Transfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions

A central issue in the recent reforms of state pensions in Spain has been to increase the proportionality between contributions and benefits along actuarially fair lines. The aim of this paper is to quantify the transfer component of social security retirement pensions, with transfer being understood as the difference between the pension effectively received and that which would be received under a system of actuarial fairness. The analysis is placed within a life-cycle framework, with particular reference to the distributive effects by income level. The results show that, in the past, there was a marked bias in favour of the objective of intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution, to the detriment of the objective of income insurance. This paper examines the factors that determine the final value of the transfer component within the entire Spanish pensions system.     

Altruism, incomplete markets, and tax reform

We compute the welfare effects of different revenue-neutral tax reforms that eliminate capital income taxation in two general equilibrium models calibrated to the U.S. economy. In our dynastic model, the reform with the largest welfare gain is the one that eliminates all income taxation and increases the consumption tax to 35%; 75% of the population alive at the time of the reform benefit from it. Individuals use intervivos transfers and bequests to redistribute the long-run benefits. In a pure life-cycle economy that lacks this redistribution technology, we find that the same reform would benefit only 9% of the population.     

The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries*

In social project appraisal, the policy profile of both distributional welfare weights and the social discount rate has risen considerably in recent years. This fact has important implications for the allocation of funds to social projects and policies in countries, and in unions of countries such as the EU. A key component in the formulae for both welfare weights and the social discount rate is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, e. A critical review of existing evidence on e suggests that the UK Treasury's preferred value of unity is too low. New evidence presented in this paper, based on the structure of personal income tax rates, suggests that, on average, for developed countries e is close to 1.4. This particular approach to the estimation of e has previously been under‐utilised by researchers.     

Investor-legislators: Tax holiday for politically connected firms

In this paper, we examine whether political connections in the U.S. Congress affect voting patterns with respect to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA). Using the financial disclosure statements of members of the U.S. Congress, we define political connections as equity-based ties between lawmakers and business groups, which capture the deliberate decision of lawmakers to establish a relationship by investing personal wealth in firm equity. We first examine whether politicians are more likely to hold equity in firms receiving benefits under the AJCA (i.e., firms with high repatriation tax costs). Our results suggest that politicians are more likely to hold equity positions in firms with high repatriation tax benefits only when such firms donate to their political campaign. We further examine how equity-based connections affect the AJCA voting outcomes and find that members of the House, but not of the Senate, holding repatriating firm's equity are more likely to vote in favour of the AJCA when PAC donations support their election campaigns. Last, we investigate whether politicians with equity holdings in repatriating firms are more likely to receive larger donations from firm-affiliated PACs before the AJCA vote in Congress. We find that PACs have larger contributions to House members who purchase equity in repatriating firms immediately prior to the AJCA vote. The results suggest that PACs of repatriating firms strategically target House representatives to increase political support for the tax holiday.     

Political Sustainability and the Design of Environmental Taxes

This paper studies the issue of political support for environmental taxes. The environmental tax is determined by majority voting, given a refund rule that specifies the allocation of tax proceeds. The refund rule is chosen by a welfare-maximizing constitutional planner. We show that: (i) The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the proportion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. (ii) If labor and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion, to keep the government's budget balanced, majority voting yields a rate of environmental taxation that is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. (iii) To mitigate this negative bias, the government reduces wage taxes by a higher proportion than capital income taxes. (iv) The final outcome will either be the Pigouvian tax or else all reductions will be given in wage taxes. This depends on individuals' preferences for the polluting good as well as wage and capital income distributions.     

Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce nonpartisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Nonrenewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union-wide authority would be desirable.     

Tax structure,size of government,and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938

We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.      

The Distributional Implications of Income Under‐Reporting in Hungary*

The ability and inclination of specific social groups to evade tax vary widely, and this leads to considerable variation in the actual tax burden on individuals with similar levels of income. Thus, ignoring tax evasion can be seriously misleading in terms of the distributive and fiscal effects of the tax system. This paper estimates the distributional implications of income tax evasion in Hungary, based on a random sample of the administrative tax records of nearly 230,000 individuals. Gross incomes declared in the administrative tax returns are compared with incomes stated in a nationally representative household budget survey. Our estimates show that the average rate of underreporting is 9–13 per cent, though this conceals a big difference between the self‐employed (who hide the greater part of their income) and employees. The estimates are likely to be lower bounds. These rates are used in a tax– benefit microsimulation model to calculate the fiscal and distributional implications of under‐reporting. Tax evasion reduces households' personal income tax payments by about 16–20 per cent. While the poverty rate increases only slightly, income inequality rises significantly, suggesting that high‐income households tend to evade tax proportionately more. Finally, we find that tax evasion largely reduces the progressivity of the tax system.     

