Political uncertainty and corporate investment: Evidence from China

Using hand-collected data on changes of government officials in 277 Chinese cities, we examine how political turnover affects corporate investment in a transitional economy. We find that political turnover leads firms to significantly reduce corporate investment, particularly when the new official is an outsider appointed by a higher level government. The effect of political turnover on corporate investment is stronger for state-owned enterprises, capital intensive firms, and firms deemed locally important. Overall, the volatility of corporate investment increases with political turnover. Finally, the investment decline due to political turnover has significantly negative impact on the profitability of private firms, but not state-owned firms.     

Abnormal investment and firm performance

We find a negative relation between abnormal investment and future stock performance. Such a negative relation is mainly driven by under-investment, not over-investment. Our results are robust to various estimation methods and investment models. Both delayed market reaction and agency issues may lead to the apparently anomalous return predictability of under-investment. First, market investors may not react promptly to the fundamental information contained in under-investment about a firm’s future profitability, asset growth, and financial distress probability. Second, the negative relation between under-investment and future stock returns is more pronounced for firms with lower investor monitoring and higher agency costs.     

Digital financial inclusion and investment diversification: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of digital financial inclusion on the diversification of individual stock investments in China using nationwide data from the Chinese Stock Market Individual Investor Survey and the Peking University Digital Financial Inclusion Index of China. We show that digital financial inclusion significantly increases the diversification of individual stock investments, primarily by reducing investors' perceived transaction costs and mitigating investors' limited attention. It also plays a more significant role among investors with lower conventional financial development, lower financial literacy, below 45 years old, shorter investment experience and females. We recommend the continued promotion of digital financial inclusion to optimise asset allocation in Chinese households.     

金融科技影响企业创新投资的效应与机制研究

基于2011—2021年沪深A股上市企业数据,运用固定效应模型和中介效应模型探究金融科技发展对企业创新投资的影响及其作用机制。研究发现：金融科技发展有助于提高企业创新投资水平,能够通过促进企业短期金融资产配置行为、抑制企业长期金融资产配置行为提高企业创新投资水平;高管股权激励和政府补助均对金融科技的创新投资驱动效应有显著的强化作用;在非国有企业中,金融科技对于创新投资的驱动效应更显著。     

International investment patterns: Evidence using a new dataset

This paper examines the bilateral, source and host factors driving portfolio equity investment across a set of countries using International Monetary Fund's new dataset on international equity holdings at the end of 1997, 2001 and 2002.The paper finds that the bilateral equity investment is strongly correlated with the underlying patterns of trade in goods and services. The information asymmetries and cultural-institutional proximity are important for bilateral equity investment. The size of domestic stock market is the key correlate of aggregate foreign portfolio equity asset and liability holdings. The scale of aggregate foreign equity asset holdings is larger for countries having high income per capita.     

Limits‐to‐arbitrage,investment frictions,and the investment effect: New evidence

This study comprehensively reexamines the debate over behavioral and rational explanations for the investment effect in an updated sample. We closely follow the previous literature and provide several differences. Our tests include five prominent measures of corporate investment and corporate profitability in q‐theory and recent investment‐based asset pricing models. Both classical and Bayesian inferences show that limits‐to‐arbitrage tend to be supported by more evidence than investment frictions for all investment measures. When idiosyncratic volatility and cash flow volatility are used in measuring investment frictions, the inference is more favorable for the rational explanation.     

Bank systemic risk and corporate investment: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model in which a bank’s investment (e.g., loans) is influenced by short-term financing and a probability of a financial crisis. When banks ex ante expect to be bailed out during financial crises, they do not necessarily internalize the cost of financial crises and invest more. We argue that the level of systemic risk in the banking sector is largely driven by (1) the way in which banks finance their investment (e.g., loans) using more short-term debt and/or (2) the increase in asset commonality amongst banks. We use three measures that arguably capture two dimensions of “bank systemic risk”, namely, (1) bank funding maturity and (2) bank asset commonality, to empirically test whether bank systemic risk has a positive effect on corporate investment. We document that in a sample of publicly listed firms in the United States over the period 1991–2013, bank systemic risk is positively associated with the firm-level investment ratio after controlling for a large set of country- and firm-level variables. In addition, we show that a firm's leverage strengthens the positive effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment, suggesting that more financially constrained firms experience a larger effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment than less financially constrained firms.     

