International free riding on institutions

Economic institutions are linked to economic growth because they create conditions favourable for production and exchange. Institutions can give a country comparative advantage in producing some goods. If its trading partners lack such institutions, it can still enjoy their benefits by importing these goods. Some institutions, such as intellectual property rights, have non‐excludable benefits because the resulting production is intangible, non‐rival, and often publicly disclosed. The profits, or surplus, that result, however, is rival. Foreign countries can ‘free ride’ on this benefit by misappropriating rival surplus through infringement. This article develops a theory of institutional free riding in which firms in one country free ride on the benefit of foreign institutions to the detriment of their competitor firms and their countries' institutions. It evaluates the incentives of firms and governments for this free riding, its effects, and potential responses to mitigate these effects.     

Market-based grazing land transfers and customary institutions in the management of rangelands: Two case studies on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau

Beginning in the early 1990’s, grazing lands once held in common were contracted to individual households in the rangeland regions of China. The resulting fragmentation of rangelands has led to ecological and social problems. As China seeks to address intractable poverty and rangeland degradation, attention has turned to rental, or transfer, of contracted grazing land as a market-based approach to re-aggregating grazing land into larger units that support economies of scale. However, given that many pastoral regions still maintain community customary institutions, what the relationship between market mechanisms and local customary institutions should be in rangeland management needs further analysis. This paper applies comparative case studies of two types of relationships between market mechanisms and customary institutions: (1) market mechanisms that replace customary institutions in the case of Axi village, and (2) market mechanisms that are embedded within customary institutions in Xiareer village. This allows contrast of the impacts of differing approaches on livelihoods, livestock production, and wealth differentiation among pastoral households. We found that there is a higher level of livestock mortality, lower livestock productivity, and higher livestock production cost in Axi Village compared to Xiareer Village. In addition, household asset levels are higher and there is less income differentiation in Xiareer Village. It is concluded that embedding market mechanisms within customary institutions has had notable benefits for the herders of Xiareer Village, because it is a better fit to the coupled pastoral social-ecological system. Based on these findings, we argue that in pastoral communities where the rangeland transfer system for contracted grazing land has not yet been implemented, it is critical to reconsider China’s current policy approach to pay greater attention to the innovative management systems being developed in local regions. Instead of considering market-based approaches as oppositional to traditional institutions, options that derive from the interaction of market-based and customary institutions should be considered.     

Foreign direct investment: the role of institutional and cultural determinants

Using panel data for 29 source and 65 host countries in the period 1995–2009, we examine the determinants of bilateral FDI stocks, focusing on institutional and cultural factors. The results reveal that institutional and cultural distance is important and that FDI has a predominantly regional aspect. FDI to developing countries is positively affected by better institutions in the host country, while foreign investors prefer to invest in developed countries that are more corrupt and politically unstable compared to home. The results indicate that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries with less diverse societies than their own.     

Institutions and Work Incentives in Collective Farming in Maoist China

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that assumes widespread shirking and inefficiency in agricultural production under the collective system in Maoist China, and attributes these problems to egalitarianism in labour remuneration and difficulties in labour supervision. Drawing on interviews with 131 former production team members from 16 provinces, this paper re‐examines the issue of work incentives by placing it in a historical and social context in which formal institutions, such as the different forms of collective organization, income distribution and state extraction, as well as informal institutions, such as indigenous social networks, communal norms and collective sanction, interacted with non‐institutional factors, especially local geographical, demographic and ecological conditions, to constrain and motivate Chinese villagers participating in collective production. The complexity and fluidity of this context gave rise to a multiplicity of patterns of peasant behaviour in team farming, which accounts for the contrasting performances of rural collectives in different areas and periods.     

La gestión mecanicista de las Instituciones de Educación Superior: un estudio desde la modelación sistémica

The bureaucratic tendencies to organize work in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) of which facilitates personnel control and the mechanical ways to measure educational content are the ones that shatter education in pieces, under the hierarchy criterion, also shattering the professor's labor. This organizational method results in an incompetent education, leaving very negative consequences for teaching development. We address this problem by using systemic modeling and Structural Equations Systems (SEM) to confirm hypotheses from scientific observation. It was proven that there was a negative impact of mechanistic management which affected teacher's development. This was proven in context in two HEIs located in Villahermosa (Tabasco, Mexico).     

湖北省新建本科院校发展情况研究

自1999年,新建本科院校作为一个高校群体如雨后春笋般诞生,到2013年,湖北省新设置了15所本科院校.本文从院校的发展、定位、人才培养方案情况、发展战略等几个方面对湖北省新设置的15所本科院校进行了分析,对这15所学校升格后的发展情况进行了研究.     

对于新会计制度下如何加强事业单位财务管理的剖析

财务管理是事业单位财务活动当中非常关键的环节,其有效性为事业单位的财产安全提供了保障。但是,随着新会计制度的出台和实施,事业单位的财务管理中存在的问题和不足逐渐暴露出来,这些问题严重阻碍了事业单位的持续发展。为了保障事业单位在新会计制度下实现长期健康发展,有必要就其财务管理当中存在的问题进行深入讨论,并提出可行的解决方案。     

Environmental Multi‐dimensionality and Staff Localization in Multinational Enterprises: The Case of Korean Firms

The person–environment fit theory posits that the term “environment” can be defined at different levels. This study delineates two environmental dimensions (strategic and organizational) and empirically examines the potential moderating effects of two strategic factors (intra‐ and inter‐regional diversification) on the relationship between two organizational factors (subsidiary ownership and host‐country experience) and MNE subsidiary staffing composition. The results indicate that strategic and organizational dimensions have impacts on subsidiary staffing composition. This study also finds that the interaction effects between strategic and organizational factors are significant only when there is congruence between demands from different environmental dimensions.     

Does institutional quality resolve the Lucas Paradox?

The Lucas Paradox observes that capital flows predominantly to relatively rich countries, contradicting the neoclassical prediction that it should flow to poorer capital-scarce countries. In an influential study, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (AKV) argue that cross-country variation in institutional quality can fully explain the Paradox, contending that if institutional quality is included in regression models explaining international capital inflows, a country’s level of economic development is no longer statistically significant. We replicate AKV’s results using their cross-sectional IFS capital flow data. Motivated by the importance of conducting inference in statistically adequate models, we focus on misspecification testing of alternative functional forms of their empirical model of capital flows. We show that their resolution of the Paradox relies on inference in a misspecified model. In models that do not fail basic misspecification tests, even though institutional quality is a significant determinant of capital inflows, a country’s level of economic development also remains a significant predictor. The same conclusions are reached using an extended dataset covering more recent IFS international capital flow data, first-differenced capital stock data and additional controls.