中国国有粮食企业购销波动研究——基于小波分析和格兰杰因果检验的方法

研究国有粮食企业购销波动及相互作用,有利于深刻认识国有粮食企业市场运行规律,为充分保障国家粮食安全服务。本文尝试将小波分析和格兰杰因果检验结合起来研究国有粮食企业购销波动,首先应用小波分析研究国有粮食企业购销的波动特征,接着运用格兰杰因果分析,研究两者之间波动的格兰杰因果关系,结合小波分析结果探讨形成格兰杰因果关系的原因并提出政策建议。本文的研究表明,国有粮食企业收购量和销售量波动较大,都以12个月为周期。国有粮食企业收购量的周期性现象来源于粮食生产的季节周期性,销售量的周期性现象受制于粮食轮换制度和库存条件,一般而言,销售高峰早于收购高峰,销售谷底和收购谷底时滞不显著。国有粮食企业销售和收购序列存在单向的格兰杰因果关系。     

两阶段实物期权的供应链模型研究

在一个单期、两级供应链中供应商和销售商共同开发投资一种新型产品,在此情况下,本文分别对不考虑期权和引入期权两种情况进行分析:考虑期权的情况下,在投资和销售两阶段分别引入投资延迟期权和销售量担保期权,通过对模型分析与求解发现,销售商通过购买期权将风险部分转移给供应商,供应商获得风险补偿的同时,由于承担了更多的风险将谨慎投资,从而使供应链整体风险得到有效控制,并且实现资金的有效配置。     

Short Selling Behavior and Mad Money

We examine 1,234 buy recommendations from Jim Cramer's Mad Money television show. Consistent with prior research, we report positive abnormal returns immediately after buy recommendations, followed by a reversal, indicative of an overpricing event. We also find a marked increase in short selling. Our results show a positive association between shorting and the buy recommendations even after controlling for factors shown in the literature to influence shorting. We do not find similar effects after sell recommendations. These results suggest that short sellers act to exploit short‐term overpricing arising from behavioral biases of some investors.     

基于VAR模型对CPI与房地产价格关系的实证分析

随着经济的不断发展,物价波动与房地产价格之间的关系逐渐成为关注的焦点。本文选取我国2006年1月至2010年12月的CPI和房屋销售价格指数月度数据,建立VAR模型。通过格兰杰因果检验发现:房地产价格和物价波动之间存在单向的因果关系。通过脉冲响应函数进行分析,表明房屋销售价格指数对CPI有着正向的作用。方差分解的结果说明在长期CPI的变动很大程度是由房屋销售价格指数引起的,房地产市场价格波动受自身因素的影响较大。     

从税收征管中发现的问题看增值税改革

本文分析了增值税执行中的主要违规行为及原因,提出改革现行增值税制的建议:扩大增值税征收范围,改革现行税收优惠办法,改购进扣税法为销售扣税法;在税收征管上淡化增值税专用发票的作用。     

论营销团队建设与管理

随着现代企业环境的信息化、全球化、人本化,企业间的竞争也愈发激烈,传统的个人营销模式已完全被团队营销模式所取代,如企业拥有高效的营销团队可在激烈的市场竞争中占据强大的竞争优势。文章阐述了企业团队建设的重要性,以及高效团队所具备的特征,并分析了我国目前卷烟营销团队存在的观念老化、能力老化、心态老化、精神状态老化等问题,同时对建设高效营销团队的途径进行了探讨。     

浅谈应收账款的管理

应收账款是企业流动资产的重要组成部分,其流动性强弱直接影响企业的资金周转和经营业绩。在应收账款在资产总额中所占比例日益扩大的情况下,如何管好、用好和盘活应收账款,加强资金安全,提高资金使用效率,防范经营风险等具有重要的意义。本文就应收账款的成因进行分析,并提出相应的管理对策。     

Hedging securities and Silicon Valley Bank idiosyncrasies

Hedging requires adequacy and timing. This paper finds that banks did not systematically ignore balance-sheet risks like Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), and instead exercised risk management by asymmetrically increasing hedging activity when security losses increase and scaling back hedging activity as security losses reverse. Banks also hedge against bank runs when risk increases due to a combination of security losses and funding risks from unsecured deposits. Findings suggest SVB's mistakes are idiosyncratic. Results suggest that nonstress test banks target balance-sheet risks when hedging, stabilizing themselves from interest rate shocks transmitted through fixed-income securities. Scrutiny of rules-based outliers like SVB is preferable to increased regulatory burden for all nonstress test banks.     

Short Selling and the Weekend Effect in Nasdaq Stock Returns

We examine daily short selling of Nasdaq stocks to explore whether speculative short selling causes a significant portion of the weekend effect in returns. We identify a weekend effect in speculative short selling whereby it constitutes a larger percentage of trading volume on Mondays versus Fridays. We find an opposite effect in dealer short selling, consistent with market makers adding liquidity and stability. Our main finding is that speculative short selling does not explain an economically meaningful portion of the weekend effect in returns, even among the firms most that are most actively shorted. This finding contradicts some prior studies.     

Asset sale,debt restructuring,and liquidation

This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower financing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower cash flow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders׳ incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs. The possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure.