Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

A general framework for the analysis of fiscal equalisation systems

This paper shows that, despite the existing diversity of models of fiscal equalisation, there is a common underlying structure that links all of them. To this end, a framework of analysis sufficiently general so as to encompass the main schemes present in the literature is developed. This allows to uncover the common features of these schemes and to identify more readily the origin and nature of their differences. The formal approach is complemented with a numerical simulation of the models considered. The paper also shows the usefulness of the approach for reform policy and suggests two new models.JEL Classification: H2, H7I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions to a previous draft of this article.     

The CE-mark and the new European approach to product law: a system of fundamental legal safety requirements and technical specification standards

European product law consists of three parts: product liability law, a general product safety regulation and an increasing number of provisions with requirements on product group level. In recent years this third part has been revised in order to speed up the completion of the European single market. This article describes the development from the negative integration of member states’ markets to the positive integration by supranational law. The CE-mark is the symbol of the new approach to the harmonization of European product safety requirements. The modular system of conformity assessment is an important characteristic of harmonization-based product law. Advantages and disadvantages of the new European product law are discussed from the perspective of ensuring the future of the consumers’ basic right to safety in an increasingly global and therefore international market.     

Rules of Origin in North–South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA

All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North–South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North–South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal–agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.     

Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation

Abstract

We report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks.