Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria. Received: 11 December 2003, Accepted: 29 July 2005 JEL Classification: D41, D43, D51 We thank (without implicating) Prof. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Cuong Le Van for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and not necessarily those of Calyon.     

An algebraic index theorem for non-smooth economies

In this paper, we prove an existence theorem for equilibria in production economies with increasing returns, which generalizes the classic results on this topic. In particular, we eliminate both the free-disposal assumptions and any smoothness requirements on the boundary of the production sets. For this purpose, we propose a new definition of the topological degree for non-convex-valued correspondences defined on non-smooth topological manifolds.     

Nominal uniqueness and money non-neutrality in the limit-price exchange process

We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money. Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price orders. Money has a positive value except on optimal rest-points where it becomes a ??veil?? and trade vanishes. Typically, there is a piecewise globally unique trade-and-price curve both in real and in nominal variables. Money is not neutral, either in the short-run or long-run and a localized version of the quantity theory of money holds in the short-run. An optimal money growth rate is derived, which enables monetary trade curves to converge towards Pareto optimal rest-points. Below this growth rate, the economy enters a (sub- optimal) liquidity trap where monetary policy is ineffective; above this threshold inflation rises. Finally, market liquidity, measured through the speed of real trades, can be linked to gains-to-trade, households?? expectations, and the quantity of circulating money.     

Classroom Games: The Allocation of Renewable Resources Under Different Property Rights and Regulation Schemes

The authors describe a renewable resource allocation game designed to stimulate students' interest in and understanding of market failure associated with open-access types of resource use. They also use the game to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various property rights and regulation schemes. Because this exercise demonstrates the power of unregulated and regulated economic incentives, many types of students may benefit from this game, including undergraduates enrolled in the standard introductory and in more advanced microeconomics classes, as well as courses in environmental economics and natural resource economics. This game was specifically designed so that noneconomics majors in natural resource management and environmental courses could also benefit.     

A decision‐analytic approach to screening in chemical alternatives assessment

Material selection in the chemistry value chain involves consideration of many objectives, including cost, performance, health risk, and environmental impact. Alternatives assessment is an emerging tool for guiding complex decisions with respect to these goals. As a relatively new method, the process is not yet well developed, especially with respect to how trade‐offs among objectives can be assessed accurately and inexpensively. Using paint strippers alternatives assessment as an illustrative example, we show how an established decision‐analytic method, known as comparative screening, allows for a multistep process with gradually increasing information needs. Compared with existing methodological approaches, comparative screening instills flexible and consistent treatment of trade‐offs. This is important because it maximizes the potential for a robust assessment while minimizing arduous data collection. Further, its use in the alternatives assessment process can support the selection of more sustainable materials.     

Computational Methods for Measuring the Difference of Empirical Distributions

This paper presents a simple computational method for measuring the difference of independent empirical distributions estimated by bootstrapping or other resampling approaches. Using data from a field test of external scope in contingent valuation, this complete combinatorial method is compared with other methods (empirical convolutions, repeated sampling, normality, nonoverlapping confidence intervals) that have been suggested in the literature. Tradeoffs between methods are discussed in terms of programming complexity, time and computer resources required, bias, and the precision of the estimate.     

Assessing sustainability, a comprehensive wealth accounting prospect: An application to Mozambique

We estimate the wealth of Mozambique in 2000 and 2005 in order to assess the sustainability of its development path. Our methodology builds on Arrow et al. (2010). We show that Mozambican wealth increases through human and physical capital accumulation, while the pressure on natural capital remains low. The growth of total factor productivity enhances the outcome of the different capital assets, but population growth has a strong downward effect on wealth per capita. Results suggest that Mozambican development was sustainable between 2000 and 2005, but these remain ambiguous and are highly sensitive to data and assumptions used.     

Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism

We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of competitive outcomes in a pure-exchange economy with finitely many households. We construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism, which fully implements Walras equilibria via Nash equilibria in fairly general environments. Traders’ preferences need neither to be ordered nor continuous. In addition, the mechanism is such that no pure strategy is weakly dominated, hence is bounded (in the sense of Jackson 1992). In particular it makes no use of any integer game.