A theory of operational cash holding,endogenous financial constraints,and credit rationing

This paper develops a theory of operational cash holding. Liquidity shocks due to delayed payments must be financed using cash or short-term debt. Debt holders provide an irrevocable credit line given a firm's expected insolvency risk, and equity holders select optimum cash holding. The model demonstrates the trade-off between cash holding and investing in fixed assets. Introducing uncertain cash flows leads to precautionary cash holding if debt holders impose financial constraints. Precautionary cash holding, in turn, reduces insolvency risk enhancing access to short-term finance. The theory shows that credit rationing can occur in the absence of market frictions. Using U.S. data from 1998 to 2012, empirical findings suggest that the decline in credit lines has contributed to the increase in cash holding in line with theoretical predictions.     

A Reexamination of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss Model

We reexamine Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing by simultaneously considering adverse selection and moral hazard. If returns of the projects are ranked by first‐order stochastic dominance, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard exists. If the projects have equalized expected returns, moral hazard does not exist, and credit rationing due to adverse selection occurs under extreme conditions. If the projects are ranked by second‐order stochastic dominance (SSD), adverse selection and moral hazard may coexist, logically restoring credit rationing, but SSD imposes strict limitations on lenders’ ability to classify borrowers. In general, our results do not support significance of credit rationing.     

ON THE PROFITABILITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN

A previous study finds that in a market where a manufacturer faces uncertain demand and sells to consumers through competitive retailers, the manufacture wishes to support adequate retail inventories by imposing resale price maintenance (RPM). I show that if retail inventories are allocated to consumers through first‐come‐first‐served rule rather than efficient rationing rule in the game with unconstrained retail competition, imposing RPM may not be profitable. It may not encourage more retail inventories either. RPM may also lower consumer surpluses and social welfare. This study casts some doubt on the demand uncertainty theory that supports RPM.     

我国小企业的紧融资约束

紧融资约束是我国大多数小企业进一步发展所面临的瓶颈问题。其直接原因是信贷配给制下国有银行的自利性歧视,如企业规模歧视、治理结构歧视、所有权歧视、资金需求歧视和交易费用歧视等。其根本原因是我国的金融抑制和金融发展的水平偏低。重要的是,金融抑制往往是金融不发达的重要原因。因此,解决的办法主要有加强信用评价与管理、发展信用担保业、加强对国有银行贷款行为的规制、放松对民间融资的规制和在银行业中引入私人小银行等。其中,第三条措施是根源于国有银行的企业性质的,也是可以立即执行并在短期内见效的解决办法。     

The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).     

Credit market failure intervention: Do government sponsored small business credit programs enrich poorer areas?

Using local market employment rates as our measure of economic performance, we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. Furthermore, the intensity of this correlation is much larger in low-income markets. Indeed, our results suggest that this correlation is positive and significant only in low-income markets. This result has important implications for public policy in general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular.

中国农村金融市场中非价格信贷配给的理论和实证分析

本文建立农村金融市场中非价格信贷配给的理论分析框架,基于特殊设计的直接诱导式询问方法,对农户面临的非价格信贷配给机制进行调查和识别,并实证分析影响非价格信贷配给机制的因素。研究发现,农村利率市场化改革以来,农村金融机构并没有将灵活的利率差异化管理作为弥补潜在贷款损失的手段。当前农村金融市场中多种类型的非价格信贷配给机制并存,农村金融机构的信贷合约特征和放贷行为偏好使得一部分农户被配给出信贷市场,一部分农户主动退出信贷市场。农村金融机构倾向于与农村地区少数生产规模较大、具有稳定收入和身份特征的农户建立稳定的、以重复放贷为基础的信贷供给机制,不具备这些特征的农户将面临配给,这与利率管制时期的放贷行为并无本质差异。未来须调整仅仅以增加农村金融供给解决融资难题的改革思路,深入到市场结构、信贷合约和产品创新以及包括公司治理、风险甄别和内部管理机制在内的农村金融机构治理机制等微观层面的改革。     

中国转轨经济中的银行资产选择行为分析——一个将制度性因素内生化的银行资产选择模型

本文立足于中国转轨经济中的信贷市场,强调制度性因素对银行贷款决策和资产选择行为的影响,通过建立一个银行资产选择模型,将这些制度性因素的影响内生化,利用广义的边际分析,分析了在不确定性条件下,中国商业银行贷款变动的原因以及由此导致的结构性信贷配给机制,并且指出,在中国以银行间接金融为主导的金融市场上,银行决策者在不确定性条件下根据自身的偏好和效用函数而作出的相对独立的贷款决策和资产选择行为,不仅可能导致货币政策失效,还可能对经济运行和经济增长的质量产生独立的影响.     

宏观经济波动的微观基础:基于股权配给角度的分析

当宏观经济进入衰退阶段,由于上市公司的股权配给,上市公司投资的边际破产成本上升,导致上市公司的投资下降,在投资乘数原理和加速数原理的相互作用下,会使宏观经济衰退更加严重,宏观经济陷入经济衰退与股权配给相互作用的恶性循环中,宏观经济衰退的程度会进一步加大。当宏观经济进入繁荣阶段,呈现与上述相反的过程,会导致宏观经济持续过度繁荣。因此,股权配给是宏观经济波动的加速器。我国的现实是,从微观角度分析,上市公司具有强烈的股权融资偏好;从宏观上看,政府进行股权配给。两者的共同作用,使股权配给具有平抑宏观经济波动的功能。     

基于安全储备量的社区卫生站疫苗配给优化研究

为了确保社区卫生服务站对于儿童疫苗的安全储备量以及配给成本最低,运用存储论的经济订货批量模型对疫苗的配给进行了优化,根据基层卫生服务的宗旨,实现了特定概率下的疫苗供给,对大多数社区卫生服务站的疫苗或类似的基药配给有参考价值。