不同战略导向对自主创新与合作创新的影响研究

在动态竞争的环境下,如何选择适合自身发展的创新方式已成为企业技术创新中面临的难题.文章在借鉴前人研究的基础上,把企业家导向、市场导向、自主创新及合作创新整合在同一理论模型中,针对相关因素之间的关系,提出4种命题,从而为企业提高自主创新效率提供了有效路径.     

浮息债券基准利率创新分析

浮息债券基准利率的选择直接决定了浮息债券的投资价值。中国目前浮息债券基准利率有一年期定期存款利率和7日回购利率两种。本文主要通过对两种基准利率的生成机制以及市场波动特征进行分析,重点讨论了不同基准利率浮息债券的融资成本以及浮息债券基准利率创新对中国商业银行证券投资管理带来的新的挑战。     

论节约型社会的营销创新探析

营销活动对环境的变化是非常敏感的。在变化的环境下，营销活动必须有所创新，才能在市场中立于不败之地。我国政府将“建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会”作为基本国幕，标志着我国进入建设节约型社会时期。节约型社会建设中营销环境的变化，对企业营销活动提出了新的要求，企业营销应从观念、产品、渠道等方面进行创新以适应新的环境，形成企业新的竞争力。     

城镇社区安全管理模式的经济学分析

城镇社区安全是社会安全与稳定的基础。本文基于纳什均衡和帕累托理论，对城镇社区安全管理模式进行了经济学分析。结果显示，为实现社区安全管理资源的帕累托最优，需要改进现有的安全管理制度，通过契约协作的方式，协调社区联盟中每户居民的安全支出，以避免“搭便车”现象的发生。基于上述经济学理论分析，最后提出了有关实现社区安全管理制度创新的模式及相应对策措施。     

Diffusion and Innovation of New Technologies under Skill Heterogeneity

This article presents a model of innovation and diffusion of machines which embody a new technology. Users of the machines are heterogenous in their skill level. Skilled machine-users adopt new machines first, while unskilled users wait until machines become more user-friendly and reliable. The improvement of machines is the engine of diffusion, and it is carried out by the monopolist machine producer. The speed of diffusion is affected by the skill distribution in the economy. At any point in time, the machine producer can innovate a new generation of machines. The timing of innovation is also influenced by the skill distribution.     

农地利用技术创新的类型与模式研究

农地利用技术是一个多层次的体系，它能在扩大耕地面积、提高土地利用率和耕地质量等多方面发挥重要作用。通过对“市场机制自发作用下的技术选择”和“政府引导下的技术选择”两种现实模式的探讨，认为技术创新具有外部性，土地利用更是具有明显的“外溢效应”，加上我国农业比较利益偏低和农地使用权流转市场发育不全带来的农地价格扭曲，常造成市场机制下技术创新的方向与资源稀缺状况不相符合的现象，从而带来资源配置的低效率。因此，适当的政府引导是必要的，也是有效的。     

产业集群内企业之间合作创新的理论分析

集群有利于降低合作创新的交易成本、获得合作伙伴的隐性知识.企业选择合作创新,其动机主要是解决技术的外部性、分担研究开发成本和风险、获得合作伙伴的缄默性知识、实现技术转移以及获得巨大的国内和国际市场等.对合作创新的博弈分析表明,企业要形成合作创新的联盟,该联盟必须满足超可加性;否则,其成员没有动机形成联盟,已经形成的联盟也将面临解散的威胁.合理的利益分配方案是合作创新的基础.该方案是合作各方讨价还价的结果.     

武汉城市创新系统创新能力评价与提升对策

界定了城市创新系统的概念、结构和特征,提出了城市创新系统子系统创新能力评价的指标体系,并对武汉市城市创新系统的创新能力进行了评价。最后,提出了提升武汉市城市创新系统创新能力的对策。     

Timing of Public Information and Cost Reduction

Received July 31, 2000; revised version received July 18, 2001     

Racing in two dimensions

In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation.