审计委员会制度与中国上市公司治理创新

本文研究中国上市公司现行治理结构中的企业会计事务控制权安排及其缺陷,并提出改进措施。我们研究发现,在中国上市公司现行治理结构中,企业经理人不仅拥有企业内部会计事务的积极权力,而且实质拥有企业外部会计事务的积极权力,其中的作为董事会下设专门委员会的审计委员会不是我们所设计的本原性质的审计委员会,而是接近于美国现行公司治理结构中的审计委员会。这一安排不符合关于现代企业会计事务控制权安排的分权制衡原则,难以保证注册会计师审计的独立性。我们在分析中国上市公司治理中的监事会监督为什么会流于形式的基础上,提出应进行中国上市公司治理的创新,即取消监事会(制度),设立独立于董事会与之平行的符合本原性质的审计委员会,或将监事会改造为符合我们界定的本原性质的审计委员会。     

我国上市公司审计委员会成员遴选机制研究

审计委员会是公司治理的重要机构,其组成成员是审计委员会发挥效能的关键因素.因此,应由能代表政府意志、大股东意志和中小股东意志等多方利益的主体选择上市公司审计委员会成员.审计委员会成员实际上应该具备经理人的身份特质;作为审计委员会成员应具备相应的素质要求;其选择形式与他们的选择主体密切相关.     

上市公司审计委员会制度国际比较及启示

审计委员会制度是英美等国家公司治理结构中的一项重要制度安排,其通过在上市公司设立审计委员会,从公司董事会内部对公司的财务信息披露、会计信息质量、内部审计以及外部独立审计进行有效的控制和监督,代表股东对公司管理层履行监督职能,确保股东利益的实现。对西方发达国家审计委员会制度进行比较,进而正确认识审计委员会的职责和该制度对于上市公司信息披露质量的提高所起到的积极作用,对于健全和完善我国的审计委员会制度具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

设立审计委员会 提高内审独立性——基于制度经济学的解释

我国上市公司由于其特殊的股权结构，国有股一股独大，所有者缺位，内部人控制严重，使得社会公众股股东的利益得不到保护，内部审计作为监督经理人的一种内部控制机制由于其独立性差没有发挥应有的作用，审计委员会制度的建立作为规范内部审计的一种制度安排可以提高内部审计的独立性，     

独立董事:代理问题之一部分

本文研究独立董事制度。经理人的性质在于其是以经营才能方面的人力资本优势加入企业合约而实质拥有企业剩余控制权的人力资本所有者。当董事和董事会实质拥有企业剩余控制权时, 独立董事和内部董事都是企业的经理人, 董事会就是企业的管理层, 董事 (董事会) 与股东之间存在着实质的代理关系和代理问题。因此, 作为经理人的独立董事, 其本身首先是代理问题的一部分, 只有在其与股东之间的代理问题得到较好解决之后, 独立董事才可能成为一种有效的公司治理机制。本文认为, 有关各方缺乏对独立董事的经理人性质和其本身首先是代理问题的一部分的共同认知, 而这正是导致企业董事会的独立性与企业业绩之间不存在显著关系或呈现显著负相关关系的根本原因之所在。     

基于决策、执行、监督分离治理模式下的企业内部审计地位探讨

公司治理是依据企业产权关系建立起的一种权力制衡结构。我国的公司治理主要有以监事会为核心和以董事会(独立董事)为核心的两种结构模式。在公司治理中,内部审计与企业投资人及其他利益关系人不存在直接的委托与受托关系,其本身并不能单独成为一个合格的治理要素。内部审计与总经理为代表的经营管理系统是一种功能"抵消"和"消溶"的关系,与以董事会为代表的决策系统则是一种功能"排斥"关系,而与监事会或审计委员会位代表的监督系统却是一种功能"互补"和"融合"的关系。因此,内部审计只有依附于监督系统而成为监督支持系统和监督信息系统,才能成为一个合格的治理要素。     

创始经理人、管理层股权分散度与研发决策

本文将创始经理人与一般经理人、股东区别开来,并利用研发决策这一典型的风险决策来分析检验创始经理人对公司治理的影响。文章指出创始经理人不同于普通股东与经理人,对企业的风险行为有着特殊影响。对于创始人仍为管理层的企业而言,创始人比例、管理层的股权分散度以及创始人是否担任企业CEO都会影响企业的研发投入。中小板上市企业数据的实证表明:1)创始经理人在高管团队中的比例抑制了企业的研发投入;2)高管团队持有的股份越均匀,创始经理人对于企业研发投入的影响越小。而创始人担任CEO则会进一步抑制研发投入。文章将创始经理人纳入公司治理的研究框架中,并为企业研发投入的微观研究提供了另外一种视角,、     

从现代公司治理的角度看内部审计的本质

一、内部审计与公司治理的结合点分析公司治理理论是基于现代企业契约理论产生的,它是一种制度安排,而审计的起源可追溯到与会计起源相距不远的时代,其原始职能是监督,而内部审计由于这种原始职能与公司治理有着千丝万缕的联系。这种联系主要体现在以下三个结合点上:1.从公司治理的监控机制来看。它包括内部监控机制、外部监控机制及企业管理自我调控机制。内部监控机制主要包括股东大会、董事会、监事会、经理层等。外部监控机制包括一般股东、资本市场、外部审计、经理市场、社会舆论等。具体如下图所示:公司治理的监控体系美国管理会计协…     

