An Empirical Analysis of Quoted Depths of NYSE and Amex Stocks

In this study, we find strong intertemporal/cross-sectional correlations between quoted depths and various security characteristics for a sample of stocks listed on the NYSE and Amex. Our empirical results indicate that although specialists are generally unable to discern insider trading as it occurs, they cope with insider trading by posting smaller depths for stocks with a greater tendency of insider trading. Empirical evidence also indicates that specialists/limit order traders quote smaller depths for riskier stocks to limit potential losses to better-informed traders. In addition, we find that specialists/limit order traders quote larger depths for stocks with greater trading volume, larger market capitalization, and higher competition. Overall, our findings suggest that depths are an important means through which specialists and limit order traders deal with the adverse selection problem, order processing problem, and competition.     

PRICE AND QUANTITY QUOTES ON NASDAQ: A STUDY OF DEALER QUOTATION BEHAVIOR

We show that the majority of quotes posted by NASDAQ dealers are noncompetitive and only 19.5% (18.4%) of bid (ask) quotes are at the inside. The percentage of dealer quotes that are at the inside is higher for stocks with wider spreads, fewer market makers, and more frequent trading, and lower for stocks with larger trade sizes and higher return volatility. These results support our conjecture that dealers have greater incentives to be at the inside for stocks with larger market‐making revenues and smaller costs. Dealers post large depths when their quotes are at the inside and frequently quote the minimum required depth when they are not at the inside. The latter quotation behavior leads to the negative intertemporal correlation between dealer spread and depth.     

THE DETERMINANTS AND DYNAMICS OF BID-ASK SPREADS ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE

We analyze the effect of various factors on the size of spreads on the London Stock Exchange since “Big Bang” and find that the price of a security, volume of transactions, risk associated with security returns, and degree of competition among market makers explain 91 percent of the cross-sectional variation in spreads. The results are consistent with the argument that the inside spread encompasses the order-processing, inventory-adjustment, and adverse-information cost of spreads. We also investigate the speed at which spreads move toward their normal levels after a temporary deviation. Although the speed of adjustment varies across firms, the cross-sectional median of 0.896 indicates it takes more than one period (day) for the adjustment to be completed. The volume of transactions and the degree of competition among market makers are the significant factors that affect the speed of correction in spreads toward their normal levels. This implies private information is incorporated more quickly into prices for stocks with greater competition and high trading volume.     

Making a Market with Spreads and Depths

Abstract:   In this paper we study the quote revision behavior of NASDAQ market makers by analyzing inter‐temporal changes in their spread and depth quotes. Using individual dealer quote and trade data for a sample of 2,319 stocks, we find that NASDAQ dealers make more frequent revisions in depths than in spreads and the extent of liquidity management is greater for stocks of smaller companies, lower‐priced stocks, and stocks with larger trade sizes and fewer number of transactions. We show that intraday variation in the number of quote revisions follows the U‐shaped pattern, indicating that the extent of liquidity management is greater during the early and late hours of trading than during midday.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

The Effect of Option Listing on Bid-Ask Spreads,Price Volatility,and Trading Activity of the Underlying OTC Stocks

This paper examines the changes in spreads, price volatility, and trading activity surrounding option listing for a sample of 144 OTC stocks. For this sample, both price volatility and volume increase, but the evidence on spreads is mixed. The increase in price volatility is attributed primarily to an increase in residual return variances. Furthermore, price volatility increases even after controlling for volume, insider trading, and spreads. Although these variables do not fully explain the causes for the increase in price volatility after option listing, the results suggest that liquidity trading or volume has a stronger effect on price volatility than insider trading. This study also finds that both the number of trades and institutional holdings show substantial increases, which are supportive of the notion that listing of options on OTC stocks attracts more attention.     

An empirical examination of the impact of market microstructure changes on the determinants of option bid-ask spreads

This paper examines the determinants of bid-ask spreads in the Australian Options Market before and after it switched from a quote-driven floor-traded market to an order-driven screen-traded market. This study reports that both put and call option bid-ask spreads are positively related to the option's value, its remaining term-to-maturity, its absolute hedge ratio and the volatility of returns from the underlying asset and negatively related to the level of trading activity in that option series. The study also reports that spreads are generally less when market makers are obliged to maintain continuous quotes in the market. The paper also finds that following the change in trading regime, both call and put option spreads became more sensitive to the absolute value of the option's delta. This finding is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical work from equities markets that has suggested that a switch to an electronic trading regime results in an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. There is also some limited evidence that suggests that the switch to electronic trading resulted in call option spreads being less sensitive to the return volatility of the underlying asset but more sensitive to the option's price.     

