“一带一路”倡议能否提升对外直接投资企业盈利能力？

基于2011-2015年A股上市公司与商务部《境外投资企业（机构）名录》数据，利用倾向得分匹配方法（PSM）和双重差分法（DID）考察“一带一路”倡议对中国对外直接投资企业盈利能力的影响及作用机制。研究发现：“一带一路”倡议显著提升了中国对沿线国家投资企业的盈利能力。机制检验表明，“一带一路”倡议能够通过推进中国与沿线国家间的经济融合和文化包容来提升对外投资企业的盈利能力，而政治互信在样本期内不显著。进一步研究发现，“一带一路”倡议对企业盈利能力的提升作用主要体现在国有企业、新兴优势产业以及投资目的为非邻近中国的“一带一路”国家上。     

Environmental Multi‐dimensionality and Staff Localization in Multinational Enterprises: The Case of Korean Firms

The person–environment fit theory posits that the term “environment” can be defined at different levels. This study delineates two environmental dimensions (strategic and organizational) and empirically examines the potential moderating effects of two strategic factors (intra‐ and inter‐regional diversification) on the relationship between two organizational factors (subsidiary ownership and host‐country experience) and MNE subsidiary staffing composition. The results indicate that strategic and organizational dimensions have impacts on subsidiary staffing composition. This study also finds that the interaction effects between strategic and organizational factors are significant only when there is congruence between demands from different environmental dimensions.     

Hedge fund ownership and voluntary disclosure

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using 13F filings from 1996 to 2011, we document that hedge fund holdings are negatively associated with the subsequent frequency of portfolio...     

要素市场扭曲、区域差异与R&D投入

本文利用要素市场扭曲指数及中国高技术产业1997～2009年省际面板数据,考察了要素市场扭曲对R&D投入的影响及区域差异。结果表明,要素市场扭曲对R&D资本投入和R&D人力投入有着不同的影响,抑制了R&D资本投入增长,促进了R&D人力投入;而且其对两者的影响都存在着显著的区域差异。在此基础上,运用门槛检验方法对这种区域差异的影响因素进行了探讨,研究发现,在区域经济发展水平、人力资本水平、财政收入、产权结构和对外开放程度等因素的不同门槛值区间,要素市场扭曲对高技术产业R&D投入的影响程度和方向都存在着明显的差异。     

影响中国房地产市场发展的主要制度安排研究

影响我国房地产市场的主要制度安排有五种：房地产住房供给和保障制度、房地产土地供给制度、房地产金融制度、房地产税收制度和存在于我国居民购房行为中的非正式制度。本文对这些制度安排的主要内容及其变迁做了分析，并研究了这些制度安排对我国房地产发展的影响。     

The role of perceived behavioural control in the constraint-negotiation process: the case of solo travel

This study extends the leisure constraint-effects-mitigation model to the perceived behavioural control (PBC)- constraint-negotiation model by adding PBC. Three competing models were tested to determine which model best fits the data. Results suggested that PBC mediates the relationship between motivation and negotiation, and there is a direct path from motivation to participation. Findings contribute to deepening and broadening the theory of leisure constraint negotiation because the new variable was successfully added to the original model and the model was extended to new settings (i.e. solo travel and non-Western).     

Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis

We consider a strategic situation in which a firm may conceal the illegal activity of violating environmental regulations and a regulator seeks to verify the illegality to punish the firm. We study two main factors, fines and social monitoring, that influence the firm’s decision in that situation. First, we find all the possible equilibria of our model and examine conditions of those two factors that lead to each equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we then study the optimal enforcement policies that induce the most socially desirable equilibrium and improve social welfare within each equilibrium. Our main findings are as follows. First, the two factors have a complementary relationship in getting the most desirable equilibrium: Certain high levels of fines and social monitoring are both needed. Second, if making the social monitoring above the certain critical level is impossible, setting the level of the fines as high as possible may be the optimal enforcement policy. Finally, if setting the fines above the certain critical level is not available, either, setting the level of the fines as low as possible might be optimal, and the higher level of the social monitoring does not necessarily bring higher social welfare.     

Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests

We examine players' equilibrium effort levels in a contest with difference-form contest success functions in which two players compete with each other to win a prize. We show the following. At the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game, and in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential-move game, only one of the players expends effort or neither player expends effort. If one player's composite strength is far greater than the other player's, only the player with greater composite strength expends effort whether they move simultaneously or sequentially. If the players' valuations for the prize and their marginal probabilities of winning at (0, 0) are sufficiently small, neither player expends effort whether they move simultaneously or sequentially.