Paragon or pariah? The consequences of being conspicuously rich in China's new economy

In some cultures vast personal wealth is lauded whereas in others, it is viewed with suspicion and contempt. In recent years, a super rich elite of business people has emerged in China, and, given the country's cultural and socialist past, we believe that people are more likely to react negatively to reports of conspicuous wealth. To test our arguments, we examine the reactions to and consequences of China's entrepreneurs being included on the Hurun Rich List. We find negative consequences for stock market traded firms controlled by the Rich List entrepreneurs: stock prices decline, government subsidies are reduced, and the named entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated. These effects are strongest in rent-seeking industries and are mitigated by philanthropy.     

产权性质、制度环境与内部控制

内部控制是近年来国内外监管部门、实务界和学术界关注的热点与前沿问题。本文研究我国上市公司最终控制人的产权性质与地区制度环境对公司内部控制质量的影响。利用厦门大学内控课题组(2010)构建的2007-2009年我国上市公司内部控制指数,本文主要发现:首先,相比于中央政府控制的公司,地方政府控制的公司内部控制质量相对较差,而非政府控制的公司内部控制质量与中央政府控制的公司之间则没有明显差异;其次,上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高或政府对经济的干预程度越低,公司的内部控制质量越高,尤其是对于地方政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司,并且,良好的外部制度环境有助于缩小地方政府控制和非政府控制公司的内部控制与中央政府控制公司之间的差距。本文的研究结果对相关主管部门及监管机构具有一定的政策启示意义。     

产权性质、CFO背景特征与内部控制质量

基于高层梯队理论和社会网络理论,以2008-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证考察CFO背景特征对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：CFO的年龄越大、任期越长,内部控制质量越低;CFO的学历越高,内部控制质量越高;女性CFO较男性CFO在内部控制建设方面存在相对劣势;CFO外部兼职有助于提升内部控制质量。进一步研究发现：在国有企业和非国有企业中,CFO背景特征对内部控制质量的影响存在显著的差异。     

监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量

中国上市公司大股东持股比例相对较高,大股东之间可能存在合谋掏空或监督制衡的关系,为此,以2008~2016年A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东的股权结构对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：相对于只有单一大股东的公司而言,具有多个大股东的公司内部控制质量更高;大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股比例越高、大股东之间股权偏离度越低,公司内部控制质量越高;外国投资者和国有法人大股东能够显著提升公司内部控制质量;多个大股东的治理效应主要体现在非国有企业中,公司所处地区的法律及市场环境越好,多个大股东监督效应对公司内部控制质量的提升作用越明显。     

The relationship between earnings' yield,market value and return for NYSE common stocks: Further evidence

The empirical relationship between earnings' yield, firm size and returns on the common stock of NYSE firms is examined in this paper. The results confirm that the common stock of high E/P firms earn, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than the common stock of low E/P firms and that this effect is clearly significant even if experimental control is exercised over differences in firm size. On the other hand, while the common stock of small NYSE firms appear to have earned substantially higher returns than the common stock of large NYSE firms, the size effect virtually disappears when returns are controlled for differences in risk and E/P ratios. The evidence presented here indicates that the E/P effect, however, is not entirely independent of firm size and that the effect of both variables on expected returns is considerably more complicated than previously documented in the literature.     

终极股东特征、公司多元化与融资约束

理论研究表明公司多元化经营形成的内部资本市场有助于缓解公司所面临的融资约束,不同的终极股东特征可能由于代理问题或由于加强内部资本市场功能而减弱或增强缓解公司融资约束的作用。本文以2004～2009年中国上市公司作为样本,实证考察不同终极股东特征下,非国有控制公司与国有控制公司多元化经营战略缓解公司融资约束的作用是否存在显著差异。实证结果表明当终极股东现金流权与控制权不偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较多时,非国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用显著强于国有控制公司。然而,当终极股东现金流权与控制权偏离,或者当终极股东控制链层级较少时,国有控制公司多元化缓解融资约束的作用并没有显著强于非国有控制公司。     

企业集团内部资本配置的经济后果——来自中国企业集团的证据

通过对企业集团的成员企业进行实证检验,我们发现:企业集团内部资本配置损害其成员企业的价值。控制权与现金流权分离程度大和规模大的成员企业,企业集团内部资本配置活动对其价值的损害比较显著。民营集团内部资本配置有利于其成员企业价值的提升,尤其是规模小的成员企业受益于集团内部的资本配置活动。中央政府为最终控制人的集团,其内部资本配置活动有利于成员企业价值的提升,集团内部资本配置尤其使规模小和存在融资约束的成员企业受益;地方政府为最终控制人的集团,内部资本配置活动往往不利于其成员企业价值的提升。     

