Hub location problems in transportation networks

In this paper we propose a 4-index formulation for the uncapacitated multiple allocation hub location problem tailored for urban transport and liner shipping network design. This formulation is very tight and most of the tractable instances for MIP solvers are optimally solvable at the root node. While the existing state-of-the-art MIP solvers fail to solve even small size instances of problem, our accelerated and efficient primal (Benders) decomposition solves larger ones. In addition, a very efficient greedy heuristic, proven to be capable of obtaining high quality solutions, is proposed. We also introduce fixed cost values for Australian Post (AP) dataset.     

从财政分权看我国地方政府发行公债的必要性

举债权是规范的分税制赋予地方政府应有的财权。在财政分权的框架下,一级政权,一级事权,一级财权是题中之义。本文首先从财政分权理论出发,指出发行市政债是地方融资平台的替代措施。     

浅析杜鲁门政府时期美国对远东地区的战略转变

冷战迫使美国重新分析日本在美国全球战略中的地位.美国对日本政策的调整带动了美国对韩国政策的调整,即收缩在韩国的军事力量,回避直接介入朝鲜半岛,主要通过政治、经济援助来稳定韩国的局势.美日韩三国同盟明显体现了“分工理论”.     

地方政府公共投资与区域经济增长的差异性分析

文章采用全国31个省、自治区和直辖市1995~2008年的面板数据,构建动态面板数据模型,考察了地方政府公共投资对区域经济增长的影响。研究表明,1995年以来我国地方政府公共投资总体上推动了区域经济增长,但不同公共投资项目的拉动效应在区域间存在着较大差异。     

中国“十二五”时期税收划分思路探讨

十二五时期,中国财政体制改革还需全面突进。税收划分应按照财权、财力与事权相匹配的原则进行改革。本文提出了一个税收划分的基本方案,并对房产税、营业税、资源税等相关问题作了分析。     

地方政府投融资平台研究综述

2008年金融危机以来,我国实施经济刺激计划使地方政府投融资平台数量和规模得到了迅猛的发展。地方政府投融资平台对地方经济发展作出了巨大的贡献,同时也累积了巨大的风险。本文对地方政府投融资平台的国内外相关文献作了梳理和评述,以期对未来相关领域的深入研究有所裨益。     

Local fiscal distress and investment efficiency of local SOEs

In this paper, we use A-share listed firms between 2002 and 2010 to investigate the relationship between local fiscal distress and the investment efficiency of local SOEs, along with the effect of corporate tax payments on this relationship. We find a positive relationship between the extent of local SOEs' overinvestment and the fiscal distress of the corresponding local government where the enterprise and this relationship become stronger for firms that pay fewer taxes. The pattern of underinvestment among local SOEs was in contrast,and these relationships do not exist for non-SOEs or central SOEs. Moreover,we find that expanding a firm's investment scale leads to an increase in total taxes paid, including income and turnover taxes, which further result in more local fiscal revenue. Overall, we conclude that local governments have an incentive to increase fiscal revenue when faced with fiscal distress by raising the investment scale of local SOEs and that the incentives and effects of such interventions appear to be stronger among firms that contribute less to local fiscal revenue.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.     

Local interests or centralized targets? How China’s local government implements the farmland policy of Requisition–Compensation Balance

The Requisition–Compensation Balance of Farmland (RCBF) is a strict policy in China aimed at controlling farmland conversion and replenishing farmland loss caused by urban expansion through a set of top-down quotas. These conflict with local interests, since land conversion from agriculture to construction is a key tool by which local governments attract investment and raise fiscal revenue. How should local authorities respond to this centralized policy? This paper presents a framework “quantity–quality–productivity–environment” to investigate local governments’ coping strategy and the holistic performance of the RCBF. The empirical study indicated that local jurisdictions placed economic and financial growth first and continued expropriating farmland on a large-scale, including land of high quality, for development. However, impelled by compulsory quotas and supervision from governments at higher levels, local authorities would partly replenish the quantity loss through farmland exploitation, regardless of the quality of the new cropland and the possible environmental impact. Consequently, fast requisition and unqualified compensation undermined the capacity of regional agricultural output. We suggest that the RCBF is not capable of guaranteeing food security, whilst farmland supplementation threatens the local environment.     

Transfer payments from the central government to the local governments and the local governments' efforts on taxation: taking China as an example

The influence of the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments on the local governments' efforts on taxation must be taken into consideration by every country for the design of the transfer payments. Based on the theoretical analysis on the influence of the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments on the local governments'payments, this paper indicates that the local governments'efforts on taxation depends on the demand elasticity of the district for public goods. It increases with the increase of the elasticityλ.Judge the degree of the local government's efforts on taxation by measureλ. After an empirical analysis on the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments from 2000 to 2004, thins paper gets the conclusion that the local governments'efforts on taxation abates with the increase of supporting payments or with the increase of the ratio of transfer payments to local willing public payments. Under specific circumstances, the higher the ratio of transfer payments to the local fiscal expenditure is, the smaller the local governments' efforts on taxation is under the central payments, whereas the higher the local income is, the higher the efforts is under the eentral payments. Based on this. this paper gives the meanmg of its corresponding policies.