Political booms and currency crises

This paper shows evidence that political booms, defined as the rise in governments’ popularity, are associated with a higher likelihood of currency crises. The reasoning behind this finding is that prudent economic policies to address underlying weaknesses in the economy may be political costly for incumbent governments in the short-term. Hence, popularity-concerned governments may not have enough incentives to take such corrective actions in a timely manner. This approach, in turn, can deteriorate economic fundamentals and increase related risks in the economy which can eventually lead to crises. This paper sheds light on this phenomenon in the case of currency crises, suggesting that currency crises can be viewed as “political booms gone bust” events. Moreover, it finds that higher international reserves, higher exports, and a higher degree of financial openness alleviate the effect of political booms on currency crises.     

The International Politics of Reactive Currency Statecraft: Japan’s Reaction to the Rise of the Chinese Renminbi

This study analyses how a state’s reactive currency statecraft – its strategic reaction to an international currency issued by a foreign state – is shaped, by devoting special attention to its broad foreign policy stance towards the state issuing that international currency, with a main empirical focus on the Japanese case with regard to the Chinese renminbi. This research argues that a state uses its policy related to a foreign international currency as a diplomatic means of managing its political relationship with the state issuing that currency, while also showing that in general most market actors are not greatly interested in their governments’ policies regarding foreign international currencies, especially those that are newly internationalising ones. This study finds as well that the conventional notion of ‘competition’ between international currencies does not necessarily affect a state’s reactive currency statecraft, even if its own currency is a major international one. All of this suggests that the inter-state politics between the state issuing an international currency and foreign states does have a crucial impact on the currency’s international use, especially during its early stages of internationalisation. It also implies that a state’s reactive currency statecraft can be fluid, depending upon the directions of its foreign policy.     

Dynamic risk spillovers and portfolio risk management between precious metals and global foreign exchange markets

This study examines portfolio management and risk spillovers between four major precious metals (gold, silver, palladium and platinum) and 20 important U.S. exchange markets. To this end, we employ the multivariate DECO-GARCH model and the spillover index developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014, 2016) to examine the spillovers between those metal prices and the exchange rates and design portfolios and hedging strategies using different risk measures. The results show evidence of weak average conditional equicorrelations among the considered markets over time, excluding the turbulent 2008–2010 period. Furthermore, the precious metals (excluding platinum) and the currencies (with the exception of the Australian, Brazilian, Denmark, Euro, Mexican, Norwegian, New Zealand and Swedish currencies) are net receivers of shocks. Finally, the four precious metals provide strong risk and downside risk reductions, underscoring the usefulness of including precious metals in a traditional foreign exchange-dominated portfolio.     

Do currency undervaluations affect the impact of inflation on growth?

In this paper, we investigate how the level of currency undervaluations affects the effect of inflation on growth in a sample of 62 countries over the 1980–2015 period. While previous studies find a positive effect of an undervalued currency, we show that higher currency undervaluations reinforce the contractionary effect of inflation on growth. As an undervalued currency is associated with supplementary inflation pressures arising from a cost-push inflation phenomenon and economy overheating, growth is thus penalized. This result is shown to be robust to the exclusion of currency crises episodes from our sample, and dependent of the development level of countries. Specifically, it holds in the case of emerging countries, but not for developing economies. Consequently, policies based on undervaluations should not be encouraged for emerging economies as they tend to reinforce the contractionary effect of inflation on growth.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

The Euro Illusion in Consumers’ Price Estimation: An Italian–Irish Comparison in the Third Year of the Euro

The euro illusion is a transient phenomenon that consists of currency-related asymmetries in the intuitive judgment of product prices made by consumers. The results of a cross-country study in the third year after the introduction of the euro show a strong price estimation asymmetry in a country with an extreme exchange rate (Italy) and a weaker effect in a country in which the nominal values of the new and the old currency are much closer (Ireland). These results rule out proposed explanations of the euro illusion in price estimation that assume the sole influence of plausible anchors (reference prices stored in memory within the plausible price range), supporting instead accounts also endorsing the role of implausible anchors (reference prices outside the plausible price range). Beyond contributing to our theoretical understanding of the euro illusion, this research starts to unveil the interplay between structural factors (i.e., the currency exchange rate) and psychological mechanisms that produce long-lasting difficulties for consumers after a monetary changeover.

东亚区域货币联盟实践、前景与对策

东亚区域货币联盟得到大多数理论研究的支持,各国政府也表现出较大的兴趣,东盟10+3货币互换安排和亚洲债券基金是东亚货币金融合作的两个标志性事件。在可预见的将来,东亚有可能出现某种松散的货币联盟,以流动性提供机制为核心、建立相对灵活的汇率稳定机制、以其他经济领域一体化为基础、保持“亚洲传统”的特色,是东亚货币联盟的四大特点。中国应该采取积极、灵活的政策,在全面经济金融合作的基础上支持区域货币联盟,并在其中发挥应有的作用。     

析我国外汇占款对冲策略

根据我国的经济运行情况,分析固定汇率、资本流动与货币政策自主的“三元困境”在我国的具体表现。指出在经常项目和资本项目持续顺差的情况下,货币政策与外汇储备增长的矛盾。说明为控制流通中的货币而被动进行的单向对冲操作的成本昂贵,并且是以牺牲货币政策自主为代价的,还易积蕴金融风险,酿致恶性后果。证实了外汇占款对冲策略的不可持久性,为此必须改革现行的固定汇率制度,并放松资本管制。     

基于风险选择与投资收益的外汇储备币种结构研究

随着外汇储备规模的不断增加,国家外汇储备投资的风险偏好亦会发生相应的变化。借鉴 J. H.Makin(1971)的方法,构建外汇储备币种结构配置理论模型,讨论在效用最大化的情况下,储备资产投资如何在安全性、流动性和盈利性三原则间进行权衡。假设外汇储备仅投资于美元和欧元两种币种资产,选取2000年初~2014年第三季度的10年期美国国债和欧元区公债季度数据,运用协整分析、格兰杰检验等方法进行的实证研究发现：储备货币在外汇储备中的比重与储备货币收益率及其三阶矩显著正相关,国家外汇储备投资总体而言是风险规避型的。     

On the predictability of the distribution of excess returns in currency markets

This paper investigates the predictability of foreign exchange (FX) volatility and liquidity risk factors on returns to the carry trade, an investment strategy that borrows in currencies with low interest rates and invests in currencies with high interest rates. Previous studies have suggested that this predictability could have been spuriously accounted for due to the persistence of the predictors. The analysis uses a predictive quantile regression model developed by Lee (2016) that allows for persistent predictors. We find that predictability changes remarkably across the entire distribution of currency excess returns. Predictability weakens substantially in the left tail once persistence is accounted for, implying a moderate negative predictive relation between FX volatility risk and carry trade returns. By contrast, it becomes stronger in the right tail. Furthermore, we provide evidence that FX volatility risk still dominates liquidity risk after controlling for persistence. These findings suggest that the persistence of the predictors needs to be taken into account when one measures predictability in currency markets. Finally, out-of-sample forecast performance is also presented.