CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA

Tax avoidance can range from reduction of the corporate tax burden by legitimate use of tax rules to violation of tax laws. In this paper, we endeavor to synthesize the major findings of tax avoidance research from the accounting and finance literatures over the past ten years. We consider theoretical developments and the related empirical findings about the interconnected issues of measuring tax avoidance, and the possible causes and outcomes of corporate tax avoidance. We present some ideas for further research to examine underexplored topics regarding tax avoidance.     

Defending Gibrat’s Law as a long-run regularity

According to Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the period examined. While earlier studies tended to confirm the Law, more recent research generally rejects it. This article reconciles these two streams of literature, taking into account the role of market selection and learning in reshaping a given population of firms through time. Consistently with previous studies, we find that Gibrat’s Law has to be rejected ex ante, since smaller firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts. However, a significant convergence toward Gibrat-like behavior can be detected ex post. This finding is an indication that market selection “cleans” the original population of firms, so that the resulting industrial “core” does not depart from a Gibrat-like pattern of growth. From a theoretical point of view, this result is consistent with those models based on passive and active learning, and can be seen as a defense of the validity of the Law in the long-run.

我国上市公司大股东与中小股东企业剩余分配不均衡的权力解读--兼论我国上市公司中小投资者利益保护机制

真实经济中存在大量的大股东利益侵占现象,本文认为,这是股东经济权力天然非对等的必然结果.本文从放松股东为同一性质主体假定和股东间非对等经济权力入手,建立企业剩余分配的博弈模型,推演出大股东侵占中小股东利益过程和实现机制,指出通过控制权实现利益侵占是市场失灵的必然结果,市场机制本身无法解决.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to address two sets of questions: (1) what are the characteristics of firms that choose the various modes of foreign market access (exporting, greenfield FDI, and cross-border M&A), and (2) how does the international organization of production vary across industries and country-pairs? We show that the answers to these questions depend on the nature of firm heterogeneity. Depending on whether firms differ in their mobile or immobile capabilities, cross-border mergers involve the most or the least efficient active firms. The comparative statics on industry and country characteristics display a similar dichotomy.     

零售企业扩张实践质疑威廉姆森命题

"复制和选择性干预不可能",是威廉姆森关于企业规模边界的一个颇具权威性的命题,但是本文认为,这个命题已遭到零售企业扩张实践的质疑,沃尔玛、家乐福等零售企业的扩张恰恰是由"复制和选择性干预"所支撑的.本文从零售企业"类似性活动"业务属性和"订购性生产"经营特征分析切入,对零售企业扩张中"复制和选择性干预"成为可能的深层原因进行了探讨.最后,文章认为,威廉姆森命题的遭遇与经济学的某种局限有关,这种局限的直接表现是经济学一直都将企业默认为生产企业,忽略流通企业的特殊属性,"工商合一"、"以工代商".文章对这种表象背后的原因也作了一定的分析.     

Corporate Demography and Empirical Industrial Organization: A Critical Appraisal

The emerging field of corporate demography views corporations and industries in a similar way to human or animal individuals and groups. In spite of a surprisingly large overlap of subject matter with economics, corporate demography is not well-known by, nor easily accessible to economists. An extremely useful recent book, The Demography of Corporations and Industries, by Glenn R. Carroll and Michael T. Hannan (2000) should change that. This review essay critically examines corporate demography from an economic viewpoint. The very different view of competition in corporate demography gets particular attention.     

外部融资、技术创新研发与企业成长--银行信贷与技术研发交互作用的经验研究

在当前经济转型升级的大背景下,要想保持经济长期可持续的增长,必然要求微观企业保持良好的成长态势和较高水平的生产效率。本文利用BEEPS的中国企业调查微观数据,考察了外部融资约束、银行信贷和技术研发影响企业绩效和企业成长的作用机制。研究表明：外部融资约束对企业生产效率有显著负面影响,企业技术研发对生产效率有显著的促进作用,外部融资约束通过技术研发投入途径对企业生产效率产生抑制效应;银行信贷对于企业生产效率有直接的负面影响,只有将其投入到技术研发活动中才会发挥促进企业成长的作用。     

企业异质性与服务贸易保护水平的决定——基于中国数据的实证检验

笔者从政治经济学的分析视角,运用博弈论的分析方法,对企业异质性和服务贸易保护水平的相关性进行了理论分析,并结合中国服务部门的数据进行实证检验。结果表明:一个服务部门的产业集中度越高,劳动生产率越低,资本密集度越低,其贸易保护水平也越高。此外,中国所有制结构的特殊性赋予企业异质性更多的内涵,在一个服务部门内,国有企业的比重越大,贸易保护水平也越高。     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.