Is unlevered firm volatility asymmetric?

Asymmetric volatility refers to the stylized fact that stock volatility is negatively correlated to stock returns. Traditionally, this phenomenon has been explained by the financial leverage effect. This explanation has recently been challenged in favor of a risk premium based explanation. We develop a new, unlevering approach to document how well financial leverage, rather than size, beta, book-to-market, or operating leverage, explains volatility asymmetry on a firm-by-firm basis. Our results reveal that, at the firm level, financial leverage explains much of the volatility asymmetry. This result is robust to different unlevering methodologies, samples, and measurement intervals. However, we find that financial leverage does not explain index-level volatility asymmetry. We show that this difference between index-level asymmetry and firm-level asymmetry is driven by the asymmetry of the unlevered covariance component of index volatility.     

Government support for environmental regulation: Evidence from China

With an emphasis on innovation, Porter (1991) challenges the traditional wisdom and then hypothesizes a promotional effect of environmental regulation on firm performance. This paper reveals a complementary source, i.e., government support, to explain the promotional effect in a developing country. We use evidence from China to find a positive causal effect of environmental regulation stringency on firm performance. To justify our theory, we show that state ownership shares of a firm as an exogenous proxy for government support positively moderate the causal effect. We also use causal mediation analysis to document that loans from banks as the representative type of government support mediates the causal effect significantly in statistics and economics.     

Does familiarity with business segments affect CEOs' divestment decisions?

We examine the impact of familiarity with business segments on CEOs' divestment decisions. We find CEOs are less likely to divest assets from familiar than from non-familiar segments. We attribute this effect to CEOs' comparative information advantage with respect to familiar segments. Consistent with this information advantage, we document that the familiarity effect is particularly strong in R&D intensive industries. We further find the familiarity effect to be most pronounced for longer-tenured CEOs who have built up sufficient political power over the course of several years in office to enable implementation of their preferred divestment choices. We also document the value effects of divestments and show that familiarity affects returns on divestment announcements.     

COMMONALITY IN LIQUIDITY OF NEARBY FIRMS

In this article, we examine commonality in liquidity of firms headquartered in the same states and how the local liquidity commonality is influenced by firm‐ and state‐level characteristics. We document strong liquidity comovement of nearby firms. Moreover, firms that change headquarters location experience a decrease in their liquidity commonality with firms in the old states and an increase in their liquidity commonality with firms in the new states. Our findings show that both firm‐ and state‐level characteristics determine local liquidity comovement. Local liquidity commonality is stronger for firms with smaller size and lower level of institutional ownership. Our results also suggest that state‐level volatility, state personal income, state investment income, and state turnover commonality explain the local component of liquidity commonality. We further document that the four state‐level factors perform differently during volatile market periods.     

Hierarchical determinants of capital structure

We analyze the influence of time-, firm-, industry- and country-level determinants of capital structure. First, we apply hierarchical linear modeling in order to assess the relative importance of those levels. We find that time and firm levels explain 78% of firm leverage. Second, we include random intercepts and random coefficients in order to analyze the direct and indirect influences of firm/industry/country characteristics on firm leverage. We document several important indirect influences of variables at industry and country-levels on firm determinants of leverage, as well as several structural differences in the financial behavior between firms of developed and emerging countries.     

Firm Size,Book-to-Market Ratio,and Security Returns: A Holdout Sample of Financial Firms

Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns for nonfinancial firms. Because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns, Fama and French exclude from their analysis financial firms, thus creating a natural holdout sample on which to test the robustness of their results. We document that the relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns is similar for financial and nonfinancial firms. In addition, we present evidence that survivorship bias does not significantly affect the estimated size or book-to-market premiums in returns. Our results indicate data-snooping and selection biases do not explain the size and book-to-market patterns in returns.     

Do Japanese CEOs matter?

In a country where individualism is emphasized less than in Western countries, we ask whether the CEO (shacho) of a Japanese corporation positively affects firm performance. To answer this question, we construct a shacho-firm matched panel data set in the period 1990 through 2002 of all listed 1419 Japanese manufacturing firms and their 3520 shachos. Though we find a positive abnormal stock return on the date a shacho change is announced, especially when the shacho change is non-routine, we document that this effect is short-lived. There seems to be no long-run positive change in performance or policies after a shacho change, even when the shacho change is non-routine. Finally, in trying to explain firm performance or policies, we attempt to separate a firm-fixed effect from a shacho-fixed effect, and are unable to disentangle a shacho-fixed effect. We are thus left to conclude that shachos do not positively matter in the Japanese corporation in this decade of a stagnant economy.     