Corporate investment,government control,and financing channels: Evidence from China's Listed Companies

We investigate the relation between the internally generated cash flows and fixed asset investments of Chinese firms and find that it is U-shaped. Cash flow and investment are negatively related for low levels of cash flow but positively related for high levels of cash flow. We find that government controlled listed firms have greater investment–cash flow sensitivities than do privately controlled listed companies, especially on the left-hand side of the U-shaped curve where cash flow is negative. However, the difference in sensitivities appears only among firms that possess few profitable investment opportunities. We attribute this finding to the government having multiple socio-economic objectives, which leads to increased capital expenditures by the firms it controls when internal funds are abundant and when internal funds are negative. There is no evidence that access to finance and soft budget constraints explain the differences between the investment–cash flow sensitivities of government controlled and privately controlled listed firms.     

Does International Accounting Network Membership Affect Audit Fees and Audit Quality? Evidence From China

Regulators suggest that small audit firms join international accounting networks to reduce their resource constraints in serving large clients and providing high-quality service. Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2016) investigate the issue in the United States and find that both audit fees and quality are higher for members of international accounting networks (i.e., member audit firms). We investigate the effects of network membership on audit fees and quality in China, a relatively weaker institutional environment than the United States. Using data of Chinese listed companies audited by non-Big N audit firms from 2001 to 2010, we find that member audit firms charge 3.9% higher fees than nonmember audit firms, much lower than the 30% fee premiums charged by U.S. member audit firms. We do not find consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for member audit firms. Overall, our results demonstrate that China's weak institutional environment may overwhelm the quality control brought by international accounting networks and that it may weaken or even offset the benefits of audit firms' participation in these networks, resulting in smaller or even no effects of membership on audit fees and quality.     

The impact of labor unions on investment-cash flow sensitivity

This paper empirically examines how labor unions affect investment-cash flow sensitivity using samples from the US covering the period of 1984–2009. We find a significant positive union effect using a q model of investment. The capital expenditures of firms are 1.71 times more sensitive to internal cash flows when unionization rates increase one standard deviation from the mean. This effect holds when we control for other proxies of financial constraints. In addition, unionized firms are associated with lower cash–cash flow sensitivity, which suggests that the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in unionized firms is primarily driven by the incentive of these firms to reduce liquidity and enhance bargaining power against the union. We also show that the above union effects become more pronounced during labor contract negotiation years.     

Employee quality,monitoring environment and internal control

We investigate the effect of internal control employees(ICEs) on internal control quality. Using special survey data from Chinese listed firms, we find that ICE...     

Corruption culture and accounting quality

This paper examines the impact of corruption culture on accounting quality (AQ) of listed firms at the municipal level in China. We consider municipalities with (without) corrupt top government officials as having high (low) corruption culture. To isolate the effect of corruption culture, we use the arrest of corrupt officials (the events) to capture the change in local corruption culture, and apply the difference-in-difference method to compare AQ of firms operating in the jurisdictions of corrupt officials pre and post the events, compared to control firms. We find that AQ of firms affiliated with corrupt officials is higher after the events, which is robust to the placebo test, time-trend analysis, and various robustness tests. We complement the literature by showing that the increase in AQ is greater for firms associated with more powerful officials and having stronger connections with corrupt officials. Moreover, the positive effect on accounting quality is stronger in the post-2012 period. Further, we document that firms improving AQ after the events issue more SEOs and have lower cost of capital. Finally, analyses on channels firms used to improve AQ show that firms switch to higher quality auditors, have better internal control, and issue more management forecasts. This study has implications for policymakers in countries that suffer from corruption.     

Uncertainty and R&D investment: Does product market competition matter?

In recent years, the question of how uncertainty influences corporate decisions has received greater interest among academics, researchers, and corporations. This study is an attempt to investigate how uncertainties (firm-specific uncertainty (fsu), market-based uncertainty (mu), and economic policy uncertainty (epu)) influence research and development (R&D) investment and to further examine whether this relation is moderated by product market competition across firms of different sizes. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms covering 2000–2017, this study applies a two-step system GMM model to perform estimations and control for endogeneity issues. The findings show that uncertainties (fsu, mu, and epu) negatively influence R&D investment and that this negative relationship is more prominent for firms operating in competitive industries. In concentrated industries, however, the negative impact of uncertainty is mitigated for large firms, which have more internal resources and better access to external financing. This study contributes to real options theory by illustrating how different forms of uncertainty embedded in a firm’s internal and external environment reduce R&D investment, and by indicating how this relationship is moderated by product market competition.     

