基于公共财政构架下财政支出结构的优化

现阶段我国要建立与市场机制相适应的公共财政，就必须科学界定公共财政支出范围，优化财政支出结构，这样才能提高财政支出效率，降低政府运作成本，减少对竞争性领域的财政投资，强化公益性事业支出，最终实现支出结构的优化调整.     

注册会计师与被审计对象合谋行为分析

作为独立性最强的注册会计师审计,对促进我国证券市场的稳定和健康发展起到了重要作用。但近年来系列审计失败事件的不断曝光,注册会计师与被审计对象合谋行为逐步引起了人们的重视,本文对审计合谋动机、产生的条件进行了剖析,并有针对地提出了相关对策及建议。     

公共投资就业效应的一个解释——基于CES生产函数的分析及其检验

本文在分析CES生产函数过程中引入劳动力市场,探讨了公共投资与就业的联系.本文认为,公共投资是通过劳动工资弹性来影响就业的.公共投资增加会引起劳动需求的工资弹性提高,而公共投资的溢出效应则会导致企业实际工资支出水平降低,两方面原因的共同作用引起就业的增长.在此分析基础上,本文用ARDL方法构建了一个多方程模型,并用中国的数据进行了检验.为提高分析的有效性,我们用SUR方法对模型做了系统估计,并进一步通过方程转化对变量的短期波动和长期均衡关系进行了探讨.实证研究发现,中国的公共投资增长在短期减少就业,但长期内对就业有显著的正效应.     

公共资本生产率的比较研究——基于长三角21城市公共资本边际生产率的实证分析

近10年来长三角的政府公共投资（分配）过多地流向了上海、苏州、杭州、南京等核心城市，使这些城市的人均公共资本拥有量大幅上升，从而引发了其边际生产率递减情况的发生。但它们的资本利用效率或技术创新水平没有明显提升（或下降），不足以抵消其资本边际生产率下降的趋势。对这些大城市的经济发展来说，公共投资对其经济增长的意义已经在数量上表现得不明显，但对正处于经济快速增长期且资本边际生产率呈递增态势的长三角外缘中小城市而言，公共投资却有着积极意义。     

基于Miller-Orr模型的省级政府现金管理实证研究

现代国库制度的两项重要功能是,确保对预算执行过程的有效监控和对政府现金资源的妥善管理,而高效的现金管理系统对监控预算执行起着重要的支持性作用.在政府现金管理已逐渐为政府和理论界所关注的背景下,本文从政府现金管理的基本理论、本质及意义入手,以实际调研数据为基础,通过将西部某省2003-2005年的实际数据运用到修正的Miller-Orr模型中,较准确的测算出了2006年该省国库现金月余额的控制范围,为建立省级政府现金管理模式提供了有益的参考.     

The effectiveness of government spending on education and health care in developing and transition economies

Recent studies show that corruption is associated with higher military spending [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 17 (2001) 794] and lower government spending on education and health care [J. Publ. Econ. 69 (1998) 263]. This suggests that policies aimed at reducing corruption may lead to changes in the composition of government outlays toward more productive spending. However, little empirical evidence has been presented to support the claim that public spending improves education and health indicators in developing and transition countries. This paper uses cross-sectional data for 50 such countries to show that increased public expenditure on education and health care is associated with improvements in both access to and attainment in schools, and reduces mortality rates for infants and children. The education regressions are robust to different specifications, but the relationship between health care spending and mortality rates is weaker.     

Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government.     

Threshold cointegration and nonlinear adjustment between goods and services inflation in the United States

In this paper, we model the long-run relationship between goods and services inflation for the United States over the period 1968:1–2003:3. Our empirical methodology makes use of recent developments on threshold cointegration that consider the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between the two inflation series. According to our results, the null hypothesis of linear cointegration would be rejected in favor of a two-regime threshold cointegration model. Consequently, we could expect a cointegrating relationship only when the divergence between services inflation and goods inflation is above the threshold point estimate.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.