Option trading after the opening bell and intraday stock return predictability

Prior literature finds that information is reflected in option markets before stock markets, but no study has explored whether option volume soon after market open has predictive power for intraday stock returns. Using novel intraday signed option-to-stock volume data, we find that a composite option trading score (OTS) in the first 30 min of market open predicts stock returns during the rest of the trading day. Such return predictability is greater for smaller stocks, stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, and stocks with higher bid–ask spreads relative to their options’ bid–ask spreads. Moreover, OTS is a significantly stronger predictor of intraday stock returns after overnight earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that option trading in the 30 min after the opening bell has predictive power for intraday stock returns.     

THE IMPACT OF MARKET MAKER CONCENTRATION ON ADVERSE‐SELECTION COSTS FOR NASDAQ STOCKS

We examine the impact of market maker concentration on adverse‐selection costs for NASDAQ stocks and find that more market makers results in lower costs. Furthermore, this reduction in adverse selection exceeds the overall reduction in spreads that is attributable to market maker competition. We hypothesize that order flow internalization is increasing in market makers and allows for greater information production, and is an explanation for our findings. Our results provide an explanation for the puzzle documented by previous work that finds that adverse‐selection costs for NASDAQ tend to be lower than for the New York Stock Exchange, whereas spreads tend to be higher.     

DEALER BID-ASK SPREADS AND OPTIONS TRADING ON OVER-THE-COUNTER STOCKS

In this study the impact of option listings on bid-ask spreads for over-the-counter stocks is examined. Option listings are hypothesized to impact spreads by affecting the inventory-holding cost and/or the informed risk component of spreads. Univariate tests reveal that the commencement of options trading is accompanied by a statistically significant decline in percentage spreads. In addition, it is found that there is a significant rise in the average daily stock trading volume in the post-option-listing period, while there is no significant change in variance of the underlying stock returns in the short term. Regression results indicate that some stocks experience a decline in spreads even after controlling for changes in inventory-holding costs. The univariate and regression results taken in conjunction indicate a favorable impact of option listings on both the inventory-holding cost and informed-trading risk components of spread determinants. The combined evidence suggests that initiation of options trading enhances the overall liquidity of the underlying stock.     

OPTIONS LISTING, MARKET LIQUIDITY AND STOCK BEHAVIOUR: SOME CANADIAN EVIDENCE

This study examines the price behaviour, trading volume and liquidity of stocks in the Canadian market at the time of options listing. Unlike some studies examining similar effects in the United States, the present one finds no evidence to indicate that either daily return volatility or trading volume is affected by the listing. Similarly, liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, is unaffected. At the same time, cross-sectional tests indicate an inverse relationship between before-to-after trading volume and the before-to-after bid-ask spread.     

The dynamics of quote adjustments

Liquidity providers on the NYSE make faster quote adjustments towards equilibrium spreads and depths than they do on NASDAQ. Liquidity providers in both markets make faster spread and depth adjustments for stocks with more frequent trading, greater return volatility, higher prices, smaller market capitalizations, and smaller trade sizes. We find that stocks with greater information-based trading and in more competitive trading environments exhibit faster quote adjustments. The speed of quote adjustment is faster after decimalization in both markets. These results are robust and not driven by differences in stock attributes between the two markets or time periods. Overall, our results indicate that stock attributes, market structure, and tick size exert a significant impact on the speed of quote adjustment.     

Multimarket trading and liquidity: a transaction data analysis of Canada–US interlistings

We use transaction data for Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) listed stocks to examine the impact on trading costs of the decision to interlist on a US exchange. We measure trading costs using both ‘posted’ bid-ask spreads and ‘effective’ bid-ask spreads that measure actual transaction prices relative to standing bid-ask quotes. After controlling for price level, trade size and trading volume effects, we find that overall posted and effective spreads in the domestic (TSE) market decrease subsequent to the interlisting. However, the decrease in trading costs is concentrated in those TSE stocks that experience a significant shift of total trading volume (TSE and US) to the US exchange after listing. We interpret this result in the context of theories of multimarket trading as a competitive response by TSE market makers to the additional presence of US market makers.     

