管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。     

债务违约、社会责任与政府支持

转型期中国，地方国有企业作为地区经济发展的一股中坚力量，当其发生债务违约时，作为实际控制人的地方政府究竟是否愿意提供支持，会优先选择哪些企业提供支持，政府的支持行为是否会影响到信贷资源的配置效率呢?为得到验证，文章选取2007-2016年沪深A股地方国有上市企业作为研究样本，实证分析了地方国企发生债务违约后，地方政府的支持行为及其对信贷资源配置效率的影响。研究结论表明：第一，地方国企发生债务违约后，地方政府会提供更多的"支持"，且支持额度与债务违约额呈显著正相关关系；第二，债务违约前，承担了更多社会责任（环保投资、捐赠以及就业等）的地方国企，在债务违约后可相应地获得更多的地方政府支持；第三，违约企业，尤其是得到更多政府支持的违约企业可获得更多的信贷资源，而其经营业绩却往往更差。由此表明政府干预一定程度上降低了信贷资源配置效率。     

Network structure,portfolio diversification and systemic risk

We investigate the effect of portfolio diversification on banking systemic risk, where the network effect is incorporated. We analyze three kinds of interbank networks, namely, random networks, small-world networks and scale-free networks. We show that the effect of portfolio diversification on banking systemic risk depends on interbank network structures and shock types. First, systemic risk increases first and then reduces with the increase of the level of portfolio diversification in the case of the individual shock. Second, in the case of the systemic shock, systemic risk reduces with the increases of the level of portfolio diversification. Third, banking systems with scale-free network structures are the most stable, and those with small-world network structures are the most vulnerable.     

A truly global crisis? Evidence from contagion dependence across international REIT markets

This study examines the global nature of the recent crisis under bivariate Markov-switching models for pre- and post-crisis periods using the breakpoint of August 9, 2007. It quantifies international synchronization of boom-bust regime switches to investigate contagion-type dynamic comovements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Global REIT markets display persistent bust regimes from September 2008 to May 2009, whereas the regime-switching patterns are not significant in the pre-crisis period. The results provide new evidence for global REIT contagion phenomena and suggest greater difficulties in diversifying risks across global REIT markets during the post-crisis period.     

Media coverage and investment efficiency

We examine the effect of media coverage on firm-level investment efficiency. We find that media coverage reduces under-investment but increases over-investment. The negative effect of media coverage on under-investment is more pronounced in firms affected by greater information asymmetry and poorer corporate governance. The positive effect of media coverage on over-investment is driven by media-induced CEO overconfidence. Additional results show that both investment- and non-investment-related news coverage decrease under-investment, while non-investment-related news coverage is more influential in increasing over-investment. In general, higher news optimism is associated with less under-investment but more over-investment. Moreover, media coverage affects investment efficiency through its information dissemination rather than information creation function. Collectively, our results suggest that firms’ media visibility promotes more over-investment than under-investment.     

外商直接投资对工业技术溢出效应的分析——基于江苏省与广东省的比较研究

江苏和广东是我国FDI流入最为集中的地区,有关资料显示,两个地区的外资流入量占我国外资流入量的60%左右,同时流入两省2/3的资金流向工业。本文检验了1995～2006年间江苏与广东的外商直接投资对工业的技术外溢效应,同时检验了FDI外溢效应影响因素人力资本、贸易开放度和R&D对外溢效应的影响。研究认为,从总体上看两省利用FDI有正的溢出效应,但并不显著。     

人力资本投资中对职业教育培训的投资分析

职业教育培训投资是人力资本投资中很重要的一项投资。本文从人力资本投资的分析入手 ,分析了其中的职业教育培训投资的必要性和重要性以及应该采取的措施。     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.     

Repatriation taxes, repatriation strategies and multinational financial policy

Several investment-repatriation strategies are added to the standard model of a multinational in which an affiliate is located in a low-tax country and is limited to two alternatives: repatriating taxable dividends to the parent or investing in its own real operations. In our model, affiliates can invest in passive assets, which the parent can borrow against, or in related affiliates which can be used as vehicles for tax-favored repatriations. We show analytically how the availability of alternative strategies can effect real investment throughout the worldwide corporation. We use firm level data for US multinationals to test for the importance of alternative strategies. The evidence is generally consistent with the theory, particularly the strategies using related affiliates.     

Labor income and risky investments: can part-time farmers compete?

In the developed countries, a majority of farm households receive at least as much income from nonfarm sources as from the farm. Such part-time farms have survived inspite of lower returns than full-time farms. This paper considers when lower returns to part-time farming could be compensated by risk-reduction due to diversification of income sources. The paper uses a dynamic portfolio choice model with labor income. The model and results could be applied in other contexts as well.