关于国有商业银行公司治理的思考

公司的精髓是股东的多元化和股权的分散化,以及由此形成的股东和公司之间、股东彼此之间的有效制衡关系。作为公司基本特征之一的公司治理结构实质上是一套制度安排,即用来规范若干在企业中有重大利益关系的团体(个人),特别是所有者、董事会和经理人三者之间的关系,以便尽可能地降低代理成本,实现股东和企业利益最大化。工、农、中、建四大国有银行是适应计划经济体制需要而建立的国有独资金融机构,其法人治理不具有公司特征。     

关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究

本文对经理人股票期权会计确认问题进行了较深入的研究。本文提出 ,按照现代企业理论 ,经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享 ,行权前的经理人成为企业的非股东所有者。因此 ,应将股票期权确认为企业的利润分配 ,而非美国现行的确认为费用之处理 ,以反映经理人股票期权的经济实质。这样 ,股票期权的会计处理将不影响利润表 ,从而也更有助于推动用公允价值法计量之 ,以更科学地反映其价值。为此 ,应革新现行的财务会计观念与模式 ,建立非股东所有者的新概念 ,使之适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

Increasing the role of auditing in corporate governance

While critical accounting research has long been vitally interested in relationships between accounting, auditing and control of business organizations, mainstream research in accounting, finance and management has only recently displayed an increased interest in questions of corporate governance. The notion of corporate governance typically employed in mainstream research focus on enhancing benefits to shareholders. The structure and the functioning of boards of directors, and audit committees of such boards, are primary concerns within this line of research. This paper presents an alternative view of corporate governance and the role of auditing within corporate governance. We argue that the role of auditing should be increased in order to enhance the control of corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders and society generally.     

Auditing in the United States: a historical perspective

This article reports several archival auditing discoveries and episodes, including significant previously unpublished ones, in a context that relates auditing to early corporate enterprises in the United States. While the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad's reliance on its audit committee of directors from its inception in 1827 and the functions of the auditing committee of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in the 1850s are the principal subjects of the article, other railroad examples are also provided. These uses of auditing in the early corporate United States provide materials which provide a useful perspective for today's accounting researchers and practitioners as to the fundamental control and governance values of the auditing function. The article advances the basis for explaining the origins and development of auditing in the United States.     

An analysis of the effect of mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS on earnings management

This paper examines whether mandatory adoption of international accounting standards, IAS/IFRS, by French companies is associated with lower earnings management. In addition, the impact of six factors that may be related to earnings management level are also considered: the independence and the efficiency of the board of directors, the separation of roles of CEO and Chairman of the board, the existence of an independent audit committee, the existence of block shareholders, the quality of the external audit and the listing on foreign financial markets.Based on a sample of 353 French listed groups relating to the period 2003–2006, our results show that the mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS is associated with a reduction in the earnings management level. In addition, the independence and the efficiency of the board of directors, the existence of an independent audit committee, the existence of block shareholders, the quality of the external audit and the listing on foreign financial markets are important factors for enforcement of IAS/IFRS in France. Mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS has decreased earnings management level for companies with good corporate governance and those that depend on foreign financial markets.     

From Member of the Company to Registered Auditor: The Role of the External Auditor in Corporate Governance

Corporate governance has often been defined in a narrow way as comprising 'the range of control mechanisms that protect and enhance the interests of shareholders of business enterprises' ( Fama and Jensen 1983 ). In the corporate governance literature there has also been a general focus on the structure and functioning of boards of directors and the responsibilities of audit committees in relation to external auditing ( Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990 ; Shleifer and Vishny 1997 ). This article looks at the evolution of the role of external auditing in corporate governance. The role of the external auditor has changed through time, and consequently it should not be assumed that the role of external auditing is fixed or that it cannot be changed to meet societal needs and expectations. This observation leads to the primary argument of our article, which is that the role of the external auditor in corporate governance ought to be expanded in order to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance for the benefit of a wider spectrum of stakeholders and society generally.     

Performance effects of appointing other firms’ executive directors to corporate boards: an analysis of UK firms

This paper studies the effect on company performance of appointing non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other firms. The analysis is based on a new panel dataset of UK companies over 2002–2008. Our findings suggest a positive relation between the presence of these non-executive directors and the accounting performance of the appointing companies. The effect is stronger if these directors are executive directors in firms that are performing well. We also find a positive effect when these non-executive directors are members of the audit committee. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the view that non-executive directors that are executives in other firms contribute to both the monitoring and advisory functions of corporate boards.     

An Investigation of Audit Committees' Oversight Responsibilities

Audit committee performance has come under close scrutiny in recent years from a variety of policy-makers, interest groups and researchers. In particular, the adequacy of audit committee oversight has been challenged. At the same time, audit committees are under pressure to increase the scope of their oversight work. This study examines audit committee oversight from the internal perspective of active U.S. audit committee members. A two-part survey used Wolnizer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee objectives related to accounting and reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in general as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the key tasks and issues currently addressed by audit committees. The results indicate that audit committee members appreciate the importance of all audit committee members having sufficient expertise in oversight areas related to accounting, auditing and the law. However, some respondents agreed they lacked sufficient expertise in many or all of these areas. In addition, the findings indicate that audit committee members tend not to recognize their assigned responsibilities, but agree with the proposed expansion of committee responsibilities. Using a multimethod approach, internal control evaluation was consistently listed and ranked as the most important oversight responsibility. These findings provide insight into the priority perceived by audit committee members as to their oversight responsibilities, and the adequacy of U.S. reporting disclosures as signals of audit committee work.     

Audit committee,board of director characteristics,and earnings management

This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. A negative relation is found between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. A negative relation is also found between board independence and abnormal accruals. Reductions in board or audit committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accruals. The most pronounced effects occur when either the board or the audit committee is comprised of a minority of outside directors. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.