Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

严寒地区高速铁路混凝土基床聚氨酯保温特性试验研究

基于严寒区京沈客专朝阳试验段路基基床的温度监测资料分析,研究不同厚度聚氨酯保温板对高速铁路路基混凝土基床温度变化特性影响.测试结果表明:①铺设聚氨酯保温板能够有效阻断严寒区环境与路基基床间的热量传递,保温效果与板厚相关;②地温大多数时间呈阳高阴低现象,同时阴、阳坡路基温差波动幅度随埋深逐渐减小;③基床表层阴、阳面各测点的温度变化起始时间一致,而阴面的冻结时间比阳面晚一个月.由此表明,保温板能够有效降低环境与混凝土道床之间的热交换,但是对路基阴、阳坡的影响存在差异.建议在严寒地区高速铁路路基阳、阴坡可以采取不同厚度的聚氨酯保温板,减小阴阳坡地温差异,保持季冻土路基温度变化稳定.     

Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of board directors with foreign experience (BDFEs) on stock price crash risk. We find that BDFEs help reduce crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including a firm fixed effects model, controlling for possibly omitted variables, and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, we find that the negative association between BDFEs and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with more agency problems, weaker corporate governance, and less overall transparency. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of board directors matter in determining stock price crash risk.     

城市化进程中的乡村衰落现象：成因及治理——“乡村振兴战略”实施视角的分析

党的十九大报告提出了“实施乡村振兴战略”。乡村振兴是“中国梦”不可或缺的组成部分，城市化进程中的乡村衰落现象不容忽视，乡村问题的解决关系到乡村振兴战略能否实现和现代乡村能否建成。为此，剖析了我国乡村衰落的成因，探索了乡村振兴战略落实的办法，提出了现代乡村建设的可能路径。     

What have we learnt about board gender diversity as a business strategy? The appointment of board subcommittees

This paper explores whether a board's gender diversity influences the voluntary formation of its board subcommittees. Female board directorship may become a business strategy for firms if it affects the appointment of board subcommittees. We hypothesize that the voluntary creation of board subcommittees is affected by the presence of female directors on boards; the presence of independent, executive, and institutional female directors; and the proportion of shares held by female directors on boards. Board gender diversity has been measured as a proportion and with Blau's index. The results show that independent female directors are positively associated with the likelihood of voluntarily setting up all or some of the committees and a supervision and control committee. The presence of executive female directors negatively influences the probability of forming all or some of the committees, an executive committee and a supervision and control committee. The percentage of shares held by female directors has a positive effect on the voluntary creation of an executive committee. The findings also report that women directors and institutional female directors do not contribute to the voluntary creation of board subcommittees. Our evidence shows that female board directorship impacts the demand of internal control mechanisms such as board subcommittees, suggesting that firms should take it into account as a business strategy. The main implications derived from this research are relevant for Spanish policymakers and researchers because board gender diversity may play a significant role in the decision‐making processes of firms and may influence firms' outcomes.     

External regulation,independent director attendance,and governance effects

In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.     

The heterogeneous relationship between board social ties and corporate environmental responsibility in an emerging economy

Firms in emerging economies are faced with multiple, incompatible institutional forces in their environmental activities. Which of these forces will be dominant and instantiated within an organization is partly determined by the social relationships that a firm maintains with external actors. This paper investigates the relationship between board social ties and the level of environmental responsibility undertaken by firms in China, an emerging economy, by categorizing board social ties into three types in terms of the three isomorphic forces in the institutional field (coercive, normative and mimetic). Drawing on institutional and agency theories, using a sample of listed firms in environmentally sensitive industries, and a generalized least squares regression method, the results provide empirical evidence that ties that are linked to coercive and normative forces (i.e., political organizations and universities) are related to a higher level of environmental responsibility; however, those that are linked to mimetic forces (i.e., industrial peers) have a negative association with environmental responsibility, which is mitigated by CEO power. These findings suggest that the heterogeneous effects of board social ties on environmental responsibilities experienced by firms in a context of environmentalism are at an early stage.     

Influence of acquirer boards on M&A value creation: Evidence from Continental Europe

We examine how the size and the composition of acquirer boards are associated with shareholder abnormal returns for 2,230 M&As made by listed firms in Continental Europe. Although board size proves insignificant, our findings do offer some evidence as to a beneficial effect of board diversity on M&A value creation. Gender diversity appears marginally positively associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal returns. The fraction of foreign directors is in general not significantly positive, unless the rule of law in the acquirer country is weak. Nonetheless, nationality diversity in the board turns out harmful in purely domestic takeovers. The influence of age diversity is marginally positive, yet only in domestic and horizontal takeovers. Next, the fraction of independent directors has a robust positive effect on the acquirer CAR, while directors with multiple board appointments prove valuable especially through preventing firms from pursuing poor takeovers. Finally, CEO duality is detrimental only in industry‐diversifying deals initiated by acquirers that are not controlled by an individual or a family shareholder. Any negative CEO‐duality effect is mitigated when the acquirer‐country rule of law is strong.