基于商业银行特殊性的价值增值指标构建及实证研究

本文基于商业银行特殊性,对EVA计算模型中的各个关键要素进行了相应调整,构建出适合我国商业银行自身特点的商业银行EVA（CBEVA）计算模型,并采用实证分析方法对模型的有效性进行检验.结论表明CBEVA指标与商业银行在资本市场的表现更加一致,可以用来实施更加精确的业绩评价和经济资本管理.     

我国商业银行个人金融盈利溯源——基于定量与定性方法的结合

本文从行为经济学角度论述了个人金融盈利的产生,探讨了个人客户盈利与商业银行个人金融盈利间的关系,在定量与定性方法有机结合的基础上,建立了综合评价模型分析客户可量化利益即产品收益,并采用SV组织架构对客户非量化利益即金融服务进行探寻,为商业银行个人金融业务迈向常态化、快速化经营发展提供了重要的参考价值。     

EVA在业绩评价中的优劣以及与平衡计分卡的互补作用探析

EVA业绩评价指标可对企业内部的债务资本成本以及股权资本成本予以反映,在各行各业中得到了普遍应用。笔者主要针对EVA在企业业绩评价中的优势以及与平衡计分卡的互补作用进行了相应的分析和探讨,同时提出了自身的思考。     

经济资本配置:商业银行绩效评估与考核的核心

经济资本作为一种风险资本,直接反映了商业银行风险状况对资本的内在要求。国内越来越多的商业银行改革传统的以规模为主的绩效评估的方法,代之于平衡记分卡等先进的绩效管理手段,并在此过程中运用EVA和RAROC的指标和方法,但要科学度量这些指标,必须科学地进行经济资本配置。为商业银行建立EVA和RAROC绩效评估的指标,笔者从可操作的角度出发,研究了经济资本的配置方法和步骤,期望对拟实施EVA和RAROC进行绩效考核的商业银行有一定的借鉴意义。     

以EVA为导向的混合所有制钢铁企业业绩评价体系的几点思

利润并非价值,这一点已经被越来越多的企业所认识到.因此,很多有利润的企业并非就一定有价值.传统的盈利能力指标仅考虑了企业的债务资本成本,而并未考虑来自股东方的权益资本成本.本文以混合所有制钢铁企业为研究视角,以EVA业绩评价体系为研究内容,通过分析混合所有制钢铁企业实行以EVA为导向的企业业绩评价体系的现实意义和优越性,指出混合所有制钢铁企业在当前形势下应如何建立EVA业绩评价体系.     

以EVA为导向的混合所有制钢铁企业业绩评价体系的几点思

利润并非价值,这一点已经被越来越多的企业所认识到.因此,很多有利润的企业并非就一定有价值.传统的盈利能力指标仅考虑了企业的债务资本成本,而并未考虑来自股东方的权益资本成本.本文以混合所有制钢铁企业为研究视角,以EVA业绩评价体系为研究内容,通过分析混合所有制钢铁企业实行以EVA为导向的企业业绩评价体系的现实意义和优越性,指出混合所有制钢铁企业在当前形势下应如何建立EVA业绩评价体系.     

我国商业银行转型中加强经济资本预算管理的策略建议

本文对转型中的商业银行如何强化经济资本预算管理阐述实践认识、分析现实问题与提出策略建议.强调经济资本对风险资产总量的约束与缓冲作用、对业务结构调整的引导作用、对商业银行转型的根本制约作用以及资本回报和资本成本（即经济增加值EVA）的核心激励约束作用.     

农村合作金融机构推行管理会计模式的必要性

面对利率市场化进程的不断推进,同业间竞争日益加剧,用什么样的财务管理工具来有效评价银行客户的资本回报水平,评价银行客户经理、机构或部门的经营业绩,如何应对利率市场化管理,增强自主议价能力,如何配置有效资源,使资金向集约化配置转变等,对农村合作金融机构的经营管理显得越来越重要,也是当前农村合作金融机构思考的一个重要课题.近几年来,国内商业银行为提高银行经营管理水平与竞争能力,探索应用管理会计这一财务管理工具,通过运用内部资金转移定价、成本分摊盈利评价分析以及资产负债管理等方法,建立了对客户、产品、机构部门、客户经理等多维度的盈利业绩评价体系.     

我国商业银行客户贡献度模型设计与分析

实施客户关系管理系统是二十一世纪商业银行的发展趋势,对客户进行细分,实施差别化的客户管理是客户关系管理系统的重要内容,建立客户贡献度模型是目前商业银行实现对客户细分的主要方式。本文通过对现代商业银行构建客户贡献度模型的意义着手分析,得到自己对客户贡献度模型建设所依据原理的新见解,并依据该原理设计了具有较强的可实施性的客户贡献度模型,针对模型展开具体公式构成要素以及具体实现方法的分析。     

我国商业银行资本充足率影响因素的实证研究

本文在分析了我国商业银行资本充足率的同生性基础上, 选取了我国49家商业银行样本数据,采用Logit模型分析法,对我国商业银行资本充足率影响因素进行了实证研究,结果表明盈利能力、风险水平、固定资产比率以及银行性质都是影响其资本充足率的因素.总体而言银行规模不会影响资本充足率水平,但是不同性质银行的规模则对资本充足率会有不同的影响.     