SMALL FIRM AND VALUE EFFECTS IN THE CANADIAN STOCK MARKET

We examine the relation among average returns, market beta, firm size, and book-to-market value for Canadian stocks during 1975–92. We document a negative relation between average return and the market capitalization of firms, but find no relation between average return and market beta. While the small firm effect is significant during a period of reduced capital gains tax, it is noticeably lower than during the period leading up to the change. We find that average returns are positively related to book-to-market value especially during the period of lower capital gains tax.     

ASYMMETRIC COVARIANCE,VOLATILITY, AND THE EFFECT OF NEWS

We propose that covariance (rather than beta) asymmetry provides a superior framework for examining issues related to changing risk premiums. Accordingly, we investigate whether the conditional covariance between stock and market returns is asymmetric in response to good and bad news. Our model of conditional covariance accommodates both the sign and magnitude of return innovations, and we find significant covariance asymmetry that can explain, at least in part, the volatility feedback of stock returns. Our findings are consistent across firm size, firm leverage, and temporal and cross‐sectional aggregations.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Board independence and firm value: A quasi-natural experiment using Taiwanese data

We examine the impact on firm value of independent directors based on Taiwanese firms. Using the changes in independent director composition mandated by the Amendments of Security and Exchange Act in Taiwan as a quasi-natural experiment, we document the arguably causal and negative effect of independent directors on firm value in both the short and long run. We also find that, in response to this act, firms have tended to replace existing non-independent directors, rather than simply adding new independent directors. We also find that the new independent directors have the same qualifications as those replaced non-independent directors but are costlier and busier. The evidence reflects the short supply of qualified independent directors and might explain the negative valuation effect.     

Risk factor and industry effects in the cross-country comovement of momentum returns

This paper examines the sources of cross-country comovement of momentum returns over the 1975–2004 period. Using data on more than 17,000 individual firms across 100 industries from 40 countries, we document the profitability of country-neutral individual firm, industry, and industry-adjusted return momentum. We show that country-neutral momentum returns are significantly correlated across countries, the correlation is time-varying, and that comovement among industries cannot explain the comovement of country-neutral momentum returns. However, we find that standard risk factor models do explain a significant portion of the cross-country comovement of momentum returns, even though they do not explain average momentum returns.     

Risk-weighted capital requirements and portfolio rebalancing

We use a 2013 Norwegian policy reform to study how banks react to higher capital requirements and how these adjustments transmit to the real economy. Using bank balance sheet data, we document that banks raise capital ratios by reducing risk-weighted assets. Most of the reduction in risk-weighted assets is accounted for by a reduction in average risk weights. Consistent with this reduction in risk, we document a substantial decline in credit supply to the corporate sector relative to the household sector. We also show that banks react to higher requirements by increasing interest rates, consistent with the reduction in corporate credit growth being supply driven. Using administrative loan level tax data, we document a reduction in lending on the firm level. This is robust to controlling for firm fixed effects, thereby accounting for potential firm-bank matching. Finally, we find that the reduction in bank lending has a negative impact on firm employment growth and that this effect is driven by small firms.     

Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls

In this paper, we exploit the open nature of conference calls to explore whether managers withhold information from the investing public. Our evidence suggests that managers regularly leave participants on the conference call in the dark by not answering their questions. We find that the best predictors of such an event are firm size, a CEO's stock price–based incentives, company age, firm performance, litigation risk, and whether analysts are actively involved during the call's Q&A section. Finally, we document strong support for the assumption maintained in the literature that investors interpret silence negatively. That is, investors seem to interpret no news as bad news.     

