证据推理在数学模型信度检验中的应用浅析

数学模型在解决实际问题中具有重要地位和作用。针对同一问题 ,不同的数学模型往往有不同的信度 ,有时甚至相差甚远。如何检验数学模型的信度 ,是我们经常遇到的问题。利用 Dempster-Shafer合成法则 ,给出了数学模型与经验知识的合成公式 ,它可以作为一种检验数学模型信度的可行而简便的方法。     

论灵胡太后与武则天佛教信仰的差异

灵胡太后与武则天两位显赫一时的女性生活在不同的时代环境之中,她们虽然都与佛教有着密切的关系,但其佛教信仰却有着显著的差异。灵胡太后的佛教信仰属于民俗型的信仰,而武则天的佛教信仰则兼具民俗型和经典佛教型的信仰性质。     

法律信仰的生成与培养

分析法律信仰首先应从其应然状态和实然状态入手,即理想中的信仰状态和现实中的信仰状态,得出社会公众对法律信仰崇尚程度的高低与其所付出的法律成本息息相关,进而对如何培养普通民众的法律信仰做出对策性分析。     

Random belief equilibrium in normal form games

In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust.     

社会实践活动是高职学生理想信念教育的有效途径

社会实践活动是大学生深入社会、了解社会、服务社会，在实践中培养和锻炼自我的一种活动，是大学生思想政治教育的重要环节。本文从社会实践活动的具体化、隐性化的教育特点以及高职学生自身特点和我院学生社会实践案例论述，社会实践活动是高职学生理想信念教育的有效途径。     

宗教信仰、政治身份与企业投资偏好

文章运用企业家宗教信仰的直接调查数据,考察了企业家的个人宗教信仰对企业投资活动的影响。研究发现,相对于研发型投资,有宗教信仰的企业家偏好于风险相对较小的关系型投资;不同类型的宗教信仰对企业投资偏好具有不同的影响,笃信东方宗教的企业家相对于笃信西方宗教的企业家更加偏好于关系型投资;企业家的宗教信仰对投资偏好的影响因企业家是否具有政治身份而有所不同,相对于有政治身份的企业家,没有政治身份的企业家的宗教信仰会更加显著地正向影响关系型投资,表明政治身份可能会弱化宗教信仰在关系型投资中的作用。     

中国梦视阈下边疆大学生理想信念教育探究

边疆高校学生是边疆民族地区未来建设的生力军,将引导着边疆民族地区未来发展的方向,因而对大学生进行理想信念教育是边疆高校思想政治教育的核心内容。在中国梦语境下加强边疆高校学生理想信念教育要拓新大学生理想信念教育的内容,改进大学生理想信念教育的方式,优化大学生理想信念教育的环境。     

Endogenous uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money

Summary. We study some implications of the Theory of Rational Beliefs to monetary policy. We show that monetary policy in a Rational Beliefs environment can have an important effect on the characteristics of economic fluctuations. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral unlike Rational Expectations Equilibria in which money is neutral and monetary policy is ineffective. Under Rational Beliefs Equilibria nominal prices and real output change not only in response to changes in the exogenous growth rate of money but also in response to changes in the state of beliefs. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria monetary shocks have real effects even when they are observed but are not fully anticipated. Furthermore, the non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve. When money “flutters, real output sputters” [8]. We show that Endogenous Uncertainty and the distribution of market beliefs are the major explanatory variables of such fluctuations. Under Rational Expectations monetary policy is ineffective because agents neutralize it by predicting correctly the effect of the policy. Under Rational Beliefs it is shown instead that inflation and recessions can be substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs. Received: January 14, 2002; revised version: April 5, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mordecai Kurz for his constant help and support. Most of the ideas developed hereby have been inspired by innumerable and fruitful discussions with him. I have also greatly benefited from helpful comments by Stanley Black, Luigi Campiglio, Carsten Nielsen and Ho-Mou Wu. I also received valuable remarks from participants at the V meeting of “The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory” held in Ischia, Italy, on July 2-8, 2001, where an initial draft of the present work was presented.     

国有企业高管马克思主义信仰对企业绩效的影响

信仰是对理论的高度信服,从而成为行动指南和行为准则,国有企业高管以马克思主义理论为做事准则,对企业绩效会产生积极影响。国有企业高管把马克思主义信仰内化为企业家精神,外化为企业文化。本文通过调查分析验证了马克思主义信仰通过企业家精神和企业文化的完全中介作用而影响企业绩效。     

Toward a theory of honesty and trust among communicating autonomous agents

This article outlines, through a number of examples, a method that can be used by autonomous agents to decide among potential messages to send to other agents, without having to assume that a message must be truthful and that it must be believed by the hearer. The main idea is that communicative behavior of autonomous agents is guided by the principle of economic rationality, whereby agents transmit messages to increase the effectiveness of interaction measured by their expected utilities. We are using a recursive, decision-theoretic formalism that allows agents to model each other and to infer the impact of a message on its recipient. The recursion can be continued into deeper levels, and agents can model the recipient modeling the sender in an effort to assess the truthfulness of the received message. We show how our method often allows the agents to decide to communicate in spite of the possibility that the messages will not be believed. In certain situations, on the other hand, our method shows that the possibility of the hearer not believing what it hears makes communication useless. Our method thus provides the rudiments of a theory of how honesty and trust could emerge through rational, selfish behavior.This research was supported, in part, by the Department of Energy under contract DG-FG-86NE37969, and by the National Science Foundation under grant IRI-9015423.