Does financing influence the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility?

Research shows that asset tangibility substantially impacts firms’ cash levels and investment. Using the deregulation of equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, we investigate the influence of financing on the dependence of cash and investment on asset tangibility. We show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility, and promotes investment and firm growth. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S. benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.     

“营改增”与企业金融化--来自制造业的经验证据

本文利用2010-2018年A股制造业上市公司数据,考察"营改增"对不同产权性质企业金融资产配置结构的影响。研究发现:在"营改增"影响下,国有企业的长期金融资产配备增加,实体投资"挤出"效应明显存在,说明国有企业配置金融资产以利润最大化为动机;非国有企业的短期金融资产持有量明显减少,融资约束有所缓解,说明非国有企业配置金融资产以资金储备为动机。     

金融资产配置与违约风险:蓄水池效应,还是逐利效应？

本文以2007—2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,检验了企业金融资产配置对违约风险的影响。实证研究发现:金融资产持有量越多,企业的违约风险越低,金融资产配置的“蓄水池效应”显著;在货币政策宽松时期,金融资产配置导致的代理冲突显现,宽松的货币政策会抑制金融资产投资对违约风险的降低作用。政府规制也会有一定的公司治理作用,将产业政策纳入讨论发现:对于产业政策支持的行业来说,企业金融资产配置能够降低违约风险,但是宽松的货币政策会刺激管理层的短视投资行为,抑制政府规制的公司治理作用。进一步地,本文提出会计稳健性的提升是企业金融资产配置降低违约风险的重要路径。本文的研究结论丰富了企业金融资产配置动机和违约风险影响因素的讨论,能够为政府部门防范经济运行中的内在风险提供有益借鉴。     

The implied cost of equity capital,corporate investment and chief executive officer turnover

This study investigates how the cost of equity capital, along with corporate investment, affects chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions. We hypothesize that the cost of equity conveys information about firm performance uncertainty that is informative of CEO talent. Consistently, our empirical results show that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, after controlling for earnings and stock performance measures and risk factors. Additional analysis of reverse causality supports the causal effect of the high cost of equity on CEO dismissals. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems. These results suggest that the cost of equity plays a more important role in assessing CEO performance when the firm needs more external equity capital to pursue investment opportunities.     

Asset liquidity,corporate investment,and endogenous financing costs

We analyze how the liquidity of real and financial assets affects corporate investment. The trade-off between liquidation costs and underinvestment costs implies that low-liquidity firms exhibit negative investment sensitivities to liquid funds, whereas high-liquidity firms have positive sensitivities. If real assets are not divisible in liquidation, firms with high financial liquidity optimally avoid external financing and instead cut new investment. If real assets are divisible, firms use external financing, which implies a lower sensitivity. In addition, asset redeployability decreases the investment sensitivity. Our findings demonstrate that asset liquidity is an important determinant of corporate investment.     

我国保险资金境外投资风险防范探析

随着保险业发展速度的加快,保险投资资金的不断增多,使保险资金境外投资逐步成为国内保险机构扩展投资领域、提高保险资金投资收益的重要途径。但与境外投资高收益相伴的是不容忽视的高风险,2008年下半年以来,随着美国次级债风波演变为百年难遇的全球性金融危机,国际金融形势风云突变,对外投资形势日趋严峻,我国保险资金对外投资面临着严峻的风险。本文通过对当前我国保险业保险资金境外投资面临的风险分析,采取理论与案例相结合的方式,从保险监管方式、内部风险控制、资产负债匹配、投资比例限制及投资人才储备等方面提出我国保险资金境外投资风险的具体策略和措施。     

Bank concentration and financial constraints on firm-level investment in Europe

This study examines the effect of bank concentration on financing constraints of non-financial firms in 14 European countries between 1992 and 2005. Using firm-level data we analyze financial constraints with the Euler equation derived from the dynamic investment model. We find that with a highly concentrated banking sector firms are less financially constrained. This result is robust to consideration of firm opacity, firm size, and business cycle. Relaxation of financial constraint while greater for firms in less opaque industries also accrues for firms in more opaque industries. Greater bank concentration is associated with less tight financial constraint during both expansions and recessions. Results overall are consistent with an information-based hypothesis that more market power increases banks’ incentives to produce information on potential borrowers. Findings are robust to consideration of country specific institutional factors.     