Non‐additivity in Accounting Valuation: Theory and Applications

This paper has three objectives. First, to introduce a theoretical solution to the issue of non‐additivity between assets in place, relying on an accounting‐based valuation approach. Second, to explain how such an approach can be implemented empirically by measuring synergies between assets. Third, to present the properties of this non‐additive valuation technique. We use Choquet capacities, that is, non‐additive aggregation operators, to measure the interactions between assets and apply our methodology to a sample of US firms from the capital goods industry. To operationalize our approach we examine the relationships between synergies—captured by Choquet capacities—and the market‐to‐book ratio (proxying for growth options), and show how interactions between assets are consistently linked to a firm’s market‐to‐book ratio. We also measure firm‐specific productive efficiency relative to the industry and firm size. For large firms, efficiency, as defined by our approach, is positively associated with higher future operating cash flows. For small firms, efficiency is positively associated with higher future sales growth. We document that the non‐additive approach appears to be better able to identify expected relationships between efficiency and future performance than a simpler approach based on the market‐to‐book ratio.     

The Role of Beta and Size in the Cross-Section of European Stock Returns

This paper examines the ability of beta and size to explain cross-sectional variation in average returns in 12 European countries. We find that average stock returns are positively related to beta and negatively related to firm size. The beta premium is in part due to the fact that high beta countries outperform low beta countries. Within countries high beta stocks outperform low beta stocks only in January, not in other months. We reject the hypothesis that differences in average returns on size- and beta-sorted portfolios can be explained by market risk and exposure to the excess return of small over large stocks (SMB). Consistent with recent US evidence, we find that after controlling for size, there is no association between average returns and exposure to SMB.     

Disagreement-induced CEO turnover

We propose and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover, and examine its implications for the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on optimal decisions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Theory suggests that such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms; we document that this induces them to sometimes replace CEOs who investors disagree with, controlling for firm performance. A lower level of CEO-investor disagreement serves to partially “protect” CEOs from being fired, thus reducing turnover-performance sensitivity, which we also document. We also show that firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Using various empirical strategies, we rule out other confounding interpretations of our findings. We conclude that disagreement, independently of firm performance, affects forced CEO turnover.     

Does an anti-corruption campaign increase analyst earnings forecast optimism?

We examine the impact of an anti-corruption campaign on analyst earnings forecast optimism. Using hand-collected site visits data by the Central Inspection Team (CIT) in China that began in 2013, we document higher analyst optimism during CIT visit periods than during non-CIT visit periods. The results are robust to matched samples, placebo tests, alternative fixed effect and clustering specifications, endogeneity of CIT site visits concern, and alternative samples. Additional analysis suggests that local government pressure and firm bad-news-hiding explain the findings but it is not consistent with the improved firm fundamentals interpretation. Moreover, we find that the effect of CIT visits on analyst optimism is more pronounced for star, non-affiliated, and experienced analysts, supporting the notion that, because of their greater influence, local governments focus on pressuring these analysts. More important, the impact of CIT visits on analyst optimism is more salient if a CIT leader had previous work experience or longer work experience in the inspected province. Interestingly, we document a reversion in analyst earnings forecast optimism 60 days after CIT site visits, especially among the non-state-owned firms, suggesting that, after the CIT investigation, analyst optimism is no longer needed.     

Conditional extreme risk,black swan hedging,and asset prices

Motivated by the asset pricing theory with safety-first preference, we introduce and operationalize a conditional extreme risk (CER) measure to describe expected stock performance conditional on a small-probability market downturn (black swan). We document a significant CER premium in the cross-section of expected returns. We also demonstrate that CER explains the premia to downside beta, coskewness, and cokurtosis. CER provides distinct information regarding black swan hedging that cannot be captured by co-crash-based tail dependence measures. As we find that the pricing effect is stronger among black swan hedging stocks, this distinction helps explain the absence of premium to tail dependence.     

Delegated trading and the speed of adjustment in security prices

Institutional trading arrangements often involve the portfolio manager delegating the task of trade execution to a separate division within the firm. We model the agency conflict that arises in this setting and show that optimal performance benchmarks often create an incentive to execute orders contrary to concurrent information flow. We hypothesize that aggregate contrarian trading resulting from widespread application of such benchmarks leads to delays in the assimilation of information in security prices. Using institutional trading data, we document the hypothesized contrarian trading pattern and relate the pattern to price-adjustment delays in the response of individual stocks to index futures returns. The evidence supports the assertion that delegated institutional trading contributes to these delays.