of the three countries (TRIA in the U.S., Pool Re in the U.K., and Extremus in Germany). The authors then provide a detailed comparative analysis of the evolution of prices and take‐up rates (based on as yet unpublished data), with particular attention to financial institutions. For those who think the U.S. is the most likely target for mega‐terrorism, the findings are somewhat puzzling. On average, for example, companies in the U.S. do not pay even half as much for comparable coverage under TRIA as companies pay in Germany under Extremus, which raises the questions: Is terrorism coverage under the U.S. insurance program now drastically underpriced? If so, what would be the likely consequences of another large‐scale attack in the U.S.? On the demand side, the authors observe a dramatic increase in take‐up rates in the U.S. since 2003, revealing increased corporate concern. By contrast, the market penetration in Germany remains remarkably low. A better understanding of these programs and of the recent evolution of terrorism insurance markets in the U.S. and Europe should help corporate and government decision makers develop more effective protection against the economic consequences of mega‐terrorism.     

An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.     

Strategic responses of incumbents to new entry: the effect of ownership structure: capital structure, and focus

We examine how certain firm- and market-specific characteristicsaffect incumbent firms' responses to new entry into their localmarkets. Data comes from the discount department store industrywhere Wal-Mart entered a large number of markets in a shortperiod of time. Consistent with existing research, larger andmore profitable incumbents respond more aggressively to Wal-Mart'sentry, while more highly levered incumbents respond less aggressively.Also, there is evidence that incumbent managers fight harder(possibly overinvest) when their job is at greater risk andhigh managerial ownership appears to reduce this agency problem.Incumbent firms behave differently in markets under attack byWal-Mart than in markets not yet threatened, suggesting thatsome of the documented responses are specific to Wal-Mart'sentry.     

Risk management,firm reputation,and the impact of successful cyberattacks on target firms

We develop a model where a firm has an optimal exposure to cyber risk. With rational, fully informed agents and with no hysteresis, a successful cyberattack should have no impact on a financially unconstrained target's reputation and post-attack policies. In contrast, when a successful attack involves the loss of personal financial information, there is a significant shareholder wealth loss, which is much larger than the attack's out-of-pocket costs. This excess loss is higher when the attack decreases sales growth more and lower when the board pays more attention to risk management before the attack. Further, an attack decreases a firm's risk appetite, as it beefs up its risk management and information technology and decreases the risk-taking incentives of management. Finally, successful cyberattacks adversely affect the stock price of firms in the target's industry. These results imply that successful attacks with personal financial information loss provide adverse information about cyber risk to target firms, their stakeholders, and their competitors.     

New development: The UK coalition government and the future of public sector pensions

This article presents a critical analysis of the contemporary attack on public sector occupational pensions in the UK. It traces the implications of the attack for future pensions policy on this issue.     

Terrorist attacks and corporate investment: The beneficial value of CEO overconfidence

This study examines whether terrorist attacks influence corporate investments and firm value. We expect that overconfident CEOs can mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by terrorist attacks because they overestimate the returns on investment. Using measures of terrorist attack proximity in the U.S., we find that firms with non-overconfident CEOs significantly decrease their investment growth when terrorist attacks affect them, while firms with overconfident CEOs do not. Consequently, the impact of terrorist attacks on firm value varies between firms with overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. Overall, this study suggests that CEO overconfidence can benefit shareholder value under certain conditions, such as terrorist attacks.