Historical social capital and contemporary private investment choices

This paper investigates the impact of historical commercial social capital on contemporary private investment choices. We use unique data on shanghui, which represented the most important institutionalization of commercial social capital in China's financial industry in the late Qing Dynasty, to find that the establishment of shanghui is associated with a significant increase in residents' private risky asset investment today. The impact originates mainly from (i) an increase in local available investment finance, (ii) individuals' higher financial knowledge and literacy, and (iii) individuals' higher trust level and risk-taking abilities in the financial market. From a historical perspective, this study partially explains the current private investment choices and household financial investment imbalance in China.     

Can local policy uncertainty curtail corporate speculation on financial assets?

Using a hand-collected data set of city-level local official's turnover in China, we find that the average financial investments of listed non-financial firms decrease significantly in the spike of local political uncertainty, i.e., when upon the turnover of city head occurs. The decrease in financial investment still occurs upon the predicted timing of city heads' turnover. The effect is more prominent for firms with high financial distress risk and weaker corporate governance, i.e., those with higher speculative motives. Overall, this paper reveals that local political uncertainty discourages firms' speculative motives of investing in financial securities.     

Optimal investment of an insurer with regime-switching and risk constraint

We investigate an optimal investment problem of an insurance company in the presence of risk constraint and regime-switching using a game theoretic approach. A dynamic risk constraint is considered where we constrain the uncertainty aversion to the ‘true’ model for financial risk at a given level. We describe the surplus of an insurance company using a general jump process, namely, a Markov-modulated random measure. The insurance company invests the surplus in a risky financial asset whose dynamics are modeled by a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion. To incorporate model uncertainty, we consider a robust approach, where a family of probability measures is cosidered and the insurance company maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth in the ‘worst-case’ probability scenario. The optimal investment problem is then formulated as a constrained two-player, zero-sum, stochastic differential game between the insurance company and the market. Different from the other works in the literature, our technique is to transform the problem into a deterministic differential game first, in order to obtain the optimal strategy of the game problem explicitly.     

Real investment and risk dynamics

We ask to what extent the negative relation between investment and average stock returns is driven by risk. We show that: (i) the average return spread between low and high asset growth and investment portfolios is largely accounted for by their spread in systematic risk, as measured by the loadings on the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) factors; (ii) as predicted by q-theory and real options models, systematic risk falls during large investment periods; (iii) the returns of factors formed on the investment-to-assets, asset growth, and investment growth all forecast aggregate economic activities. Our evidence suggests that risk plays an important role in explaining the investment-return relation.     

Optimal constrained investment in the Cramer-Lundberg model

We consider an insurance company whose surplus is represented by the classical Cramer-Lundberg process. The company can invest its surplus in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset, governed by the Black-Scholes equation. There is a constraint that the insurance company can only invest in the risky asset at a limited leveraging level; more precisely, when purchasing, the ratio of the investment amount in the risky asset to the surplus level is no more than a; and when short-selling, the proportion of the proceeds from the short-selling to the surplus level is no more than b. The objective is to find an optimal investment policy that minimizes the probability of ruin. The minimal ruin probability as a function of the initial surplus is characterized by a classical solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We study the optimal control policy and its properties. The interrelation between the parameters of the model plays a crucial role in the qualitative behavior of the optimal policy. For example, for some ratios between a and b, quite unusual and at first ostensibly counterintuitive policies may appear, like short-selling a stock with a higher rate of return to earn lower interest, or borrowing at a higher rate to invest in a stock with lower rate of return. This is in sharp contrast with the unrestricted case, first studied in Hipp and Plum, or with the case of no short-selling and no borrowing studied in Azcue and Muler.     

Using Asset Turnover and Profit Margin to Forecast Changes in Profitability

Financial statement analysis textbooks advocate disaggregating profitability into asset turnover and profit margin in performing financial analysis. In spite of the prominence of this technique, there is no evidence demonstrating its usefulness in a forecasting context. We provide evidence that disaggregating return on assets into asset turnover and profit margin does not provide incremental information for forecasting the change in return on assets one year ahead, but that disaggregating the change in return on assets into the change in asset turnover and the change in profit margin is useful in forecasting the change in return on assets one year ahead.