Does food retail access moderate the impact of fruit and vegetable incentives for SNAP participants? Evidence from western Massachusetts

ObjectivesThis study investigates whether the response of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participants to a 30% incentive on fruit and vegetable spending varies with their access to food retailers.MethodsThe analysis exploits the random assignment of SNAP households in Hampden County, MA, to an intervention group that earned the incentive. Regression models for the impact of the incentive are augmented with measures of food retail access and interactions of random assignment status with food retail access. The main outcome—use of the SNAP benefit—is based on Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card transaction records.ResultsAlthough households that lived within a mile of a participating supermarket spent approximately $2.13 or 19% more per month on targeted fruits and vegetables at participating supermarkets than households that did not live within a mile of a participating supermarket, we found no evidence that the impact of the incentive on SNAP fruit and vegetable spending varies with distance to retailers.ConclusionsThese findings imply that incentives to purchase fruits and vegetables were equally efficacious for SNAP households with high and low access to food retailers.     

WHAT'S TO KNOW ABOUT LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS?

Abstract Experimental economics has grown as a discipline from near non‐existence 50 years ago to a full‐fledged field within economics in the present. Much of experimental economics research involves experimental methods as a tool, applied to problems in other fields of economics. However, some of this research is inward looking, focusing on questions of the methodology of experimental economics. In this note, I briefly discuss two methodological issues in experimental economics that might benefit from meta‐analysis: the pool from which experimental participants are drawn (university undergraduate students versus other populations) and the scale of monetary incentives faced by participants (large, small or hypothetical).     

Channel Incentives as Unilateral and Bilateral Governance Processes

Abstract

The authors investigate channel incentives as extra-contractual governance processes that maintain and extend marketing channel relationships. More specifically, instrumental incentives are monetary-based payments made by a manufacturer in a unilateral channel arrangement to motivate distributor compliance, while equity incentives are bilateral expectations of fair treatment that motivate both parties to continue to cooperate with one another. A model of the antecedents and performance consequences of channel incentives is conceptualized and tested on 314 marketing channel relationships using a structural equation modeling methodology. The findings support the conceptual model and suggest that unique facets of the channel relationship explain the type of incentive mechanism in use.     

论赫茨伯格双因素理论中激励因素在高校舞龙运动队建设中的应用

激励有激发和鼓励的意思,是指激发人的行为的心理过程,用各种有效的方法去调动个体的积极性和创造性,使个体努力去完成组织的任务,实现组织的目标①.有效的激励会点燃个体的激情,促使个体的行为动机更加强烈,让其产生超越自我和他人的欲望,并将潜在的巨大的内驱力释放出来,为组织的远景目标奉献自己的热情.舞龙运动本身的特殊性对运动员在大局意识、协作精神、团队凝聚力和服务精神要求极强.因此,本文通过舞龙运动的实践调查,提出激励因素在舞龙运动中对运动员激励的方向和意义.     

Constructive Pressures And Incentives To Reform: Globalization and its impact on public sector performance and governance in developing countries

Contrary to widespread pessimism regarding the effects of globalization on nation states and the quality of governance in developing countries, this contribution stresses that several of its features can be made instrumental, and be beneficial, in terms of public policy making and state capability. Four ‘constructive pressures’ stemming from globalization could be seized constructively by citizens and governments in the developing world: First, better informed and better connected citizens, and an emerging global civil society, demand improvements in service delivery, transparency, and participation. Second, subnational governments, often backed by local NGOs and businesses, and keen to attract foreign investment, increasingly exert pressure vis-à-vis central governments. Third, global investment strategies by private businesses increase the demand for appropriate institutional arrangements within developing countries as well as credible government policies. Although with mixed results, forth, International Organizations, in particular IFIs, have been addressing public sector modernization in developing countries, also sponsoring global public policy networks in critical areas. Moreover, policy coordination and cooperation among states increases significantly, constraining arbitrary action by governments. Globalization, thus, advances the discussion about, and the demand for, new institutional arrangements, clearly with new opportunities for improvements in state capability and governance.     

The marketability of bank assets, managerial rents and banking stability

Financial innovation and greater information availability have increased the tradability of bank assets and have reduced banks’ dependence on individual bank managers. We show that this can have two opposing consequences for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks’ capital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits – the most effective disciplining device – can be reduced, increasing banks’ resilience to adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers’ rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse implications for asset quality. Thus, the default risk of banks does not necessarily decline. We argue that this delivers a novel explanation for the origin of the recent subprime crisis.     

企业中的职位晋升理论研究进展

企业中的职位晋升有两个基本功能,它们是职位分配和提供激励,但企业中的职位晋升往往无法实现职位配置的效率,职位晋升不足和职位晋升过度是职位配置无效率的两种形式。企业中的职位晋升的激励功能包括激励员工努力工作和激励员工进行专用性人力资本投资。企业中的职位晋升可能无法同时实现这两个基本功能,这时就会产生职位晋升决策的动态不一致问题,对这个问题的解决途径的研究相对缺乏而且具有明显的局限性,强制退休计划能否成为职位晋升决策动态不一致问题的解决途径是未来值得深入探讨的方向。     

Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems

Consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m. This paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent. We present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal observed by the principal and on the agentʼs utility under which when m increases, induced effort (and hence productivity) falls. We also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level varies in m. We present an efficient algorithm for numerically calculating optimal contracts for given parameters and show that induced effort falls when m is increased in many cases even when our sufficient conditions fail.     

Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms

We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply effort inelastically. Thus, we assume away the problem of moral hazard in order to focus on that of adverse selection. We also consider a hierarchical structure of production in which the workers need to be organised in two tiers. We look for reward schemes which specify higher payments to workers who have been assigned to the top-level jobs when the principal detects no lies, distribute the entire output in all circumstances, and induce workers to revel their true abilities. We contemplate two scenarios. In the first one, each individual worker knows only her own type, while in the second scenario each worker also knows the abilities of all other workers. Our general conclusion is that the adverse selection problem can be solved in our context. However, the range of satisfactory reward schemes depends on the informational framework.     

Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis

We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the former case but strategic substitutes in the latter one. We tested our predictions in a laboratory experiment. The results confirm the effort ranking but show that in a severe crisis individuals deviate from equilibrium significantly stronger than in other situations. This behavior contradicts the benchmark model and leads to a five times higher survival probability of the department. We develop a new theoretical approach that might explain players׳ behavior.