基于EVA视角的企业薪酬激励机制运用

由于忽视了股东资本的机会成本,采取传统的会计利润等指标来评价企业经营业绩是有缺陷的,企业获得的利润只有高于全部资本成本才能为股东创造价值。文章在讨论了EVA内涵的基础上,以能够弥补这一缺陷的EVA理念为核心,设置了一套规范经营者行为、维护所有者和股东合法权益的激励机制,并探讨了比传统激励机制的优越性。     

经济利润、市场竞争与企业价值

从经济利润的涵义入手,从市场竞争的角度阐述了经济利润在企业经营过程中的变化趋势。由于市场竞争最终会趋于一个相对稳定的状态,即均衡竞争,因此,企业的投资资本回报率在充分竞争下会等于资本成本,经济利润最终将趋于零。经济利润与经济利润趋于零的思想对传统的估值理念与估值方法提出了新的挑战,为此,在经济增加值(EVA)和剩余收益(RI)估值模型原有的理论基础上,探讨了如何将新的估值理念运用到这两种估值模型中。     

Why EVA Bonus Plans Failed—and How to Revive Them

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.     

资本约束、金融脱媒、利率市场化与商业银行战略转型

当前国内商业银行内外部经营环境已发生深刻的变革,在资本约束、金融脱媒和利率市场化条件下,国内商业银行传统发展模式已难以为继,必须进行战略转型。我国商业银行战略转型的目标就是要实现股东价值的最大化。本文探讨了战略转型的主要途径,包括:一是要转变业务增长方式,即从外延粗放型增长到内涵集约型增长;二是要转变风险管理模式,即从风险管理理念、风险管理体制和风险管理技术等方面重构商业银行全面风险管理模式;三是要转变绩效评价体系,即从传统的以当期账面利润和不良资产率为核心的绩效考核体系,转变为以RAROC和EVA为核心的绩效评价体系。     

我国商业银行信用卡业务风险管理浅析

本文首先对我国商业银行信用卡业务的盈利模式进行介绍分析,然后分别从影响利润和费用的风险因素的角度对我国银行信用卡业务的风险管理进行分析,提出现阶段可以通过严格划分目标客户群、完善客户服务体系、对客户信息进行实时监督、采取合理的筹资管理等途径来提高我国商业银行信用卡业务的风险管理水平,进而缩小我国银行业信用卡业务与外国银行业信用卡业务的差距。     

EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

对西部基层商业银行提高经济增加值的思考

实施以经济增加值为核心的绩效考核，在金融资源匮乏的西部欠发达地区，基层行面临着经营核心目标与业务计划体系的统一、经营效益增长与市场份额增长的关系、产品定价机制问题、相对单一的信贷资产结构与降低经济资本占用、财务核算体系中业务风险体现不充分等两难选择。西部基层行必须从转变经营理念，完善组织结构，构建与完善管理信息系统、业绩评价系统、部门预算等方面创造条件为推行经济增加值奠定基础。在经济资本约束下，西部基层行在经营管理工作中要牢固树立价值最大化的经营理念，平衡好规模与效益的关系，加快经营结构的调整及强化风险管理等。     

对西部基层商业银行提高经济增加值的思考

实施以经济增加值为核心的绩效考核,在金融资源匮乏的西部欠发达地区,基层行面临着经营核心目标与业务计划体系的统一、经营效益增长与市场份额增长的关系、产品定价机制问题、相对单一的信贷资产结构与降低经济资本占用、财务核算体系中业务风险体现不充分等两难选择。西部基层行必须从转变经营理念,完善组织结构,构建与完善管理信息系统、业绩评价系统、部门预算等方面创造条件为推行经济增加值奠定基础。在经济资本约束下,西部基层行在经营管理工作中要牢固树立价值最大化的经营理念,平衡好规模与效益的关系,加快经营结构的调整及强化风险管理等。     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

The four faces of mass customization

Virtually all executives today recognize the need to provide outstanding service to customers. Focusing on the customer, however, is both an imperative and a potential curse. In their desire to become customer driven, many companies have resorted to inventing new programs and procedures to meet every customer's request. But as customers and their needs grow increasingly diverse, such an approach has become a surefire way to add unnecessary cost and complexity to operations. Companies around the world have embraced mass customization in an attempt to avoid those pitfalls. Readily available information technology and flexible work processes permit them to customize goods or services for individual customers in high volumes at low cost. But many managers have discovered that mass customization itself can produce unnecessary cost and complexity. They are realizing that they did not examine thoroughly enough what kind of customization their customers would value before they plunged ahead. That is understandable. Until now, no framework has existed to help managers determine the type of customization they should pursue. James Gilmore and Joseph Pine provide managers with just such a framework. They have identified four distinct approaches to customization. When designing or redesigning a product, process, or business unit, managers should examine each approach for possible insights into how to serve their customers best. In some cases, a single approach will dominate the design. More often, however, managers will need a mix of some or all of the four approaches to serve their own particular set of customers.