Abolishing the Tax‐Free Threshold in Australia: Simulating Alternative Reforms*

This paper examines the role of the tax‐free income tax threshold in a complex tax and transfer system consisting of a range of taxes and benefits, each with its own taper rates and thresholds. Considering a tax and benefit system with benefit taper rates whereby some benefits are received by income groups other than those at the bottom of the distribution, it is suggested that a tax‐free threshold is not a necessary requirement to achieve redistribution. Four alternative policy changes, each involving the elimination of the tax‐free threshold in Australia and designed to achieve approximate revenue neutrality, were examined using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator. A range of implications were examined, including labour supply responses to tax changes and the effects of policy changes on inequality and social welfare. The results demonstrate that it is possible to eliminate the tax‐free threshold under approximate overall revenue and distribution neutrality, but that it is impossible to improve labour supply incentives at the same time. In order to achieve improved incentives, either revenue or distribution neutrality has to be sacrificed.     

On the optimal timing of capital taxes

For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge in production in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzes the implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.     

Supply-side reforms and learning dynamics

This paper studies the nature, the magnitude and the length of the transition after a capital tax cut. The transition is analysed with adaptive learning, under which agents do not need to adjust instantaneously to the change, as with rational expectations (RE). Impulse response analysis reveals that the transition with learning is asymmetrically sensitive to the nature of the exogenous technological shock at the time of the reform. If the reform coincides with a negative shock, the transition to the new steady state is slow, whereas, if it coincides with a positive shock, it is approximately the same as the one predicted by RE. The results imply that cutting capital income taxes before or during a recession may not be an effective means for short-run fiscal stimulus.     

Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC

The monetary policy committee (MPC) of the Bank of England consists of five internal and four external members. We study the voting record and show that outsiders dissent more often than insiders and tend to prefer lower rates, especially during economic downturns. Moreover, dissents by outsiders help forecast future interest rate changes, in contrast to dissents by insiders. A model in which outsiders in contrast to insiders are "recession averse" and more uncertain regarding the appropriate level of interest rates replicates the observed voting pattern well.     

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. We demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogoff [1989. Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget? American Economic Review 79, 43-50]. From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.     

Health Care Reform: Separating Insurance from Income Redistribution

Most systems of health care financing in EU member states currentlyinclude elements of income redistribution. The paper analyzesthe effects of shifting this kind of redistribution to the taxsystem and argues that this reform could create two types ofefficiency gains. On the expenditure side, it would facilitatethe adoption of more incentive-compatible insurance contracts,for example through the introduction of copayment schemes. Onthe revenue side, income redistribution through the general taxsystem is likely to imply a shadow price of public funds thatis lower than if redistribution is carried out through wage-basedinsurance contributions.     

Does Fiscal Decentralization Promote Fiscal Discipline?

We investigate the efficiency and equity implications of a redistributive rule that takes into account both local tax collection efforts and deviation of local incomes from respective targets under alternative fiscal mechanisms. We show that, if the general budget constraint is binding, the proposed transfer rule leads to higher fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization (FD) than under centralized redistribution. Although the centralized decision yields better income distribution than FD, FD also improves income distribution unambiguously when equalization across regions is targeted explicitly. When localities act strategically, the private sector’s utility weight enhances the disciplinary effect of decentralization.     

Effects of Family Policy Reforms in Norway: Results from a Joint Labour Supply and Childcare Choice Microsimulation Analysis*

Mothers of pre‐school children represent one part of the population that might be able to increase its labour supply. We discuss the effects of family policy changes that encourage the labour supply of these mothers, such as childcare fee reductions and increased availability of centre‐based care. The effects of policy changes are described by using a joint labour supply and childcare choice decision model. Detailed empirical results are provided with respect to mothers' labour supply, families' childcare choices, public expenditures, and distributions of income and money metric utility.     

Social security in the UK under New Labour: what did the Third Way mean for welfare reform?

In 1997, the Labour Party was elected in the UK with few explicitly articulated ideas about social security reforms. This paper reviews the large number of subsequent reforms to social security, and argues that some consistent themes have emerged. A commitment to keep to the tight spending plans of the previous, Conservative, administration left little scope for increases in benefit spending during the first two years in office. Since that time, increases in the generosity of some social security programmes have been directed towards achieving certain goals. An emphasis on encouraging paid work has been a consistent theme, whilst aims of reducing poverty rates for children and pensioners have been emphasised since 1999. Spending to achieve these goals has often been directed through means‐tested programmes, and there has been a related weakening of the link between paid National Insurance contributions and benefit entitlements. It remains to be seen whether reforms to the process of income assessment will increase take‐up.     

Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities

We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis.     

Mortgage risks,debt literacy and financial advice

A limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold riskier mortgages.     

Deductio’ ad absurdum: CEOs donating their own stock to their own family foundations

I study large charitable stock gifts by Chairmen and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of public companies. These gifts, which are not subject to insider trading law, often occur just before sharp declines in their companies’ share prices. This timing is more pronounced when executives donate their own shares to their own family foundations. Evidence related to reporting delays and seasonal patterns suggests that some CEOs fraudulently backdate stock gifts to increase personal income tax benefits. CEOs’ family foundations hold donated stock for long periods rather than diversifying, permitting CEOs to continue voting the shares.