Information,individual errors,and collective performance: Empirical evidence on the Condorcet Jury Theorem

The Condorcet Jury Theorem implies that the collective performance of a group, in arriving at a “correct” judgment on the basis of majority or plurality rule, will be superior to the average performance of individual members of the group, if certain apparently plausible conditions hold. Variants of the Jury Theorem are reviewed, particularly including the politically relevant variant that allows for conflicting interests within the group. We then examine two kinds of empirical data. First, we compare individual and collective performance in a large number of multiple-choice tests, and we find that collective performance invariably and substantially exceeds average individual performance. Second, we analyze American National Election Study data to create dichotomous-choice tests concerning positions of candidates on a variety of political issues; Condorcet-like effects are again evident. Finally, continuing to use NES data, we construct, on each political issue, a simulated referendum (direct voting on the issue) and election (indirect voting on the issue by voting for candidates on the basis of their perceived positions on the issue), and we compare the two results. Despite high rates of individual error, electoral error is quite small, and collective performance is fairly high, providing evidence of Condorcet-like effects in situations of conflicting preferences.     

人性·公正·社会资本：科斯定理伦理意蕴中的误读与缺失

科斯定理的核心要素是产权和交易费用。产权表面上是对财产的各种权利的界定,实质上则体现的是人与人的关系。交易费用也是发生在市场参与者之间,是在人与人之间的经济互动中产生的。道德是处理人与人之间关系的行为规范,经济领域也是道德规范约束的范围。经济与伦理的这种内在的联系成为对科斯定理进行伦理反思的可能性所在。通过对科斯定理进行伦理学的反思,文章认为科斯定理首先将人性假设简单化了;其次它误解了公正的真正内涵,在实践上忽视了公正问题;最后它忽视了社会资本在降低交易费用中的作用。     

农地流转的市场逻辑“产权强度-禀赋效应-交易装置”的分析线索及案例研究

农户普遍存在的禀赋效应,因土地人格化财产特征的强化,而成为抑制农地流转的重要根源。农地流转并不是一个纯粹的要素市场,而是包含了地缘、亲缘、人情关系在内的特殊市场,有其特殊的市场逻辑。推进农地的流转及其规模化经营,需要针对产权主体与产权客体不可分的交易约束,进行相应交易装置的选择与匹配。基于“产权强度一禀赋效应一交易装置”的分析线索,本文拓展了科斯定理。文章进一步对四川省崇州市的“农业共营制”进行了案例剖析。作者认为,以土地“集体所有、家庭承包、多元经营、管住用途”为主线的制度内核,将成为我国新型农业经营体系的基本架构。     

An empirical Coasian study on the socio-economic profiles of two politically sensitive informal settlements: Kowloon Walled City and Rennie’s Mill

Informed by the “corollary of Coase Theorem” (Lai and Hung, 2008; Lai et al., 2007), for a better understanding of the self-help post-war development of two politically sensitive and vanished places in Hong Kong, the so-called “Kowloon Walled City” (Lai, 2016; Lai and Chua, 2017; Lau et al., 2018) and Rennie’s Mill (Lan, 2006), which have attracted academic interest but remained under-researched in terms of empirical scrutiny, this study:

• •Identify and compare their institutional arrangements by archival research;
• •identify and compare their development outcomes, as measured by census and other official data including mapping and photographic information, supplemented by published oral history of witnesses; and
• •establish and discuss the relationship between the differences in institutional arrangements and development outcomes in terms of a landlord-tenant analogy.

     

Farmer Brown v. Rancher Wyatt: Teaching the Coase Theorem

The Coase Theorem is a fundamental tenet of environmental economics and is taught to thousands of principles of microeconomics students each year. Its counterintuitive conclusion, that a Pareto optimal solution can result between private parties regardless of the initial allocation of property rights over a scarce resource, is difficult for students to understand. By using a mock trial that centers on a property dispute, students can be taught how the Coase Theorem works in practice with minimal preparation. The strong assumptions on which the Coase Theorem relies also can be included to show why the theorem may not hold. By using a unique, active learning technique, students will be more engaged and may have a better understanding of a difficult but seminal theory of economics.     

Much ado about nothing? The controversy over the validity of the Coase theorem

The controversy over the theoretical validity of the ‘Coase theorem’ is closely linked to the controversy over the correct statement of it, since the principal need is to determine what valid generalizations can be made on the basis of Coase’s 1960 Coase, R. H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3:1–44.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] examples. The present article does not aim to review the content of the controversy as such, but rather to question the reasons behind it: why so much noise about a proposition that is patently unrealistic (because of its assumption of zero transaction costs)? I argue that the prominence of the controversy, namely of the question of the validity (and statement) of the ‘Coase theorem’, can be analytically explained by the roles this ‘theorem’ plays in microeconomics: it is critical (of the standard theory of market failures), heuristic (drawing out the consequences of the efficiency assumption), and normative (conveying an optimistic view of the efficiency of exchange). I stress that these roles depend on the nature of the exchange defined in the formulation of the ‘theorem’. And I conclude that they rest upon the cooperative bargaining version, and therefore on an optimistic belief in the ability of people to find efficient agreements.     

科斯三定理的新表述与新证明

科斯第二定理指出,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,产权的不同界定会对资源配置效率产生影响。政府(或法院)的基本原则应该是把权利界定给能以较低交易费用解决外部性问题的一方。科斯第三定理的准确含义是,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,制度安排的生产本身是有成本的,净收益最大的制度安排就是最佳的选择。科斯第二、三定理为市场经济中普遍存在的外部性问题提供了新的解决措施和科学的决策原则,间接意味着科斯并非政府干预的完全反对者,科斯定理也不足以成为有些学者把新制度经济学定性为新自由主义的充分理由。     

企业内部控制评价:基于管理层和审计师的博弈分析

企业内部控制评价是企业内部控制执行机制的一个重要组成部分,这一评价过程主要包括管理层的自我评价和审计师的鉴证,是多方利益主体相互协调的结果。在企业内部控制评价中,管理层与审计师之间存在相互博弈,成本效益原则是该博弈的约束条件。运用贝叶斯法则,分析内部控制评价过程中系统内各方的信念修正及作用过程,考察内部控制评价中各利益主体的连动效应,旨在构建一个有效的分析框架。     

外部性、负外部性及其在生态保护中的应用

外部性是社会生活生产中很常见的一种经济现象,由于行为和结果的不一致造成的负外部性更是普遍,负外部性一般的解决办法为庇古税和科斯定理。以国内影视剧组破坏环境为例,分析负外部性在生态保护中的应用,提出通过科斯手段、庇古税、法律手段、媒体社会力量等多种方法解决外部性问题。     

减少排污权交易 降低环境污染

文章首先从＂排污（污染物）＂的供需均衡入手,分析了＂排污收费价格＂必须由政府制定的理论基础,分析了＂排污＂、＂排污权＂与＂排污权交易＂的不同。文章认为,在我国目前市场经济不完善的条件下,推行＂排污权交易＂,既有悖于科斯定理,也不利于控制环境污染。