Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.     

Classical biased technical change approach and its relevance to reality

The purpose of this article is to evaluate empirically the classical viability condition for East Asia, Latin America, Sub‐Saharan Africa 1980–1995, and advanced countries 1950–1992. The viability condition is proposed by Foley and Michl (1999 Foley, D.K. and Michl, T.R. 1999. Growth and Distribution, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  [Google Scholar]), and is used for judging empirically which approach is more valid, the classical biased technical change approach or neoclassical production function approach. Our results acknowledge the predominance of the former, which is Foley‐Michl’s contention. However, there remains a disputable interpretation as to the case of a declining labour productivity, which is broadly seen in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa during the period considered.     

URBANIZATION, URBAN CONCENTRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

An international comparative study of the relations among the process of urbanization, urban concentration and economic development, and income distribution was performed by using data of developing and developed countries. Cross-section analyses at certain time periods for capturing "long-run" effects as well as time-series analyses for some countries for "short-run" effects were done taking advantage of the "rectangular" array of data. There were several interesting results: the pattern of unemployment rate in most developing countries shows an inverted-U shaped curve with respect to the degree of urbanization; the pattern of urban concentration is in the form of an inverted-U with respect to the economic development level; and the degree of inequality of income distribution seems to react in an inverted-U form to the variances in the extent of urbanization.     

Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders

The literature suggests that security design can be used to manipulate the information content of securities prices [what is referred to as the “informational leverage effect” in Boot and Thakor (J Finance 48, 1349–1378, 1993)]. The informational leverage effect arises in this literature in a market microstructure environment in which noise trade is exogenous, which is a fairly standard assumption dating back to the framework developed in Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70, 393–408, 1980). This assumption is relaxed in our paper, and we show that the informational effects described in the related literature become less clear cut when noise trading activity is endogenous. We find that the intensity and direction of these effects depends crucially on the parameters describing the modeling environment. The elegant point of the informational leverage literature is that these effects arise largely independently of such parameters, but with endogenous noise trading that is no longer true. This literature may, therefore, lead to too strong conclusions being drawn about the relationship between information revelation and security design. We are very grateful for the helpful comments made by an anonymous referee.     

Would Excess Capacity in Public Firms Be Socially Optimal?

We analyse oligopolistic interactions between a welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm in a repeated game. We find that the public firm can hold excess capacity as a strategic punishment device to sustain a subgame perfect equilibrium which is welfare-superior to the static Nash equilibrium. Basically, potential punishment from the public firm in the dynamic game can make the self-interested private firm behave in the public interest. Furthermore, if capacity is endogenous, public excess capacity can occur in a welfare efficient equilibrium when the cost of public capacity investment is higher than that of private investment.     

Endogenously Asynchronous Entries into an Uncertain Industry

We model and analyze a priori symmetric duopoly where supply quantity adjustment is slow and time-consuming. The state of demand is ex ante uncertain, and becomes observable a certain time period after at least one firm's entry. We characterize those conditions under which sequential entries can be endogenously chosen either as an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium or as a consequence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Also, in the limit where information revelation is infinitely fast (i.e., the time period it requires becomes infinitesimally short), the expected waiting time until the first entry does not necessarily become proportionately short, whilst the time interval between the leader's entry and the follower's entry does become infinitesimally short. This suggests that chronologically nearly simultaneous entry should not necessarily be interpreted as counterevidence against leader-follower relations. In addition to equilibrium comparative statics, we also analyze some of the welfare issues associated with strategic timing of entry.     

Endogenous technological change,income distribution,and unemployment with inter-class conflict

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model that incorporates endogenous technological change. The model endogenously determines the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of economic growth, income distribution, and the employment rate in addition to technological change. The paper shows that whether or not an increase in the relative bargaining power of workers raises the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate depends on which regime is realized in the long-run equilibrium. If, for example, the long-run equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of workers leads to a decline in the unemployment rate. This result is never obtained from the mainstream NAIRU model.     

MATCHING FUNCTION FOR THE JAPANESE LABOUR MARKET: RANDOM OR STOCK–FLOW?

This paper estimates outflow equations for the unemployed and job vacancies under random and stock–flow matching using Japanese data. We find that for the outflow of the unemployed, the stock–flow matching model fits better than the random matching model at the quarterly frequency, but not at the monthly frequency. In contrast, the outflow of vacancies is affected by the stock of the unemployed as well as its inflow at both monthly and quarterly frequencies. In addition, we calculate the exit rates of the unemployed and job vacancies to show the relationship between the exit rates and the durations of unemployment and job vacancies.     

Employment and hours of work

This paper develops a dynamic model of the labor market in which the degree of substitution between employment and hours of work is determined as part of a search equilibrium. Each firm chooses its demand for working hours and number of vacancies, and the earnings profile is determined by Nash bargaining. The earnings profile is generally nonlinear in hours of work, and defines the trade-off between employment and hours of work. Concave production technology induces firms to overemploy and, as a result, hours of work are below their optimal level. The Hosios condition is not sufficient for efficiency. When there are two industries, workers employed by firms with higher recruitment costs work longer and earn more. That is, “good jobs” require longer hours of work. Interestingly, technology differentials cannot account for working hours differentials.     

The historical significance of the revaluation of fixed assets in Japan's state-owned railway system, 1955-6

The Government Railways of Japan (GRJ) established a fixed assets accounting system on the accruals basis after the Second World War. The revaluation of tangible fixed assets was indispensable for GRJ's introduction of depreciation in 1948. GRJ scheduled the revaluation to secure a reasonable depreciation expense, because the company had applied the replacement method to all tangible fixed assets since its foundation in 1869. At the same time, GRJ assumed the balance of the revaluation reserve account to be a means of dealing with possible future accumulated losses.