Do aggressive orders affect liquidity? An evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates how aggressive orders affect spreads and trading activity measures on the stock market. Based on a sample of stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange this study finds that spreads and trading activity measures increase significantly when aggressive orders are executed, but quickly revert to initial levels. The reaction to these orders on the bid and ask side of the market is similar. The effect of aggressive orders differ depending on the size of the firms. Trading activity measures such as volumes or number of transactions increase stronger for bigger than for smaller stocks, while spreads increase more for smaller firms than for bigger ones. These findings enrich the understanding of liquidity dynamics especially on the emerging markets where liquidity is an important price formation factor.     

Market Making and Trading in Nasdaq Stocks

This paper examines the relations between the number of market makers, trading activity, and price improvement in Nasdaq stocks, using a model motivated by Grossman and Miller (1988). Results indicate a positive relation between the number of market makers and trading frequency, and that competition among market makers reduces effective bid-ask spreads. Results estimated using a simultaneous equations framework support the model predictions of Grossman and Miller. Results also indicate that trading frequency may be more important than trade size in determining the number of market makers.     

The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks

This paper provides an analysis of the nature and evolution of a dealer market for Nasdaq stocks. Despite size differences in sample stocks, there is a surprising consistency to their trading. One dealer tends to dominate trading in a stock. Markets are concentrated and spreads are increasing in the volume and market share of the dominant dealer. Entry and exit are ubiquitous. Exiting dealers are those with very low profits and trading volume. Entering market makers fail to capture a meaningful share of trading or profits. Thus, free entry does little to improve the competitive nature of the market as entering dealers have little impact. We find, however, that for small stocks, the Nasdaq dealer market is being more competitive than the specialist market.     

Why effective spreads on NASDAQ were higher than on the New York stock exchange in the 1990s

Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain why spreads on NASDAQ were substantially higher than those on the NYSE in the 1990s: “collusion” and “preferencing and payment for order flow.” We present data on all actively traded stocks in these markets of relative effective spreads (RES), aggregated monthly over 1987–1999 and advance a third hypothesis: NASDAQ “SOES-day-trading.” We estimate NASDAQ and NYSE informed-trade losses and gains to market makers and other liquidity providers on six trade sizes, and find that losses on trades we ascribe to SOES day traders were substantially greater than those on other trades, offset somewhat by gains from small-trade-size investors. NASDAQ market makers' response to these losses and additional operations costs incurred to reduce the losses resulted in greater RES and increased trading within the best quotes, predominantly on larger trade sizes. The data are consistent with the “SOES-day-trading” hypotheses, but not with the other two. Furthermore, the mandatory SOES “experiment” provides insights into the negative effects of automated trading systems (such as ECNs, which now dominate NASDAQ) when their design does not adequately consider opportunistic traders.     

Short Sales and Option Listing Decisions

We find that stocks with higher levels of prelisting short activity have a greater probability of option listing. These results are driven by the prelisting short activity of market makers, which suggests that exchanges believe that stocks with greater short selling will provide option market makers a better opportunity to hedge with short sales in the spot market. We also confirm that after options are listed, stocks with more prelisting short activity have more option trading activity. These results indicate that option exchanges strategically list options for stocks they believe with generate high trading volume thereby maximizing the profits of exchange members.     

Market structure and microstructure, in international interest rate futures markets

We examine the role of market structure in identifying microstructure features of the NYSE.Euronext-LIFFE STIR futures market by comparing the ability of two bid-ask spread component models to explain bid-ask spreads. These two models differ only in their assumptions about whether or not market makers are present. The period we analyze includes data from pit-based trading alongside electronic market data. We explore how market structure affects the way private information influences bid-ask spreads and return volatility. A second part of our study employs intraday correlation to investigate these links in greater depth, while a third part looks at how private information and trading noise contribute to price evolution.     

The Quality of ECN and Nasdaq Market Maker Quotes

This paper compares the quality of quotes submitted by electronic communication networks (ECNs) and by traditional market makers to the Nasdaq quote montage. An analysis of the most active Nasdaq stocks shows that ECNs not only post informative quotes, but also, compared to market makers, ECNs post quotes rapidly and are more often at the inside. Additionally, ECN quoted spreads are smaller than dealer quoted spreads. The evidence suggests that the proliferation of alternative trading venues, such as ECNs, may promote quote quality rather than fragmenting markets. Moreover, the results suggest that a more open book contributes to quote quality.