Optimal investment with fixed financing costs

Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities.     

Whose Capital is It? Putting Owners Back in Control

John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, looks at corporate governance issues. JEL Classification G3     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Organizational rejuvenation for knowledge exploitation: Exploring corporate entrepreneurship in an MNE

The purpose of this paper is to study how organizational rejuvenation is used to increase and support knowledge exploitation in multinational enterprises. Using case-study data to explore the theoretical arguments, interesting findings emerge. The main finding is that entrepreneurial activities in IT industry enable organizational rejuvenation with repercussions beyond the focal function. Other findings relate to how corporate entrepreneurship activities provide possibilities for continuous knowledge exploitation within the MNE and how entrepreneurial groups inside MNEs form the foundation from which the organizational rejuvenation originates. Finally, the form of organizational rejuvenation studied embraced both structural and behavioral changes. The authors acknowledge an equal share in the development of this article.     

Village Elections,Accountability and Income Distribution in Rural China

1. Introduction The village election was first envisioned by the late chairman of the National People’sCongress (NPC), Mr Peng Zhen, in the mid-1980s to enhance village governance after the commune system was dissolved in China in the early 1980s. In 1987, the NPC passed a tentative version of The Organic Law of the Village Committee (OLVC), and started a 10 year experiment of village elections. In 1998, the NPC formally passed the law and elections quickly spread to the whole count…     

A change in market responses to the environmental management ranking in Japan

This article investigates stock price reactions to the release of the environmental management ranking issued by Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei newspaper) from 1998 to 2005, by using a standard event study methodology. An examination of stock price movements of the top 100 manufacturing companies reveals that stock prices during the sample period did not respond significantly to the release of the ranking within a 3-day event window. However, market responses became significantly positive after 2003, while they were significantly negative in 1999 and 2000. The stock prices of upgraded companies in particular reacted negatively before 2000, but positively after 2002. These results indicate that market reactions were changed between 2001 and 2002, when the Japanese government showed its strong commitment to environmental policies by establishing the Ministry of the Environment and signing the Kyoto Protocol, following a number of legislations.     

建立法人股东为主导的股权治理模式

股权结构是公司治理结构的基础,其设置状况是否合理对公司治理结构的效率有着决定性的影响.文章针对当前上市公司股权治理的弊端,设计出一种股权持有者多元化、股权集中程度分散化的股权结构,并提出我国上市公司应建立以法人股东为主导的治理模式.     

“棘轮式”代理问题与子公司经理人激励:家族集团治理

家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题.