The role of voluntary internal control reporting in earnings quality: Evidence from China

Using discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings quality, this study investigates whether and how the first voluntary internal control reporting in 2007 is associated with earnings quality in China. We find that earnings quality is higher in 2007, yet not in 2006, for public companies issuing a first-time voluntary unqualified internal control report, compared with listed firms not issuing an internal control report. Our findings are consistent with a signalling of performance explanation and inconsistent with a signalling of effectiveness explanation. We also find that earnings quality is lower for public companies issuing an internal control report mentioning a weakness, compared with public companies not issuing an internal control report. Overall, our study suggests that public companies conduct diligent self-assessments when issuing a first-time voluntary unqualified internal control report. Consequently, there is an improvement in earnings quality.     

Does the disclosure of internal control deficiency matter for accrual quality? Evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that are required to audit and disclose any internal control deficiency (ICD), this paper examines the effect of mandatory ICD disclosure on accrual quality (AQ) in China. We find that relative to voluntary ICD disclosure, mandatory ICD disclosure is associated with poorer AQ, as proxied by abnormal accruals, suggesting that the mandated disclosure of ICD effectively identifies financial reporting quality in Chinese firms. This relationship is enhanced by government control of firms (especially the central government) and by the intensity of government inspections and is stronger in undeveloped regional markets. The results are robust to the application of the PSM-DID method and use of different measures and samples. Our findings demonstrate the critical role of the mandated disclosure of ICD and improve our understanding of internal control mechanisms in emerging markets.     

Decoupling the distressed banks and their clients,and coupling the distressed firms and their lending banks

This paper simultaneously investigates the responses of stock prices of the related banks and the client firms when one of them is in distress. Two effects are examined. The distressed bank effect, which claims that the stock price of client firms are coupled to that of their related distress banks, and the distressed firm effect, which claims that the related banks are negatively affected when their client firms are in distress. We collect the detailed information of individual transaction loan data to find the relationship between banks and their client firms. Asymmetric responses are reported in this paper. Our results reject the distressed bank effect but, by contrast, cannot reject the distressed firm effect. We propose the fund diversification hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis, and argue the decoupling effect of the distressed bank and their listed firms, owing to the diversified choice of clients' financing channel.     

Internal controls,risk management,and cash holdings

Exploiting a unique setting in China where internal controls are intended to manage risks, we investigate how internal controls shape the cash holding policies. Results show that firms with higher internal control quality (ICQ) are less likely to have abnormal cash holdings, either excess or deficit cash, and this effect is not driven by corporate governance quality. We also find that firms with higher ICQ are more likely to increase dividend payments and are less likely to increase M&A investments, especially when the firms have had a negative experience with prior M&A investments. Furthermore, our tests on the market valuation of cash holdings show that investors place a higher value on cash holdings of firms with higher ICQ. Collectively, our findings suggest that internal controls help companies shape reasonable cash policies that lead to value creation.     

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.     

Foreign institutional ownership and the speed of leverage adjustment: International evidence

Employing a large sample of 7246 firms across 38 economies from 2000 to 2013, we show a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership (FIO) and firms' speed of leverage adjustment. This positive relation is concentrated for over-leveraged firms that need to decrease financial leverage to rebalance their capital structures. We validate our findings using a 2SLS regression and a DiD estimation to exploit the exogenous variations in FIO generated by the inclusion of MSCI membership and the passage of the JGTRRA. These results suggest that foreign institutional investors play an important monitoring role in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Overall, this paper lends support to the dynamic trade-off theory.     

Can short selling improve internal control? An empirical study based on the difference‐in‐differences model

Based on pilot margin trading in China, this study examines how short selling affects internal control quality in listed firms. Using the difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that compared with control firms, firms that are eligible for short selling significantly improve their internal control after they are designated as underlying securities. We consider the effects of state ownership and external auditors. The improvement in internal control is only significant for non‐state‐owned firms and firms audited by non‐Big 4 auditors. These findings indicate that short selling can improve firms’ internal control and play a role in their corporate governance.