公司治理预警——基于ST上市公司的研究

本文所研究的公司治理预警系统,是试图从公司治理这个角度,结合公司治理评价技术和公司预警原理,来构造公司预警系统,并进行了实证研究.通过关注公司在整个治理活动中可能影响公司经营业绩、财务风险等的各种治理机制与治理行为特征和表现指针等,预测公司存在的风险和潜在的危机,以提前向公司示警,从而尽力避免可以导致公司经营失败的各种风险.     

上市公司财务困境预测模型再研究

本文以2005年上半年沪深两市中首次被ST的52家公司和52家非ST公司为研究对象，同时利用这些公司的会计信息和公司治理信息来构建财务困境预测模型。研究结果表明：（1）公司治理特征对公司陷入财务困境具有显著的影响；（2）同时利用了会计信息和公司治理信息构建的模型显著优越于仅仅利用会计信息构建的模型。这一方面说明，公司治理结构对公司的财务安全具有重要的影响，因此当前应进一步完善公司治理结构；另一方面也说明今后在研究和构建财务困境预测模型的时候，不仅要考虑会计信息，还应考虑公司治理信息等．以构建出更为有效的预测模型。     

Port devolution revisited: the case of regional ports and the role of lower tier governments

Most models of port governance have been developed to fit the largest ports, and tend to simplify the devolution process as one involving the transfer of jurisdiction from the State to the private sector. The devolution of smaller ports has been largely ignored as have transfers involving transfers from upper levels of government to lower tiers of public administration. Yet in many countries this has been the experience of port governance, where complex structures have arisen, many of which involve public control, in contrast to the strongly privatised process covered in the literature. The objective of this paper is to examine the process and consequences of changing port governance involving small and medium size ports where lower tiers of government are involved. It examines the recent devolution process in Canada and the decentralization policy in France. It brings to light the diversity of actors, public and private, who have come into play. The paper goes on to examine the challenges that have come about as a result of devolution that face the new port administrations. The paper concludes that existing models of port governance are incomplete and that the role of public administration in port governance is greater, albeit in a different form, than claimed in the existing literature.     

Gaps in Guidelines on Audit Committees

Since the 1940s, advocacy of the establishment of audit committees was undertaken by regulatory agencies, and subsequently by the accounting profession, and committees representing combinations of interest groups. Over time, this advocacy literature has reflected changing views about the key responsibilities of audit committees. Initially, audit committees were primarily concerned with negotiations with (or responding to) auditors, and reviewing financial statements prior to publication. Since the 1970s, formal guidelines or requirements have suggested additional responsibilities that involve oversight of the internal management of corporations. There is a pattern of renewed enthusiasm for enhanced corporate governance and for a stronger role for audit committees following spates of corporate crashes or disasters. Nevertheless, some of the lessons from those events continue to be ignored, so that arguably there are gaps in contemporary guidelines on audit committees. These gaps concern the need for audit committees to review the structure and design of delegations, and the adequacy of financial and operational information being provided to senior management and boards (particularly concerning subsidiaries and associated entities). These gaps are also reflected in the charters of the audit committees of Australia's top 200 listed entities. However, in some respects, Australian practice has gone beyond the recommendations embodied in recent guidelines. Drawing from literature and practice, this article proposes a model charter which, if adopted, may contribute to improvements in the effectiveness of audit committees.     

不同企业治理模式下的企业创新比较及启示

创新是企业谋求生存的灵魂,是企业实现持续发展的源泉。企业创新是企业制度、组织结构的互动,不同企业治理模式,影响创新参与者的职责安排和权力分布,从而使企业创新呈现不同的特征。本文系统地分析了不同治理结构下的企业创新各纬度的不同特点,并从中得到一些有益的启示。     

大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应--来自1999-2003年中国上市公司的证据

鉴于公司的财务行为受到公司治理因素的影响,本文从公司治理的角度,基于国内外的相关研究提出六个研究假设,然后构建回归模型,依据1999年—2003年中国上市公司数据进行假设检验,具体探讨前五大股东持股比例以及在此基础上大股东之间的监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响,研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的特殊现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”,探索其中的影响机制和制衡机制。研究显示,前五大股东的持股比例、大股东控制力(或联合控制力)、大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出五点建议,试图限制控股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利,以保护中小股东的正当权益。     

治理结构与市场结构：一个金融创新的制度视角

金融创新是商业银行通过实现规模经济和范围经济,获得超额利润的必由之路,但是只有在健全的法人治理结构(总行与分支机构间信息对称、监督有效)下,商业银行才有创新的动力;即使商业银行存在创新的内部激励,在当前商业银行寡头市场条件下的“资金上存”机制会削弱其创新积极性;商业银行金融创新必须立足于改革内外激励机制,实现可持续发展。     

社交媒体上“用嘴投票”对管理层自愿性业绩预告的影响

本文研究了投资者 “股吧”讨论这种“用嘴投票”机制能否发挥治理作用进而促进管理层进行自愿性业绩预告。用上市公司股吧中的发帖量、阅读量和评论量来衡量投资者“用嘴投票”的参与程度,研究发现投资者“用嘴投票”参与度越高,管理层进行盈余预测自愿性披露的概率越大,且更愿意及时披露业绩下滑等坏消息。进一步研究发现,投资者“用嘴投票”是通过对股价产生影响、引发监管层关注和招致媒体报道这三个渠道对管理层产生预警进而发挥治理作用。且这一治理机制在管理层受到互联网信息影响可能性越大、公司中小股东户数越多以及论坛的讨论内容越负面时更为显著。     

The impact of regulation and ownership structure on market orientation in the tourism industry in China

The nature of market orientation and its impact on business performance and other related outcomes have been extensively researched in a range of service contexts including tourism. In contrast, our understanding of the factors that influence market orientation is still limited. This paper reports on a study that contributes to our understanding of the determinants of market orientation within the tourism sector by focusing specifically on the role played by two strategically important variables, namely government regulation and ownership structure. The study analyses two national samples of hotels and travel services in the rapidly growing tourism industry in China. The hotel sector has been open to foreign investment for two decades and has a diversified ownership structure, whereas the travel services sector has been dominated by government owned firms and relatively closed to foreign investment. The results of the survey suggest that of the two new antecedents, only government regulation has a significant role to play in driving market orientation. Internally, access to appropriate managerial and marketing capabilities was identified as a significant predictor of the development of market orientation.     

论股权泛化条件下的内部人控制

普遍认为国有控股上市公司内部人控制严重的根本原因是一股独大，我们对此提出异议。本文首先利用博弈论和实证结果指出股权集中度与内部人控制强度是负相关的；然后通过实证研究中国国有控股上市公司的股权集中度和内部人控制，以及公司治理效率，说明中国的情况似乎与上述规律相反；最后提出了股权泛化的概念，证明由于股权泛化，国有控股上市公司实际上没有大股东，其内部人控制极其严重是股权集中度与内部人控制强度负相关规律的必然表现。因此，国有控股上市公司内部人控制严重的原因恰恰是因为没有大股东。