An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework to discuss the costs and benefits of privatization using the recent advances of Incentive Theory. I begin by presenting a simple model in which the State (the principal) delegates a task (e.g., the production of a public good) to the private sector (the agent). I give and discuss conditions for the “Irrelevance Theorem” due to Sappington and Stiglitz [Sappington, D., & Stiglitz, J. (1987) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6, 567–582] to hold under complete contracting. I then show how various contract incompletenesses can make either public or private ownership optimal. Finally, I provide critical assessments of these results. I thank Patrick Rey and Wilfried Zantman for useful comments on an earlier draft. The excellent comments of two referees have also improved substantially the presentation and organization of the paper. I am deeply indebted to Denis Gromb for his extremely detailed comments.     

On the design of incentive mechanisms in environmental policy

The objective of this paper is to present environmental policy as a simple game in two stages within a principal-agent framework. At the outset the authority adopts a transfer payment rule. Then the firms react by carrying out abatement activities, based on their chosen levels of emission and output. Next the authority measures the emissions (and residual profit of the industry) and revises the level of its instrument. Then the game starts again. Our purpose is to narrow the scope of ad hoc incentive schemes by characterizing families of optimal linear schemes.We thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. We have also benefited from comments from I.-M. Andréasson, J. B. Opschoor, H. Verbruggen and the other members of the Task Force II: Environmental Policy instruments of the European Science Foundation Programme: Environment, Science and Society. Wang acknowledges support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).     

银行高层激励:美国20家银行调查

本文对 2 0 0 3年美国福布斯 50 0强排名中选出的 2 0家银行 1 992年至 2 0 0 2年的数据进行分析 ,研究包括董事局主席和CEO在内的高级管理人员的收入结构、收入时间序列变化 ,以及内部收入级差的特征 ,找出美国大银行高层报酬与激励中一些定量的、带有规律性的特点 ,对形成这些报酬特点的原因作初步探讨 ,作为中国银行业改革借鉴。     

浅析内地企业员工激励性管理

要提高内地企业的激励性,就要突出公平,保持物资激励与非物资激励结合,组织目标和个人目标相结合,约束与激励结合。具体来说,内地企业需要扩大员工职业生涯发展空间,强化绩效考核的反馈面谈,严格实行合同化管理,实施全面薪酬战略,加强员工培训,注重内部晋升。     

Physicians’ views on pay-for-performance as a reimbursement model: a quantitative study among Dutch surgical physicians

Objectives:

To assess the views, knowledge, and experience of Dutch physicians with regard to the general objectives and values of the pay-for-performance (P4P) system, as the Dutch healthcare industry might find it useful, in terms of governance, to explore this approach further.

Methods:

A quantitative cross-sectional survey study was conducted among 48 physicians in surgical specialties in the Netherlands between May 2014 and July 2014. The survey questionnaire was designed to gather information regarding the intensity of feelings, on a 7-point Likert scale, toward statements that address the P4P system. Confidence intervals were calculated using the bootstrap technique with 1000 iterations.

Results:

Physicians see a positive value in P4P for their organizations rather than for personal attainment (mean?=?5.00; 95% CI?=?4.62–5.39), even though they feared that P4P might put financial pressure on them (mean?=?5.03; 95% CI?=?4.50–5.54). They strongly share the view that other colleagues will resist adopting P4P as a business model (mean?=?5.74; 95% CI?=?5.43–6.04). Respondents stated that they would not leave their current jobs if P4P were to be incorporated in their organization.

Conclusions:

Physicians see value in P4P for their organizations, and consider that P4P could provide an incentive for improving medical outcomes. There seems to be potential for the P4P system in the Netherlands as participants expressed positive support for its values. There is an intersection of interests between the value of P4P and the physicians’ aim of achieving quality outcomes; however, further studies would be needed to investigate perceptions about specific design features in a larger sample. In addition, prior to implementing P4P, broad education about the system should be provided in order to counteract pre-conceptions and prevent resistance.     

Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate or outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focuses instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given decision power to run the firm at intermediate levels of host country competition. We then provide comparative statics on the optimal organization of the multinational corporation for changes in fixed FDI entry costs, trade costs, as well as changes in information technology.      

Experimental evidence on financial incentives, information and decision-making

This paper reports on a series of experiments aimed at exploring in greater detail previous work on the effects of financial incentives on information use and task performance in a principal-agent setting. The paper also develops some new statistical modelling in the area of experimental testing including incorporation into the modelling approach of data from post-experiment questionnaires. We find significant support for the finding that profit-related individual money rewards encourage increased accessing of valuable but costly past profit information by agents – and that this in turn enhances individual performance in earning profit for the agency.     

Incentives for Non‐Disclosure by Corporate Groups

A regulatory approved deed of cross guarantee (the deed) was introduced into Australia in December 1991, relieving participating companies within a group from having to prepare, have audited, and file financial statements. We examine the characteristics of firms that obtain relief from filing (and therefore disclosing) separate financial statements of closed‐group companies by adopting the deed. This is the first attempt to analyse adoption using large‐scale archival data. The results support the survey evidence in Dean and Clarke (2005 ), thus providing triangulation on their work. In particular they support the view that the decision to adopt the deed is a function of strategic factors as well as accounting and auditing cost savings. Those strategic factors were not in focus when regulators first introduced a deed of indemnity in 1985, nor when the original indemnity was modified to become a deed of cross guarantee in 1991 or when it was further modified in 1998. Further, evidence is provided to test the conflicting ideas arising from the analytical literature and the mixed results in the empirical, voluntary disclosure literatures. That evidence suggests that non‐disclosure arises when firms are in a more competitive industry and, in particular, when there is ability to retain non‐disclosure at the consolidated level (i.e., where the number of segments is high). Other factors supporting non‐disclosure are leverage and the proportion of foreign operations (proxying for deed complexity). The proportion of outside directors (a proxy for legal liability) and the number of shares outstanding (a proxy for agency costs of equity) are not associated with the decision to adopt the deed.     

财政补贴与税收优惠的创新激励效应研究——来自民营科技型企业规模与生命周期的诠释

在“大众创新万众创业”的时代背景下，激发微观主体创新活力具有重要战略意义。政府补贴是提升企业创新强度的一项重要政策工具，主要形式有财政补贴和税收优惠。选取2013-2017年在我国中小板上市的民营科技型企业为研究样本，采用固定效应模型，实证分析财政补贴和税收优惠对企业研发创新强度的影响效应，进一步考察企业规模特征对两种政府补贴工具效应的影响，并引入企业生命周期模型，考察政府补贴在民营科技型企业创新活动中的最佳投入阶段。研究结果表明：财政补贴对研发创新强度影响不显著，税收优惠能显著提升创新强度；企业规模在政府补贴与企业创新强度间存在显著调节作用，企业规模越大，政府补贴对企业创新强度的激励效应越弱。通过采用纳入企业生命周期因素的模型进行分析发现：政府补贴对成长期和成熟期民营科技型企业创新强度具有显著激励作用，对初创期和衰退期民营科技型企业创新强度影响不显著。     

Sorting,school performance and quality: Evidence from China

School choice reforms give talented students the option to sort out of low-performing schools but often leave disadvantaged students behind. This study shows how a Chinese city was successful in helping its low-performing schools to catch up by encouraging talented students to sort into these schools. The city identified eleven low-performing middle schools and guaranteed elite high school admission to their top ten-percent graduates. This study documents that the policy improved school performance by 0.19-0.26 standard deviations. Using data on lottery middle school assignment, I further test for potential mechanisms, including strategic sorting and improvement in school value-added.