Market power,price discrimination,and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.     

Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

We present a model of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers with nonlinear pricing strategies. Using home‐scan data on bottled water produced by manufacturers and sold by retail chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for two‐part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Using price‐cost margins recovered from estimates of demand parameters, we select the best supply model by performing nonnested tests, and find that manufacturers use two‐part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We then perform counterfactual policy simulations that restrict the use of these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative scenarios.     

The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining

This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the “chain store”) can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals. Bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not credible, price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms.     

Price discrimination in input markets

We analyze the short‐ and long‐run implications of third‐degree price discrimination in input markets. In contrast to the extant literature, which typically assumes that the supplier is an unconstrained monopolist, in our model input prices are constrained by the threat of demand‐side substitution. In our model, the more efficient buyer receives a discount. A ban on price discrimination thus benefits smaller but hurts more efficient, larger firms. It also stifles incentives to invest and innovate. With linear demand, a ban on price discrimination benefits consumers in the short run but reduces consumer surplus in the long run, which is once again the opposite of what is found without the threat of demand‐side substitution.     

Welfare‐increasing third‐degree price discrimination

When demand functions in different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their means, conditions exist such that third‐degree price discrimination leads to greater total output and greater total welfare. Welfare is higher with discrimination than with a uniform price when demand functions are derived from logistic distributions with different means. Welfare and consumer surplus are higher with discrimination for demands derived from a distribution related to the Pareto. In general, whether discrimination increases total output depends on demand being more convex in markets in which prices fall with discrimination than in those in which prices rise.     

The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination with nonlinear demand functions

The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination are analyzed when demand in one market is an additively shifted version of demand in the other market and both markets are served with uniform pricing. Social welfare is lower with discrimination if the slope of demand is log concave or the convexity of demand is nondecreasing in the price. The demand functions commonly used in models of imperfect competition satisfy at least one of these sufficient conditions.     

Resale price maintenance and collusion

The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.     

Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination

Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimination softening competition through a decrease in search incentives, illustrating how price discrimination may magnify the efficiency costs of search frictions.     

Informational rigidities and the stickiness of temporary Sales

How do retailers react to cost changes? While temporary sales account for 95% of price change in our data, retail prices respond to a wholesale cost increase entirely through the regular price. Sales actually respond temporarily in the opposite direction from regular prices, as though to conceal the price hike. Additional evidence from responses to commodity cost and local unemployment shocks, as well as broader evidence from BLS data, reinforces these findings. Institutional evidence indicates that sales are complex contingent contracts, determined substantially in advance. In a standard price-discrimination model, these institutional practices leave little money ``on the table”.     

减税降费的价格和福利效应——引入成本传导率的投入产出价格模型分析

本文在增值税抵扣机制的投入产出价格模型中引入社保费和成本传导机制,并利用2017年中国投入产出表和税收数据模拟分析了不同成本传导率条件下,减税降费的价格效应和福利效应。研究表明:(1)减税降费使得各行业产品价格降低,对第三产业的价格影响最为明显。(2)成本传导率越高,则产品价格的下降幅度越大。当成本传导率分别为1/3、2/3和1时,各行业产品价格的平均下降幅度分别为0.32%、0.93%和2.66%。(3)较为合理的中国整体成本传导率约为1/3,减税降费是2019年中国PPI下降的主要因素之一。当成本传导率为1/3时,模拟计算的PPI下降幅度与国家统计局公布的2019年PPI的下降幅度(-0.3%)非常接近。(4)减税降费使消费者价格下降,居民福利得以改善,且城镇居民福利改善高于农村居民。随着价格传导率增大,城镇居民与农村居民的人均福利改善差距扩大。     

Differential pricing when costs differ: a welfare analysis

This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost‐based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost‐based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand‐based counterpart, third‐degree price discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups.     

Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices

This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market‐share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own‐supplier contracts), intra‐ and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market‐share contracts are feasible. Compared to own‐supplier contracts, the use of market‐share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.     

垄断限价、代理商进入与社会福利——兼评中国民航市场价格维持政策

自从中国民航总局于 1999年实施“国内民航机票禁止打折”政策以来 ,不少民航公司仍在暗中通过机票中间代理商低价倾销机票。本文试图从社会福利角度出发 ,分析在卡特尔组织实行垄断定价政策情况下 ,中间代理商的进入对社会福利的影响 ,简要评价了中国民航市场现行价格维持政策的福利效应 ,并提出若干相应建议。     

突发事件风险下考虑企业社会责任的闭环供应链决策

基于突发事件风险概率小、后果大的特点,考虑企业社会责任的闭环供应链应对突发事件风险中再制造成本扰动风险的优化决策。结果表明：当再制造成本扰动较小时,不需要调整闭环供应链的生产计划,反之则需要调整生产计划;若再制造成本扰动值增大,则需提高最优零售价并减少最优产量;若再制造成本扰动量绝对值增大,则需降低最优零售价格并增加最优产量。关注CSR的水平越高,最优的批发价格和最优的零售价反而会降低。最优的回收利用率、最优的产量及整个链条的总利润与CSR水平呈正相关。若再制造成本扰动值较小,零售商回收模式更加合适,而若扰动值超过一定值则应该选择制造商回收模式。     

Vertical control of a distribution network—an empirical analysis of magazines

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions, we develop two empirical entry models. In the benchmark coordinated entry model, the upstream firm sets market‐specific wholesale prices and implements the first best. In the more realistic restricted/free entry model, the upstream firm only sets a uniform wholesale price. As a second‐best solution, it restricts entry in markets where business stealing (encroachment) is high, and allows free entry elsewhere. We apply the model to magazine distribution, and assess the profitability of alternative vertical restraints. Banning restricted licensing reduces profits only slightly, so the business rationale for restricted licensing should not be sought in the prevention of encroachment. Furthermore, market‐specific wholesale prices implement the first best, but the profit increase would be small, providing a rationale for the commonly observed uniform wholesale prices. Finally, uniform franchise fees are much less effective than a uniform wholesale price to cope with local market differences.     

The Efficiency of Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets

Crocker and Snow (1986) show that banning categorization based on risk‐related characteristics such as gender or race in pricing insurance policies is inefficient whenever categorization is costless. Their analysis, by contrast, suggests ambiguous welfare effects of banning costly categorization. I show that this latter conclusion is incorrect: categorical pricing bans are inefficient even when categorization is costly. Whenever the ban‐imposing government can instead provide breakeven partial social insurance, it can remove its ban in such a way that the insurance market will choose to employ the categorizing technology only when doing so is Pareto improving.     

Examples of unit tax superiority for a price-discriminating monopolist

This paper compares the welfare effects of per-unit and ad valorem taxes in four pervasive price discrimination schemes: quantity discounts, two-part tariffs, bundling, and package size price discrimination. The paper shows by example that per-unit taxes may welfare dominate ad valorem tariffs in a market with a monopoly that maximizes profits by engaging in second-degree price discrimination.     

Do Americans consume too little natural gas? An empirical test of marginal cost pricing

This article measures the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs in the U.S. natural gas distribution market during the period 1991–2007. We find large departures from marginal cost pricing in all 50 states, with residential and commercial customers facing average markups of over 40%. Based on conservative estimates of the price elasticity of demand, these distortions impose hundreds of millions of dollars of annual welfare loss. Moreover, current price schedules are an important preexisting distortion which should be taken into account when evaluating carbon taxes and other policies aimed at addressing external costs.