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91.
Frederick W. Rankin John B. Van Huyck Raymond C. Battalio 《Games and Economic Behavior》2000,32(2):285
This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects's behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83. 相似文献
92.
Alaa El‐Shazly 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2012,33(1):29-38
This article analyses the strategic moves of governments and investors under privatization programs in a game‐theoretic context. In sequential‐move games of both perfect information and incomplete information, the best response of the strategic investors to observing a slow pace of privatization is to have a low participation in economic activity because of concerns over public policy credibility. This is true even if the government chooses to randomize its action to send mixed signals to the investors while adopting a slow pace of privatization for budgetary reasons. However, the outcome is Pareto inferior to a situation of phased but fast implementation of privatization programs and high private‐sector participation under plausible assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
93.
实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。 相似文献
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96.
房地产市场价格博弈分析 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
我国房地产业发展迅速,房地产市场的发展对促进国民经济发展做出了突出贡献,房地产业已成为我国重要支柱产业之一.我国房地产市场现状是博弈得出结果的一个竞技场.文章从房地产销售过程中主要参与者的价格博弈分析,探究房地产市场交易价格形成的过程,指出中国房地产业的现状是由社会几股力量反复博弈的结果,其实质是不同社会力量之间的利益之争. 相似文献
97.
Kaisheng Zeng Xiaohui Luo 《中国与世界经济(英文版)》2008,16(4):110-126
During the process of economic globalization, China's inbound tourism has developed strongly. The present paper deals with one of the core issues of the international tourism industry: inbound tourist revenue. With the aid of conventional theories and the use of empirical tests, our study identifies some decisive factors that have influenced China's inbound tourist revenue through an analysis of the global and local conditions at macro and micro levels. The findings were then linked to the Olympic Games, the mega event having impacted international tourism. The findings were also linked to further.discussions and suggestions for the interactions between the Beijing Olympic Games 2008 and China's inbound tourism. 相似文献
98.
制度、人力资本与乡村劳动力迁移 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文构建制度框架下政府与乡村迁移者博弈模型说明政府政策选择机制形成与迁移者决策过程。在不同经济发展阶段,经济发展目标决定迁移者迁移策略,城市发展能否从迁移中获得利益决定政府对迁移的管制程度,农业发展能否为迁移提供支持决定迁移者的迁移决策。迁移者的人力资本水平是影响政府策略与迁移者策略选择的关键因素。改善乡村劳动力人力资本积累条件有助于加速迁移进程,减少城市劳动力市场对迁移者的歧视,提高城市化质量。 相似文献
99.
世界大型事件活动对旅游业的影响及对中国的启示——以历届奥运会和韩国世界杯为例 总被引:17,自引:1,他引:17
大型事件旅游活动对举办地具有深远的经济意义和社会意义。以历届奥运会和2002年韩国世界杯足球赛为实例,简要分折世界大型事件活动对举办国旅游业发展的影响及对中国的启示。 相似文献
100.
Richard Chisik 《Journal of International Economics》2003,59(2):367-397
A notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual, rather than immediate, reduction of trade barriers. In this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non-cooperative environment. We show that specialization, capacity irreversibility and the development of trade-partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease, over time, the lowest obtainable self-enforcing tariff. By increasing the penalty of future defection, sunk costs ensure that the self-enforcing trading relationship starts slowly, but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve. 相似文献