Sales contest research: Business and individual difference factors affecting intentions to pursue contest goals

Calls for sales contest research (1980/81 and 1998) suggest glaring holes in our knowledge of how to design appealing contests, whether and to what extent contests motivate salespeople, and the types of behaviors contests provoke. This study adds to our knowledge of the relationship between sales force attitudes for sales contests and intention to pursue the contest by exploring the effects of business type, demographic, and psychological variables on this relationship. Using surveys and a sorting task for several sales contest designs, a national sample of a firm's multi-business unit sales force (n = 620) provided the data for our study. A replication with two additional companies confirms that intention to pursue sales contest goals is affected by several variables, particularly for consumer/commercial salespeople. The findings and ensuing discussion provide contest planners useful direction for anticipating likely sales force responses to sales contests.     

The Efficiency of Stock-Based Incentives: Experimental Evidence

The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations.     

The predictive ability of loan loss provisions in banks – Effects of accounting standards,enforcement and incentives

In this study we compare the predictive ability of loan loss provisions with respect to actual losses under IFRS and local GAAP. The ‘incurred loss model’ of IAS 39 is a model that requires a relatively low level of judgment by preparers compared to alternative models that exist under local GAAP. We find that loan loss provisions in IFRS bank years predict future credit losses to a lesser extent than in local GAAP bank years, consistent with the incurred loss model reducing the timeliness of provisions. We also examine the interaction of standards with enforcement of financial reporting and with preparer incentives. In testing the role of enforcement from, e.g., banking supervisory authorities, we find that the benefits of local GAAP are largely limited to high-enforcement settings. Local GAAP also performs relatively better than IFRS in large and in profitable banks. This has implications for the IASB and the FASB as they prescribe the adoption of the more judgment-based expected loss model in IFRS 9 and the corresponding US GAAP standard (ASC topic 326), as well as for supervisory authorities that will enforce these standards.     

Routines and incentives in group tasks*

The artificial context “Target the Two” has been used in experiments to explore some of the features of routinization and learning. Two agents must learn to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, without being allowed to use verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance of players in two treatments. Each treatment submits players to the same sequence of starting configurations, but differs in terms of the payoff function. In the first treatment (A), the payoff is based on the number of moves required to achieve the goal, whereas in the second treatment (B) the payoff depends on the time required for completion. We observe that (1) in treatment B subjects tend to play in a more “routinized” way and (2) treatment B reduces the time spent on play, but does not decrease the resources (the number of moves) used, relative to treatment A.     

Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents*

In some tournaments, it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Union members bargain over wage distribution, and some firms allow self‐managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labor. We analyze, and test experimentally, a tournament where heterogeneous agents determine the spread between winner prize and loser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, uncertainty, heterogeneity, and effort. We find that a large prize spread is associated with a low degree of uncertainty and a high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity triggers effort. By and large, our real‐effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions.     

Expatriate compensation and its link to the subsidiary strategic role: a theoretical analysis

This paper focuses on the strategic design of expatriates' salaries. Unlike standard expatriation literature that assumes a lack of connection between strategy and international managers' compensation, we use the theoretical concepts from the international strategic management research to discuss how different international strategies affect the way expatriates are compensated. In this respect, the paper proposes a series of hypotheses on how expatriate compensation systems take shape according to the role that the expatriates may play in the internationalization process. The hypotheses refer to the type of incentives offered to encourage acceptance of the assignment, the type of criteria used to evaluate their performance and the reference unit used to establish variable compensation.     

我国公共部门人力资源管理的激励对策研究

在经济全球化的今天，国内理论界在引入西方人力资源管理思想及发展我国人力资源管理理论方面做了不少的工作，并且在新公共管理主义的发展、强化公共部门服务职能以及建立完善国家公务员制度等方面也做了有益的理论探索，但将企业人力资源管理思想应用于公共部门人力资源管理与开发的研究工作，尚停留在起步阶段。特别是在提倡管理要“以人为本”的今天，将企业人力资源管理中的激励运用于公共部门，不仅有利于完善我国的公务员制度，同时也将进一步推动政府体制改革，提高行政效率，使公共部门为社会提供更多优质的公共服务产品。     

Incentives for Non‐Disclosure by Corporate Groups

A regulatory approved deed of cross guarantee (the deed) was introduced into Australia in December 1991, relieving participating companies within a group from having to prepare, have audited, and file financial statements. We examine the characteristics of firms that obtain relief from filing (and therefore disclosing) separate financial statements of closed‐group companies by adopting the deed. This is the first attempt to analyse adoption using large‐scale archival data. The results support the survey evidence in Dean and Clarke (2005 ), thus providing triangulation on their work. In particular they support the view that the decision to adopt the deed is a function of strategic factors as well as accounting and auditing cost savings. Those strategic factors were not in focus when regulators first introduced a deed of indemnity in 1985, nor when the original indemnity was modified to become a deed of cross guarantee in 1991 or when it was further modified in 1998. Further, evidence is provided to test the conflicting ideas arising from the analytical literature and the mixed results in the empirical, voluntary disclosure literatures. That evidence suggests that non‐disclosure arises when firms are in a more competitive industry and, in particular, when there is ability to retain non‐disclosure at the consolidated level (i.e., where the number of segments is high). Other factors supporting non‐disclosure are leverage and the proportion of foreign operations (proxying for deed complexity). The proportion of outside directors (a proxy for legal liability) and the number of shares outstanding (a proxy for agency costs of equity) are not associated with the decision to adopt the deed.     

How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.     

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.